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Abstract 
This study analyzes Hillary Rodham Clinton’s key speeches and debate performances during the 
2008 Democrat presidential primary. Specifically, a rhetorical criticism of Clinton’s discourse, 
utilizing Bitzer’s “rhetorical situation,” indicates that Clinton’s discourse was highly constrained 
by her gender, and supports the theory that women candidates experience tangible double binds. 
Specifically, Clinton’s rhetoric was hindered in terms of her audience because of her initial status 
as the frontrunner, the erosion of her female voting base, her lack of response to sexism, her use 
of negative campaigning, and her appeals to super delegates. The exigencies identified in 
Clinton’s discourse reflect tangible, gendered double binds as she approached the historic nature 
of her candidacy, universal health care, the war in Iraq, and her general election strategy. Finally, 
the analysis indicates her attempts to establish experience, her negative reputation, Obama’s key 
campaign strategies, and Bill Clinton’s presence on the trail created constraints. 
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Chapter One: Introduction/Rationale/Review of Literature 
Over seventy years ago when George Gallup first asked voters whether or not they would 
consider voting for a woman for president, an overwhelming majority (65%) said that they 
would not (Clift & Brazaitis, 2000). Now, as the first decade of the 21st century comes to an end, 
there are only a small percentage of voters who would be unwilling to accept the “fairer sex” in 
the role of commander in chief (Streb, et al., 2008). Unfortunately, women in America, as well as 
those in the vast majority of nations around the world, remain largely unrepresented or under-
represented in high levels of political office. According to the UN 2000 report “The World’s 
Women 2000,” “women today are fewer than one-tenth of the world’s cabinet ministers and hold 
fewer than one-fifth of all subministerial positions” (in Norris & Inglehart, 1998, p. 245). This 
lack of representation marginalizes the majority of world citizens, and American citizens 
specifically, by keeping women out of the public sphere of governmental representation. 
Furthermore, it should also give scholars of political communication and political science pause, 
as this lack of representation is occurring at a time when the vast majority of people feel that 
more and more tangible barriers to women’s equality are coming down, and that “equal 
treatment is an accomplished fact” (Rhode, 2003, p. 6). 
 In the United States, the lack of political representation is most striking, considering that 
women make up a majority of the population yet enjoy no such majority in elective office. 
According to the Eagleton Institute of Politics’ Center for American Women in Politics (2010), 
only forty women have ever held a federal level cabinet position, and only two percent (or 256) 
of all federal congressional representatives since 1789 have been women. The center also 
indicated that women currently hold only 22.9% of all statewide elected offices, and only six 
women are currently serving as governors of states in the U.S. The Eagleton Institute also 
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reported that in 2010, only 24.4% of the 7,382 state legislators in the United States are women, 
and that women represent only 17.6% of mayors of large cities. This stark lack of representation 
in numbers has led several scholars, including Rosenthal (1998a), to note, “For much of the 
nation’s history, women have largely been invisible as political leaders” (p. 161). Still, today 
more than at any other time in American history, women are making strides. Hillary Rodham 
Clinton is a prominent example of a woman breaking many barriers: she is the only First Lady in 
history to win high elective office as the junior U. S. Senate seat in New York in 2001, and she 
was also the first viable major party female candidate for the presidency. Nancy Pelosi is 
currently serving as the first woman Speaker of the U. S. House of Representatives. Additionally, 
the United States has had three female Secretaries of State in the last three administrations, a 
compelling fact given the current international crises with nations that do not seemingly hold 
positive views of female governmental leadership or females in general. Still, these examples, 
while worthy of praise for their symbolic representation, are not the norm.  
Reflecting on Hillary Clinton specifically, Kathleen Hall Jamieson once noted, “When 
the history of Hillary is written, it will say that she was caught in a historical time warp…At a 
time when a majority of American women work outside the home in all professions, she thought 
she would be accepted. But Americans are still conflicted about the roles women play in public 
and private life” (in Clift & Brazaitis, 2000). When Hillary Clinton began her campaign for the 
presidency in January 2007, many Americans were hopeful that she would be the first woman to 
break the “ultimate” glass ceiling and become the first female president in our nation’s history. 
Clinton’s ability to blaze new trails for women compelled Marie Wilson, who created the 
nonpartisan White House Project to help women and teenage girls see themselves as future 
officeholders, to note, “Seeing…Hillary Clinton running for the presidency is really powerful for 
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girls…[because, after all]…you can’t be what you can’t see” (Evans, 2007). It is the powerful 
symbolic nature of Clinton’s campaign—as the first viable female candidate for the presidency 
in the United States—that requires a clearer examination of her campaign. Was Clinton a victim 
of stereotypes and expectations associated with her gender, or was something else at work in her 
campaign communication that led to her failure? Seeking an explanation to these basic questions 
is one of the major goals of this study. 
Initially, Clinton was a powerful force on the campaign trail. Until her loss in the Iowa 
caucuses, Clinton was ahead in fund raising, and every major poll had her solidly ahead of her 
most immediate rivals Barack Obama and John Edwards (Crowley, et al., 2007; Healy, 2007c). 
Still, history tells the tale succinctly: Clinton, though she did win several races in key primary 
states, eventually conceded in June 2008 to her chief rival, Barack Obama, and her quest for the 
presidency ended in defeat. Why this outcome occurred is debatable, though several scholars 
have already offered some educated guesses. Torrens (2009) echoed the belief of many political 
reporters and pundits in claiming that Hillary lost the primary contest because of the negative 
associations derived from her marriage to former president Bill Clinton and the varying 
embarrassments he caused on the campaign trail. Similarly, Schnoebelen, Carlin, and Warner 
(2009) argued that the negative gendered connotations and assumptions that bound Hillary to the 
role of the First Lady made it impossible to negotiate the tension between her overtly feminine 
roles in politics with the masculine demands of her presidential aspirations. Both of these studies 
and several others, featured in Theodore Sheckles’ edited volume dedicated to enumerating the 
reasons Hillary Clinton lost her bid for the presidency, tie Clinton’s loss to her gender in clear 
ways. It deserves mentioning that this edited volume, like many other academic studies centered 
on Clinton, served primarily to draw readers’ attention to one key issue that served as a barrier to 
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Clinton’s political ambitions: the fact that she was a woman trying to operate in the ultimately 
masculine world of American politics.  
This study adopts a similar standpoint, affirming the idea that Clinton’s gender played a 
crucial factor in her defeat. However, instead of simply acknowledging this idea as fact, as 
several sources that will be presented later often do, this study seeks a broader explanation 
through Clinton’s rhetorical style and tactics during her campaign. Simply put, the goal of this 
study is to describe and critique the rhetoric used by Clinton to overcome the myriad rhetorical 
problems that she faced during the eighteen-month primary race for the Democratic Party 
nomination. I argue that the lengthy race, viewed through Bitzer’s lens of the ‘rhetorical 
situation’ presented Clinton with many rhetorical problems given her distinct nature as the first 
viable female contender for the highest office in the United States. I also argue that it is 
necessary to investigate and critique the rhetorical situation of the 2008 Democratic primary and 
how Clinton addressed the constraints posed therein. Such analysis offers a more holistic view of 
Clinton’s rhetoric and demonstrates the tangible barriers facing many women as they seek high 
elective office. Thus, to accomplish the general goal of describing the rhetorical situation of 
Clinton’s campaign as a prelude to a critique of her rhetorical response to the existing 
constraints, this study examines several of Clinton’s key campaign speeches and Democratic 
primary debate performances. Specifically, I assert that Clinton’s gender was the crucial factor 
governing her rhetorical situation, and that gender conventions, stereotypes, and expectations are 
the basis for understanding the audience, exigencies and resulting constraints. And while this 
study does not proceed from the assumption that gender was the only factor in the 2008 
Democratic Primary campaign, I do contend that gender was certainly one of the most crucial 
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factors in terms of Clinton’s specific rhetorical situation and her response or lack of response to 
that aspect of the rhetorical situation helps explain the electoral outcome. 
Before the specific methodology and artifacts for study are presented in Chapter Two, the 
specific rationale and review of literature is offered to frame the constraints posed by Clinton’s 
gender as she sought the nomination, as well as the cultural beliefs regarding women in politics 
that comprised the backdrop for Clinton’s campaign. These sections also point out the current 
gaps in our literature base, demonstrating the merit of this study, and highlight some general 
questions that guide the analysis. 
Rationale One: Why Study Hillary Clinton? 
 Hillary Clinton has been the focus of several studies within and outside of 
communication studies since Bill Clinton won the presidency in 1992 (Anderson, 2002; 
Corrigan, 2000; Dubriwny, 2005; Gardetto, 1997; Kelly, 2001; Mattina, 2005; Parry-Giles, 2000; 
Parry-Giles & Blair, 2002; Trent & Short-Thompson, 2003; Wertheimer, 2005). Overall, these 
scholars have observed both the traditional and non-traditional behaviors exhibited by Clinton as 
she performed her roles as First Lady or candidate for the U.S. Senate from New York. The vast 
majority of these studies have demonstrated that Clinton often broke with convention in terms of 
gender performance. And while some of these scholars contended that Clinton effectively 
adapted her communication strategies to bend to the demands of her various roles, others have 
argued that she was unsuccessful. Still, what is common to all of these scholars is the firm belief 
that the ways in which Clinton communicated—about her roles, her career, her responses to 
media and citizen criticism—are significant for understanding the ways in which women who are 
not traditionally feminine operate in the public, political sphere. Thus, Clinton serves as a worthy 
rhetor for study so that scholars may understand more fully how political women rhetorically 
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construct themselves in the face of socio-political pressures to remain feminine and what the 
potential costs are if they fail to do so. 
 Other scholars have more recently begun to examine, as I do in this study, Clinton’s 
failures in her bid for the presidential nomination. Carlin and Winfrey (2009) maintained that 
examining Clinton’s campaign, especially her treatment of and by media sources, is important in 
terms of understanding the perpetuation of sexism in politics. Spiker (2009) agreed, and argued 
in her rhetorical analysis of Clinton’s campaign speeches and interviews that examining 
Clinton’s campaign is an essential task in understanding how feminism can both help and hinder 
a woman’s aspirations for the presidency. Thus, in order to more fully understand the rhetorical 
problems faced by women who run for president, an examination of Clinton’s campaign is 
warranted. 
 Of the studies that have examined Clinton’s campaign for president, some have looked at 
Bill Clinton’s involvement in Hillary’s campaign (Kenner Muir & Taylor, 2009; Schnoebelen, et 
al., 2009; Torrens, 2009), one has examined her debate strategies via quantitative content 
analysis that looked at the traditional argument structure absent gender variations (McKinney, et 
al., 2009), one has presented a cursory rhetorical analysis of Clinton’s speeches and interviews 
on the trail (Spiker, 2009), one has examined Clinton’s primary campaign ads via content 
analysis (Banwart, et al., 2009), and two have examined the media attention (often negative) 
surrounding Clinton during the primary campaign (Stein, 2009; Vatz, 2009). Thus, no study to 
date has offered a rhetorical analysis of both her key speeches and debate performances in 
relation to the rhetorical situation that Clinton faced. Thus, this study adds to the discussion of 
Clinton’s campaign and adds unique insight as to the societal trends—stereotypes, gendered 
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expectations, barriers and double binds, etc.—that Hillary Clinton attempted to negotiate during 
her campaign.  
Such an examination also, I contend, helps offer insight to women in the future who 
follow in Clinton’s footsteps as they attempt to negotiate the gendered nature of the public, 
political sphere. Sheckels (2009) noted: “All political campaigns teach lessons, but some do so 
more than others. I would suggest that Hillary Rodham Clinton’s quest for the Democratic 
Party’s presidential nomination is one of the richest in recent history insofar as it reinforces what 
we know about political campaigns and sheds considerable light on how gender still affects such 
campaigns” (p. 211). I absolutely agree with Sheckels estimation of the significance of Clinton’s 
campaign, and argue that the analysis within this study throws such stereotypes into sharp relief 
as I analyze not only Clinton’s rhetoric, but also the exigencies, audiences, and constraints that 
mandated or helped foster such rhetoric. Evaluating the campaign’s communication in such a 
way allows critics to demonstrate not only the nature of these challenges for Clinton, but also 
their pervasive nature in contemporary politics in the United States. 
Rationale Two: Artifacts 
To accomplish an analysis of Clinton’s rhetorical style, this study focuses on examples of 
key speeches Clinton gave while running for president as well as some of her more salient debate 
performances during the primary season. Both of these arenas of political rhetoric, in conjunction 
with secondary news sources used to contextualize the rhetorical situation, offer rich, fertile 
ground for establishing Clinton’s rhetoric in relation to the exigencies, audiences, and 
constraints. These rhetorical acts were all performed in diverse locales and in front of diverse 
immediate audiences and focused attention on nearly all salient issues and problems during the 
entirety of the campaign season relative to her male adversaries on the trail.  
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Scholarly attention to campaign speeches, especially during a presidential campaign, is 
an established focus for scholarly understanding of campaign success or failure (rhetorical or 
otherwise) (Kaid, 2004). Additionally, presidential primary debates have garnered little scholarly 
attention (compared to presidential debates) (Banwart & McKinney, 2005; McKinney & Carlin, 
2004), and even less attention has been paid to those studies involving mixed-gendered political 
debates (Banwart & McKinney, 2005; Holbert & Geidner, 2009). Thus, the current study, in 
approaching both the well-established realm of campaign speeches and the emerging arena of 
cross-gendered primary debate research, has the potential to add much to what we know about 
women in political communication contexts, chiefly the presidential race, and how they react to 
the gendered nature of their rhetorical situations. As such, attention to Clinton’s campaign 
speeches, which are conveniently (and purposefully) available on Clinton’s campaign website 
and in various other news media outlets, and her performances during the primary debates, which 
were carried on national and international networks, offer a fairly complete picture of Clinton’s 
rhetoric during the primary campaign. 
In generating an over-arching argument regarding Clinton’s rhetorical strategies during 
her campaign, I contend that gendered stereotypes and expectations heavily informed Clinton’s 
rhetorical situation during her bid for the presidential nomination. I also contend that Clinton’s 
discourse, which did not respond to and even ignored the gendered elements of her rhetorical 
situation (though I am sure she was aware of them) did not adequately respond to the constraints 
that complicated her campaign and even exacerbated the situation through her rhetorical choices. 
Finally, I argue that it is only by investigating Clinton’s unique rhetorical situation, and 
critiquing her rhetoric in relation to her gender, that a complete rhetorical criticism of Clinton’s 
campaign can be achieved. 
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With this rationale as a backdrop, the literature review is designed to 1) characterize the 
various elements that comprised Hillary Clinton’s rhetorical situation during the 2008 primary 
campaign, and 2) to draw attention to general research questions that guide this study. Chapter 
Two presents the research methodology that guides the analysis of Clinton’s campaign rhetoric 
from the 2008 campaign and discusses the specific artifacts for the current study. Chapters Three 
through Five examine the aspects of Clinton’s rhetorical situation (audiences, exigencies, and 
constraints). Finally, Chapter Six presents several critical conclusions, implications, and avenues 
for future research. 
Review of Literature 
 Any study centered on answering the umbrella question of how the first viable major 
party female presidential candidate communicated during her campaign would be remiss if 
attention were not turned to the most obvious difference between her and her male adversaries. 
Additionally, because the current study seeks to understand Hillary Clinton’s rhetorical situation 
during her campaign, attention must be paid to the substance of that situation. Thus, the review 
of literature explains, generally, why women lack representation at high levels of political 
leadership, and political efficacy in general. The focus on gender as a key issue in politics, and 
society in general, has been a vital site of study for decades, and has certainly been worthwhile. 
As Deborah Tannen, professor of linguistics at Georgetown University and a noted expert in 
gendered communication, has noted, “‘A woman in the public eye is going to provoke hatred and 
anger from men’ that is visceral’” (in Clift & Brazaitis, 2000, p. 45). But why is this the case? 
Are men and women, in functioning as voters, politicians, and leaders so different as to espouse 
hatred and prompt such an intense lack of representation? Within the realms of political 
communication and political science, we do know that men and women differ, at least 
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perceptually, in their campaign strategies (Bystrom, 2004). Research within the field has also 
noted that the campaign, specifically, is where women will often fall short in trying to sway 
voters to believe in their abilities as political communicators and leaders (Han, 2003). To explore 
this disparity, this review presents research on the following topics: (1) the “double bind” for 
political women; (2) gendered traits and expectations of male and female political 
communicators; (3) gendered issues of male and female political communicators; (4) gender and 
voting behavior in the United States; (5) media and gender in the political context; and (6) 
leadership and gender in the political, public sphere. As is argued later, each of these aspects of 
scholarship describes an over-arching rhetorical situation that Hillary Clinton had to address 
during her campaign for president. 
The ‘Double Bind’ for Political Women 
The physical and psychological context that is the public, political sphere creates a 
tangible double bind for women seeking political office, especially on a national level. Bower 
(2003) has reminded us, “the modern woman who wants to succeed in a leadership role is first 
required to demonstrate male and dominant behaviors as a manager, and then she is chastised for 
not being a lady. If she then attempts to modify her style to be more traditionally feminine, she 
finds she is not taken seriously…” (p. 110). As such, Bower (like several other authors in the 
field) has argued that women in politics must walk the thin line, with her use of rhetoric, “of 
evolution without creating the impact of revolution” (p. 115). Gelb and Palley (1982) have 
similarly argued that women must be perceived by voters as attempting to increase sex role 
equity rather than sex role change in order to not frighten voters.  
 In describing the potential first female president, Clift and Brazaitis (2000) noted, 
“Political analysts believe the first woman president will be a ‘Sister Mister,’ having the body of 
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a woman with the character traits of a man” (p. 18). Contrary to this idea, several scholars have 
noted that female politicians who balance both male and female characteristics are not only less 
apt to frighten voters, they are also more likely to succeed in politics. Bystrom, et al. (2004) 
found, “…when women candidates win, they emphasize masculine traits and both feminine and 
masculine issues most frequently, although more traditionally feminine than masculine issues” 
(p. 79). These same authors also found that “women candidates may be most successful… 
emphasizing mostly feminine or a balance of feminine and masculine image traits” (p. 109). 
Indeed, these sentiments are echoed in several studies that have indicated women must balance 
the positive leadership traits and issues associated with both male and female styles of leadership 
effectively in order to gain elective success in any capacity, especially the presidency (Bower, 
2003; Bystrom, 2004; Rosenthal, 1998b; Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993). 
 Several scholars have argued that this maintenance of both female and male leadership 
traits and issues can be accomplished rhetorically, through management of discourse that 
encourages substantive argument and discussion while allowing rhetors, both male and female, 
to embody elements that are reminiscent of female discourse (Bower, 2003; Buchanan, 1996; 
Bystrom, 2003a; Campbell, 1998; Dow & Tonn, 1993; Han, 2003). Dow and Tonn (1993) 
argued, “Female politicians must operate in the ultimate public deliberative context, where 
feminine communicative strategies would seem least valued and adaptation to typically male 
communicative patterns would seem the most useful” (p. 288). However, Han (2003) contended, 
in discussing how a woman might communicate as president, that both male and female 
politicians should strive to find a communication strategy that blends the best of both 
perspectives: 
Can a woman president master the bully pulpit? …Women view communication as  
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an opportunity for confirmation, support, and consensus…this difference has  
benefited women politicians in recent years. Television as a medium demands  
intimacy and the ability to express the private self, a skill that most presidents,  
with the exception of Reagan and Clinton, have had difficulty perfecting. Male  
politicians discuss goals, whereas, women politicians reveal themselves through an  
intimate, conversational, and narrative style of speech (p. 172-173). 
 Such a style, the “feminine style,” was first articulated by Campbell (1989) in her text 
analyzing early feminist speeches from the suffragist, temperance, and abolition movements. In a 
later text, Campbell (1998) more clearly articulated the utility and the tenets of this perspective 
in rhetorical terms. Campbell asserted, when describing the advent of this rhetorical device, that 
“women speakers were expected to reaffirm their womanliness discursively at the same time that 
they demonstrated the ordinary rhetorical competencies—cogent arguments, clarity of position, 
offering compelling evidence, and responding to competing views—that were gender-coded as 
masculine” (p. 4). Also in this text, Campbell presented the specific criteria that rhetors must 
utilize in order to enact the feminine style and thus, effectively negotiate the double bind: 
In rhetorical terms, performing or enacting femininity has meant adopting a  
personal or self-disclosing tone (signifying nurturance, intimacy, and domesticity)  
and assuming a feminine persona, e.g. mother, or an un-gendered persona, e.g.  
mediator or prophet, while speaking. It has meant preferring anecdotal evidence  
(reflecting women’s experiential learning in contrast to men’s expertise),  
developing ideas inductively (so the audience thinks that it, not the presumptuous  
woman, drew the conclusions), and appropriating strategies associated with  
women—such as domestic metaphors, emotional appeals to motherhood, and the  
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like—and avoiding such “macho” strategies as tough language, confrontation or  
direct refutation, and any appearance of debating one’s opponents. Note, however,  
that feminine style does not preclude substantive depth and argumentative  
cogency (p. 5). 
Several studies have used this notion of feminine style to analyze female politicians, 
including Hillary Clinton, acting in the public, political sphere, and have demonstrated that this 
style is effective for both men and women (Corrigan, 2000; Dow & Tonn, 1993; Durbriwny, 
2005; Gardetto, 1997; Kelly, 2001; Parry-Giles, 2000; Parry-Giles & Blair, 2002; Trent & Short-
Thompson, 2003). Bystrom (2003a) found, in her analysis of communication strategies used by 
candidates between 1990 and 2002, “Both female and male candidates were equally as likely to 
use all of the elements of the ‘feminine style’”(p. 179). Campbell (1998) argued this was wise, 
given the prevalence of television as a means of transmitting political messages: “Television has 
played a significant role in changing public discursive performance of gender roles. The qualities 
that project most effectively on television are qualities culturally associated within women’s 
speech, which has made a personal, self-disclosing style based on narrative highly valued” (p. 4-
5). Buchanan (1996) has also concurred with this contention, asserting that political leaders, 
especially women, must adhere to the social reality in which they reside while also challenging 
that reality by embracing new roles (like those in high political office, for women). In doing so, 
Buchanan asserted that the messages of female political leaders could gain persuasive power in 
their adherence to the “moral order of nature itself” (p. 27) (i.e. the sexual division of culture 
between the public and private spheres). Because it uses traditionally feminine means of 
persuasion, the feminine style provides in many ways the blending of styles urged by scholars, as 
previously articulated, and thus, can represent an appealing way for women seeking political 
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office to bypass the double bind and effectively communicate to voters. But was this the strategy 
used by Clinton in 2008? More generally, when considering the notion of the political woman’s 
‘double bind,’ two questions come to the fore with regard to Clinton’s campaign: 1) In what 
ways did Clinton acknowledge the double bind for political women, and was this a site of 
rhetorical struggle for the candidate?, and 2) How was Clinton able to assuage the societal 
dictates that comprise the double bind through her use of campaign discourse? 
Gendered Traits of Male and Female Political Communicators 
The roots of the double binds Clinton (and indeed all who seek political office) faced, 
stem from our socio-cultural adherence to gendered traits. These traits form expectations for how 
men and women should conduct their personal and public lives, and as we shall see, are 
pervasive and binding. Much of this research, and indeed much of what we know about gender 
stereotypes, traits, and roles, is rooted in the landmark psychological research by Sandra Bem 
(1974). In introducing her influential Bem Sex-role Inventory, she asserted, “masculinity has 
been associated with an instrumental orientation, a cognitive focus on ‘getting the job done’; and 
femininity has been associated with an expressive orientation, an affective concern for the 
welfare of others” (p. 156). In a later text, Bem (1993) argued, “American society 
constructs…conventionally gendered women and men by situating people in a culture whose 
discourses and social practices are organized around the lenses of androcentrism and gender 
polarization” (p. 143). Bem’s research has been applauded by several scholars who agree that sex 
role delineation and the subsequent expectations based on a person’s sex role determine the ways 
in which individuals communicate with and are perceived by others (Chodorow, 1978; Dubeck 
& Dunn, 2002; Ivy & Blacklund, 1994). The subsequent stream of research from myriad fields, 
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including communication studies, has focused in divergent ways on how notions of gender 
orientation are fostered, passed down throughout society and history, and become pervasive. 
These gender roles become salient for politicians, especially women, as they reflect the 
stereotypes about how female and male politicians are supposed to act in the public, political 
sphere. These are the qualities, based on gender stereotypes, that men and women politicians are 
expected to adhere to or challenge (especially for women) so as to appear more viable as political 
candidates. These stereotypes are pervasive as they dictate, based on one’s gender, “what is 
proper or expected from women and men…these…stereotypes [apply] to family, workplace, and 
social interactions [and] are often transmitted to the political world” (Dolan, 1998, p. 46). Studies 
in political communication have revealed that men and women will often emphasize these traits 
in different ways as they attempt to gain political office (Anderson & Sheeler, 2005; Blankenship 
& Robson, 1995; DeRosa & Bystrom, 1999; Parry-Giles & Parry-Giles, 1996). No stranger to 
politics, it is logical to assume that Clinton and her campaign staff were aware of these 
stereotypes and adapted their communicative strategies accordingly. Thus, in order to shed light 
on the specific elements of Clinton’s rhetoric during her presidential campaign, it is necessary to 
be aware of these specific expectations in order to inform our understanding of her rhetorical 
techniques in her speeches and debate performances as they are dictated by the gender traits that 
dominate politics in our country. 
 Men in politics are expected to embody myriad characteristics so as to appear politically 
and socially acceptable. They are expected to be tough, strong, successful, aggressive, 
competent, experienced, knowledgeable, stern, autonomous, masculine, active, rational, self-
confident, direct, and stress elements of past political successes (Banwart & McKinney, 2005; 
Bystrom, 2004; Clift & Brazaitis, 2000; Dolan, 1998; Gilligan, 1993). All of these characteristics 
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have created a public sphere in which “men have more often been culturally imbued with a ‘take 
charge’ capacity” more in keeping with the expectations of a political leader (Duerst-Lahti, 2006, 
p. 25). Men, both voters and politicians, regardless of political party affiliation, are also 
perceived as being more conservative than women (Palmer & Simon, 1996). As politicians, 
studies have discovered that men are more likely to interrupt colleagues, especially when they 
are female, use longer speaking times, utilize more intimidating behavior, and embody a more 
power-oriented, authoritative model of leadership more so than their female counterparts 
(Rosenthal, 1998a; Rosenthal, 1998b).  
 Traits of women represent a cultural contrast to those of men in the political sphere. 
Women are expected to embody honesty, integrity, cooperation with others, sensitivity and 
understanding of others, a nurturing nature, emotional expressiveness, caring, helping, being 
involved, being responsible, warmth, a gentle nature, passivity, and dependence (Banwart & 
McKinney, 2005; Buchanan, 1996; Bystrom, 2004; Clift & Brazaitis, 2000; Dolan, 1998; Fox & 
Schuhmann, 1999; Gilligan, 1993; Han, 2003; Helgesen, 1995; Witt, et al., 1994).  These 
characteristics “emphasize relationships with people” and “reveal a focus on the doing of various 
tasks rather than on the completion” (Helgesen, 1995, p. 28). Women are expected to act as 
ladies, even as they compete against men in politics, and are expected to “maintain some level of 
the traditional altruistic and apolitical above-it-all demeanor” (Witt, et al., 1994, p. 215). Women 
are also expected to be, or are at least perceived as being, more progressive and more liberal than 
their male counterparts, regardless of actual political party affiliation (Clift & Brazaitis, 2000; 
Dolan, 1998; Duerst-Lahti, 2006; Epstein, et al., 1998; Palmer & Simon, 1996). This perception 
of liberalism can be problematic for women seeking elective office; Duerst-Lahti (2006) 
explained that this liberal label can often pigeon-hole women, lending them expertise in working 
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on social issues or “women’s” issues, but not on high-level, substantive issues that are deemed 
more “culturally important.” Studies have also shown that, to the detriment of female politicians, 
women in politics can also be perceived as “talkative, nagging, arguing without knowledge…and 
hyperemotional and overly concerned with trivia” (Beck, 2001, p. 57). 
 Many of these characteristics are ascribed to women to maintain the cultural expectations 
associated with “Republican Motherhood,” wherein women are expected to be more passive and 
remain in the private sphere rather than assuming more active roles in the public sphere of 
politics (Dow & Tonn, 1993; Rosenthal, 1998a). “True Womanhood,” another label for this 
social construction, “was first and foremost a moral definition of women. It defined morality as 
women’s nature…and by describing what women were like [it] prescribed what they should be 
like” (Buchanan, 1996, p. 37-38). Unfortunately, these strict social prescriptions have limited 
women’s access to the public sphere, and thus full political participation and representation, 
because they inherently “[deny] them a direct relationship with government,” a man’s domain 
(Buchanan, 1996, p. 18). As such, several scholars have noted that these cultural expectations 
prevent many women from taking part in the public sphere in running for political office, or at 
least serve as a cause for women to delay their entry into politics, leading to several barriers to 
full political participation (Clift & Brazaitis, 2000; Witt, et al., 1994). Rosenthal (1998a) 
explained: “Women [in politics] are older, defer political careers until past their primary years of 
childrearing and family responsibilities, and hone their leadership ability in classrooms and 
community centers rather than in boardrooms and locker rooms” (p. 162). Because women have 
fewer years involved in politics and less access to the career achievement commensurate with 
traditional avenues of political success, they are less likely to be able to catch up with their male 
counterparts, or less likely to enter politics at all, leading to the under-representation of women at 
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all levels of government. Thus, based on our understanding of these specific attributes of male 
and female politicians, two specific questions regarding Clinton’s campaign arise: 1) How did 
Clinton acknowledge these specific traits ascribed to women in running for the most masculine 
of male political positions (the presidency), and 2) How was Clinton’s rhetoric tailored in order 
to combat the specific problems associated with these traits of “True Womanhood”?  
Gendered Issues for Male and Female Political Communicators 
 Just as stereotyping has labeled certain traits as male and female, so to have specific 
political issues been ascribed gendered labels. As is discussed in later sections of this review, the 
assignment of gender to political issues is important to discuss and analyze as it not only affects 
what issues are discussed (or not) during campaigns, but it also has implications for how women 
and men discuss issues that are gendered in opposition to their own biological sex. As 
presidential campaigns are focused around particular issues, our attention to this literature greatly 
informs our interpretation of Clinton’s rhetoric in the realms of her speeches and debate 
performances. 
 Generally, women’s issues, or those issues that are more typically emphasized by 
women, thus making them “women’s issues,” include: education, health care, senior citizen 
issues, taxes, drug use, poverty, environmental protection, abortion, and reproductive rights 
(Banwart, et al., 2003a; Banwart, et al., 2003b; Banwart & McKinney, 2005; Bystrom, 2003a; 
Bystrom, 2004; Davis, 2003; Duerst-Lahti, 2006; Palmer & Simon, 1996). Men also use some of 
these issues, including taxes, though in different ways. Women may, for instance, stress the 
effects of tax policies on the welfare of individuals rather than simply addressing the policy 
implications. Health care, too, has also been a key issue for men, especially for Bill Clinton and 
Barack Obama, but these seem to be exceptions to the rule; on balance, the research has 
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indicated that women tend to use or stress these issues more than men in campaigning for 
elective office. Women are given more credibility to discuss and act on issues that are perceived 
as women-specific issues, or issues that affect women’s roles in society, such as women’s 
research, sexual harassment laws, family leave, childcare, and gun control (Niven & Zilber, 
2001a). Issues more often associated with men, or “male issues,” include: taxes and the 
economy, unemployment, immigration, crime, defense, agriculture, and international issues 
(Banwart, et al., 2003a; Banwart & McKinney, 2005; Bystrom, 2003a; Bystrom, 2004; Clift & 
Brazaitis, 2000; Davis, 2003; Duerst-Lahti, 2006). 
It is obvious from these lists that many of these issues, save taxes—which seems to serve 
as a universal issue for politicians—reflect the stereotypical roles associated with women as 
dictated by Republican Motherhood or the ideology of True Womanhood previously discussed. 
These issues, as they are dictated by the socio-cultural expectations of American society 
establish that women have credibility, because they are women, when they discuss or are 
involved politically with feminine issues. In contrast, men must focus their political 
communication on male issues, where they are perceived as more culturally credible, though 
research has indicated that men have greater flexibility (and success) with certain women’s 
issues, such as education and health care. Still, it is clear that, to be politically successful, 
candidates for elective office must deal with myriad issues important to voters regardless of their 
gender. As such, several scholars have noted that candidates will often, in spite of cultural 
dictates, take a blended or adaptive approach to political issues, including issues from both lists 
in their campaign communication (Banwart & McKinney, 2005; Bystrom, 2003a; Bystrom, 
2004). These conclusions seem reasonable, given the diverse range of issues that may erupt 
during a lengthy political campaign, especially a race for the presidency wherein conceivably 
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any issue is considered fair game for consideration. Where this information becomes salient for 
the current study is in considering the rhetorical handling of these issues by Clinton. As a woman 
running for the presidency, Clinton had to address wide-ranging issues, regardless of the 
culturally assigned gender assigned to these issues. Thus, it is necessary to analyze, in looking at 
Clinton’s speeches and debate performances, the specific ways in which she presented and 
discussed these issues, both masculine and feminine, to see if the types of issues she addressed 
can aid in explaining the nature of Clinton’s rhetoric. 
Gender and Voting Behavior in the United States 
 The literature exploring research that has centered on issues of gender and voting 
behavior is important to consider for several reasons. First, voter perceptions, behaviors, and 
stereotypes are salient to the issue of Clinton’s rhetorical situation and her resulting discourse. 
Without an understanding of what voters think about women in politics, and where voters are 
receiving information relevant to their voting decisions, any study related to women in politics 
would be incomplete. Additionally, as clarified in the following paragraphs, the statistics related 
to voting and information gathering helps explain why women remain underrepresented in 
politics in our society, and thus, adds to what we know about Clinton’s rhetorical situation 
during her campaign. Finally, the relationship between politicians, especially women, and voters 
is salient to the present study. Dolan (1998) asserted, “…the crucial relationship is with the 
voters, with those people whose support or rejection makes or breaks a candidacy” (p. 41). Dolan 
went on to note that this relationship between politicians and voters is likely more important and 
more complex for women than for men. As such, attention to voters is necessary for 
understanding both the nature of the audience that comprised Clinton’s rhetorical situation, as 
well as the tactics that Clinton used to reach such an audience. 
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 Initially, and surprisingly to some, it is important to note that women in America vote 
more often and in greater numbers than men, especially in presidential elections since 1964 
(Ford, 2002; Johnston & Schmermund, 2008), and women are also more likely to register to vote 
than men (Bystrom, 2004). This trend has most recently been demonstrated in the 2008 election 
when a record number of women voted in the presidential election (“Women’s vote clinches,” 
2008). Additionally, Palmer and Simon (1996) noted that women are more likely than men to 
take part in other campaign activities, such as campaigning for candidates, indicating a higher 
interest level and positive feeling toward the elective process. This interest in politics, though 
later shown to not be significant between the sexes, has been confirmed by later research 
bolstering the conclusion that women are interested in politics (Banwart, 2007). Still, political 
interest aside, women voters have demonstrated a lack (at least perceptually) in political 
knowledge, do not utilize the same sources of political information as male counterparts, and do 
not feel predisposed to vote for female candidates for political office. 
 Several scholars have noted that women lack correct information related to politics, or at 
least perceive that they do, when compared to male voters. Delli Carpini and Kutter (1996) noted 
that lack of correct political information among women has remained constant over time, but 
also asserted that while men have a greater sense of correct political knowledge on national and 
state levels, women have more accurate information related to local political issues. A perceived 
lack of correct information was demonstrated in the 2000 election; Kenski and Jamieson (2001) 
noted that female respondents’ scores on two knowledge questionnaires lagged significantly 
behind male survey respondents’, and Banwart and Bystrom (2001) found that men reported a 
significantly stronger belief in how informed they were about political issues when compared to 
women. Similar trends were also discovered during the 2004 election cycle that indicated a 
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significant gender gap does exist in relation to correct political information (Dow, 2007). The 
split between awareness of local and state politics by women versus national politics by men has 
also been confirmed by Atkeson and Rapoport (2003) and Banwart (2007). Some recent 
scholarship has indicated that such studies regarding a lack of political knowledge among 
women are somewhat flawed; Mondack and Anderson (2004) have argued that such measures 
are unreliable, and that such a gap is likely due to flawed measurement techniques. Regardless of 
whether or not these measures are accurate, the predominant conclusion remains that women 
may perceive that they are less capable in answering questions about national and state level 
politics than men. This has led some in the field to contend that women, in general, believe that 
they are less likely to understand and influence politics and policy issues (Buchanan, 1996).  
 Research devoted to gender differences related to the acquisition of political information 
may aid in explaining the disparity in political knowledge. Kenski and Jamieson (2001) found 
that men are more likely than women to garner political information from traditional sources of 
political news, such as newspapers, news magazines, political radio talk shows, and the Internet. 
Dissimilarly, Banwart and Bystrom (2001) discovered that women were more likely to obtain 
political information from national morning television shows, such as The Today Show, local 
television news, and through conversations with others. In other words, men are more likely than 
women to utilize media sources that are more often strongly correlated with correct political 
information (Bystrom, 2003b).  This lack of readership, in relation to politics, of newspapers 
over the years “…reflects the fact, according to experts, that the news nationally continues to be 
overwhelmingly (white) male in content and editorial perspective” (Buchanan, 1996, p. 19).  
 The effects of the different levels of political information and use of sources of political 
information are not fully known, but some scholars have strong arguments in relation to 
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perceptions of female political leaders. Lawless (2004) suggested that political party, more than 
gender, is telling about how voters, both men and women, will vote in elections. Still, Lawless 
has also asserted that women who are represented by women are more likely to be involved in 
politics and to offer positive evaluations of their female representatives in politics. Conversely, 
Clift and Brazaitis (2000), Dolan (2006), and Rosenthal (1998a) have argued that there is no 
gender affinity among female voters in relation to voting for female politicians. Still, Dolan 
(2008) (in a later study) did find that women respondents felt more positively toward female 
Democratic politicians, but that this gender affinity did not translate to female candidates who 
were Republican, suggesting that political party, more than gender, was indeed a greater 
indicator of voting behavior. This later study by Dolan also indicated that respondents, both men 
and women, had a greater amount of information about women candidates, regardless of party, 
but lacked a clear explanation for the greater level of knowledge. 
 What is clear from much of the research related to voter perceptions of gender is that 
voters are likely to utilize, regardless of their sources of political information, stereotypes about 
gender behaviors and expectations in evaluating both men and women politicians (Fox & Oxley, 
2003; Fridkin & Kenny, 2009; Sanbonmatsu & Dolan, 2009; Taylor, et al., 2008; Witt, et al., 
1994). As such, and because the vast majority of political leaders in the U.S. are male, voters 
measure the abilities of women in politics in relation to the male standards of leadership 
(Tolleson-Rinehart, 2001). Thus, and this is key for the present study, voters are unwilling to 
vote for women, especially for the presidency in the U.S., because they are perceived as less 
competent than male elected leaders (Fox & Oxley, 2003; Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993). These 
two findings clarify a central rhetorical problem faced by the Clinton campaign in 2008: How 
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did Clinton negotiate the demands of voter expectations and assumptions based on her gender in 
order to convince voters she was capable of assuming the role of commander-in-chief? 
Media and Gender in Politics 
To fully understand the way women operate in politics, and more specifically, the 
potential rhetorical problems faced by the Clinton campaign in 2008, a discussion of news media 
coverage of women politicians and their use of other media outlets is necessary. The present 
study is not focused on a rhetorical analysis of the media coverage surrounding the campaign, 
but I would be vastly under-stating the influence of media if it were not presented as a major 
source of political information that contributes to the rhetorical situation and exigencies in a 
campaign. As Bystrom (2003a) has explained: “…the media may have an impact on the outcome 
of elections and, thus, upon how the nation is governed” (p. 175). Bystrom (2003b) further 
argued, “…the mass media are powerful and important sources of information in a political 
campaign, not necessarily because they influence voting behavior, but because they draw 
attention to the candidates and their campaigns” (p. 96). Duerst-Lahti (2006) agreed with the 
importance of news media sources, especially in terms of presidential elections: “The press 
serves as the great mentioner, without whose attention no candidate can be seen as viable…what 
the press assumes, and the way it frames its coverage…has consequences for what readers think 
about, and to a lesser extent, how they think about it” (p. 12-13). And while a significant body of 
research has been dedicated to the study of this area of gender and politics, several studies have 
contradictory findings. Still, several conclusions can be drawn in relation to media and gender 
that is explained in the following paragraphs that shed light not only on the pervasiveness of 
gender stereotyping, but also on the barriers to female political efficacy in our culture. Thus, both 
of these ideas have important implications for the current study of Clinton’s 2008 campaign as 
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this research on gender and media is telling of how messages (and thus, stereotypes and gendered 
expectations) are disseminated to the public. In other words, the media messages about Clinton’s 
rhetoric during her campaign are a useful guide for understanding the nature of her rhetorical 
constraints and, thus, also indicate the substance of what she must discuss in her speeches and 
debate performances. 
Witt, et al. (1994) asserted, “…the press coverage of women in politics is an artifact of 
this country’s age-old but unresolved debate over women citizen’s proper roles versus ‘proper 
women’s’ place” (p. 182). Several studies have documented the stereotyping and biased 
coverage that comprises the coverage of female politicians. Braden (1996) discovered that 
women “struggle to receive media coverage and legitimacy in the eyes of the media and, 
subsequently, the public” (p. 1). Scholars have also noted that journalists often will ask women 
politicians questions that they don’t ask men, and discuss women in ways that reinforce cultural 
prescriptions emphasizing traditional womanhood (Braden, 1996; Bystrom, 2003a; Bystrom, 
2003b; Carlin & Winfrey, 2009). Braden asserted, “journalists often hold women accountable for 
the actions of their children and their husbands, though they rarely hold men to the same 
standard” (1996, p. 1). Other scholars have found similar themes in news media coverage of 
female politicians; Banwart and her colleagues asserted, “news coverage across both primary and 
federal election races continue[s] to define female candidates in terms of their gender, children, 
and marital status” (2003a, p. 670), while Niven and Zilber (2001b) contended that female 
politicians and their staffs have perceived the media as being less fair in their treatment of female 
Congressional representatives. Carroll and Schreiber (1997) discovered in their analysis of media 
coverage of Congress that news media sources have continued to perpetuate stereotypes about 
women politicians, though in more subtle ways. These scholars discovered that news stories 
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often emphasize female politicians’ associations with other women, with “female issues” such as 
abortion and women’s health, and have focused on family issues faced by female politicians as 
well as their attire and appearance. Bystrom, et al. (2004) also argued the media has a “penchant 
to stereotype women with regard to mentioning their sex and marital status more often than they 
do for men” (p. 185). These same authors go on to note that since the media has often focused on 
the appearance and attire of female politicians and candidates, they have painted them as less 
serious politicians than men which can result in a distraction from their issues during campaigns.  
This perpetuation of stereotypes and gender prescriptions for female candidates can do much to 
cast doubt on a woman’s abilities in elected office and can, thus, be incredibly detrimental to her 
elective success (Carlin & Winfrey, 2009; Duerst-Lahti, 2006; Han, 2003; Wood, 2003). 
On the other hand, several scholars have also discovered that women are beginning to see 
more equitable coverage within the nation’s press. Carroll and Schreiber (1997) found that in 
1992, the so-called “Year of the Woman,” women received more (in quantity, if not quality) 
coverage than their male counterparts. Smith (1997) concurred, and concluded that newspaper 
reporters and editors provided women more equal footing in their press coverage with regard to 
their campaigns for Congress. This type of equitable coverage seemingly continued during the 
2000 and 2002 elections, wherein Bystrom and her colleagues discovered that press coverage in 
mixed-gender races was not only more equitable, it was also more “evenly balanced,” thus voters 
“had quantifiably more, as well as more favorable, information about female candidates” 
(Bystrom, et al., 2004, p. 185). Even Bystrom (2003a), an ardent critic of media treatment of 
women in politics, has admitted: “while some stereotyping does exits, the playing field for 
female candidates is becoming more equal” (p. 173).  
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Still, the most recent studies, specifically those studies that have addressed the 2008 
campaign cycle, have indicated that media outlets may be slipping back into old habits. In her 
analysis of both Clinton’s and Palin’s candidacies in 2008, Anne Kornblut (2009b), a reporter 
herself, acknowledged the sexism that was present in news media sources, and argued that news 
reporters often applied much more scrutiny and a lack of parity in their coverage of Hillary 
Clinton and Sarah Palin. Vatz (2009) concurred with this assessment, and also argued that news 
media favored Obama over Clinton in overt, completely subjective ways. Perhaps most 
succinctly, Carlin and Winfrey (2009), in their analysis of sexism during the 2008 presidential 
campaign cycle, argued, “analysis of Senator Hillary Clinton’s campaign for the Democrat 
nomination for president and Governor Sarah Palin’s campaign for vice president reveals that 
media coverage incorporated gender stereotypes and gendered language that influenced the way 
both women were viewed” (p. 330). As such, while there may have been some moments of 
improvement in terms of media representation of female candidates, it is clear that media outlets, 
in general, have a tendency to use unequal and unfair means for discussing female politicians. 
It is important to note that most of the strategies used by both women and men discussed 
previously are likely the result of societal stereotypes to offset or counter negative (or absent) 
news media coverage. Therein lies the specific relevance of the media’s involvement in political 
campaigns for the study of Clinton’s rhetoric. If the media serves as both a provider of important 
political information to voters, as well as a source of gender stereotypes, then it is logical to 
assume that in her quest to position herself as a viable presidential candidate, Clinton would 
adapt her speeches and debate performances as a response to this information. Thus, this 
discussion of the importance of media as they relate to female candidates becomes crucial, 
because media outlets served as a source of her direct rhetorical problem, or at least as a 
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constraining force necessitating rhetorical response by Clinton. In essence, I argue that the media 
coverage of her campaign highlighted her rhetorical exigency as a woman running for the most 
powerful political position in the nation (if not the world). The goal of her rhetoric, then, will 
reflect this desire to adapt to gendered expectations as she presented herself as a presidential 
leader. 
But what constitutes effective leadership, and how can women fight against cultural 
gender biases to attain elective office when stereotypes are so prevalent? To answer this 
question, and to further develop the present study, the final section of this review focuses on 
dominant notions of leadership, and female leadership styles specifically, as they relate to gender 
and political communication.  
Gender and Leadership in the Political, Public Sphere 
 Clift and Brazaitis (2000) summed up one of the more important elements of having 
women in the political, public sphere by noting, “Perhaps the most perverse obstacle to a woman 
becoming president is that no woman has ever been elected president. There is no one for girls 
growing up to emulate” (p. 25). Carroll (1985) argued similarly, charging that the lack of women 
in greater numbers in politics is caused largely by the fact that women do not have office-holding 
experience. Rhode (2003) agreed that this was still true, eighteen years after Carroll’s statement, 
and contended that the lack of mentors within politics for women is a key barrier to improved 
representation. The fact that women are still absent in the most public of spheres, politics, serves 
as an immediate and important reason why women remain underrepresented in high levels of 
government. Indeed, as Carroll (1985) asserted, this absence of women in key leadership roles is 
instrumental to the continuation of gendered expectations and stereotypes in our culture: “The 
dominance of politics by men has been viewed as a natural extension of the sexual division of 
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labor within the family” (p. 1). Without examples of women in political office, there is no 
counter-example to male leadership, inhibiting equality on a number of fronts, especially those 
regarding women’s issues and rights, but particularly in demonstrating that women can fill roles 
outside of the home (private sphere) (Norton, 2003; Rhode, 2003; Rosenthal, 1998b). This 
perpetuation of stereotypes, with all of the limitations to women’s empowerment that are implicit 
within such a power system, has been demonstrated to cause women in government to feel less 
welcomed, more easily sexually stereotyped, and feel that they face more tangible barriers to 
success in politics, which is especially troubling, considering that women in the United States 
make up more than half of the electorate (Rosenthal, 1998a).  
Such is the problem that was faced by Clinton as she began her campaign in 2007. She 
had to persuade voters, who had no previous example of a female president in the United States, 
that she could successfully occupy the role. Because this dilemma was one of the most 
fundamental sites of Clinton’s rhetorical problem during her campaign, attention to specific 
characteristics of male and female leadership is warranted. 
 A lack of examples is only one explanation why women lack viability in leadership roles; 
the cause can also be internal. Palmer and Simon (1996) argued that because women are still 
charged with maintaining their private sphere roles of mother and wife, most women “do not 
appear to be conscious of the fact that their skills and backgrounds make them qualified to run 
for office themselves” (p. 196). It is through this division of labor (with men in the public sphere 
of politics and women in the private, domestic sphere of the home) that most women, even those 
who have experienced political success, have exercised their influence (Rhode, 2003). However, 
exercising power through men still entrenches the notion of male leadership that dominates our 
culture, a key criticism from feminists who tend to define leadership in American society as 
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having a clear, though unstated, masculine bias (Rosenthal, 1998a). This explains why, whenever 
there is a woman who breaks barriers in the political sphere, she can set a positive example for 
many other women, which has been described as key to prompt other women to run for elective 
office (Tolleson-Rinehart, 2001; Witt, et al., 1994). As Skidmore (2003) noted, “It seemed that 
Ferraro’s candidacy [in 1984 for Vice President] had shattered a taboo. Many women came to 
believe that perhaps at last a woman could be president” (p. 26). But, as history has shown us 
more than twenty-five years later, only Sarah Palin has been on a major party ticket for the 
presidency or the vice presidency (on the McCain ticket in 2008), and she failed. As such, further 
examination of the barriers that impede women’s success in the public, political sphere is 
necessary before discussing the elements of both men’s and women’s leadership styles.  
 As previously indicated, societal stereotypes serve as a tangible barrier to women in 
leadership roles. Women are traditionally conceived as having specific expertise as wives and 
mothers that place them solely in the domestic sphere as the primary caretakers of children, 
causing some to believe that women are “emotionally unsuited for politics” (Carroll, 1985, p. 4). 
As Witt, et al. (1994) observed, “Her womanly-wifely-motherly attributes are a woman’s 
traditional source of authority and the core of her self esteem, yet these very important parts of 
her do not seem to have merit in the eyes of others” (p. 83). Furthermore, Bower (2003) 
contended, “For women to enter the public domain in either the business or political arenas, they 
must deal with the stereotypical expectations both of men who reside in the public domain and 
the women who do not choose to challenge the stereotypes” (p. 108). As such, the belief that 
women should remain in the domestic sphere has caused women to delay political careers till 
later in life until their children have left home or until their children are more capable of taking 
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care of themselves (Beck, 2001; Han, 2003; Norris & Inglehart, 1998; Rhode, 2003; Taylor, et 
al., 2008; Witt, et al., 1994).   
This relationship between gender stereotyping and women’s ability to serve as effective 
leaders was highlighted by Gilligan (1993) in her landmark work on the psychology of women’s 
development. She contended: 
For boys and men, separation and individuation are critically tied to gender  
identity since separation from the mother is essential for the development of  
masculinity. For girls and women, issues of femininity or feminine identity do not  
depend on the achievement of separation from the mother or on the progress of  
individuation. Since masculinity is defined through separation while femininity is  
defined through attachment, male gender identity is threatened by intimacy while  
female gender identity is threatened by separation. Thus, males tend to have  
difficulty with relationships, while females tend to have problems with  
individuation (Gilligan, 1993, p. 8). 
And even when women have dared to enter the political, public sphere in independent leadership 
roles, they have been met with hostility as they have been judged by many as violating the belief 
that women’s proper place was in the home (Dolan, 1998). Such stereotypes have not only 
inhibited support for women in leadership roles but, again, have also served to convince women 
that they should not seek political leadership roles in the first place (Palmer & Simon, 1996; 
Rhode, 2003; Taylor, et al., 2008).  
 Another explicit barrier to women gaining successful leadership roles in the political, 
public sphere has been incumbency. Several studies of women’s leadership and gender and 
politics in general have demonstrated that incumbents in political races are incredibly difficult to 
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unseat, especially for seats in Congress on the national level. Thus, because men have held most 
of these seats, women have had a difficult time entering the political sphere (Carroll, 1985; Clift 
& Brazaitis, 2000; Dolan, 1998). Palmer and Simon (1996) described this phenomenon 
succinctly: “…the growth of careerism occurred just as women were entering the national 
political arena. And by the time social attitudes about the role of women began to change in the 
1970s, the power of incumbency was well established. The political glass ceiling was firmly in 
place” (p. 21-22). These scholars went on to discuss this issue in depth, and noted that 
incumbents have franking privileges (the ability to contact their constituencies to stress their 
accomplishments, and thus why voters should keep them in office, free of charge in carrying out 
their duties as elected representatives), name recognition, and greater press coverage, which 
explains why incumbents (men) have won more than their challengers. If they have never held 
office, women have found it very difficult to persuade party officials that they are not only 
qualified, but can also assume the incredible burden of raising the funds necessary to win a 
competitive race against an incumbent, which again serves to explain why female, non-
incumbents have found it difficult, if not impossible, to break into the public sphere of politics 
(Witt, et al., 1994).  
 The available scholarship related to women as political leaders has also demonstrated that 
women simply have distaste for the political realm (Beck, 2001; Witt, et al., 1994). In a study of 
women leaders on the municipal level, Beck (2001) found that this dislike of the political sphere 
often led to a dissatisfaction of political leadership, once the role was achieved, and also led to 
some women not seeking re-election. The author summed up this dissatisfaction succinctly:  
…once in office, many of them find politics distasteful. Half the women  
interviewed said the thing they liked least about being in office was the politics,  
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the ‘Backstabbing’…of politics was appalling to some of them because they had  
a cooperative view of how councils should work…‘Not working together’ was  
the hardest thing about politics, and some even mentioned that it would propel  
them out of the political arena (Beck, 2001, p. 61-62). 
These studies have also demonstrated that women have been inhibited, once in political 
leadership positions, by implicit and explicit acts of sex discrimination. As such, once women 
have found the courage to run for political office, and if they were able to win, they have been 
somewhat less likely to remain in office (though not necessarily at the national level), or at least 
experienced a decreased sense of job satisfaction and a greater sense of inhibition when 
compared to their male counterparts. 
 A final barrier to women attaining leadership positions can be an unlikely source: women 
voters or those women already in leadership positions. Witt, at al. (1994) noted that both men 
and women can feel unsexed by powerful women. As such, female voters who are unwilling to 
challenge powerful prescriptions about gender expectations and behaviors may be unwilling to 
be supportive of women who “buck the system” and seek leadership positions. Additionally, 
when women have chosen to support other women, research has indicated that it was often not as 
tangible support as that available to men. Clift and Brazaitis (2000) have contended that women 
candidates for elected office have relied far more than their male counterparts on donations from 
women. Unfortunately, as a study by the National Women’s Political Caucus revealed, women 
have typically written checks for campaign donations for $100 or less; whereas men have usually 
contributed $500 or more (in Clift & Brazaitis, 2000). This trend may be changing, as evidenced 
by the vast amount of money in small donations that Barack Obama garnered from online 
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support in 2008 (Vargas, 2008). However, the research has predominantly indicated that women 
are at a financial disadvantage by comparison to their male opponents.  
Women already in elected office also may serve as a barrier to other women seeking 
leadership positions. Rhode (2003) asserted:  
Men are, of course, not the only group responsible for patterns of exclusion.  
Recent research chronicles lingering difficulties with what sociologists once  
labeled ‘Queen Bees’: women who believe that they managed without special  
help, so why can’t everyone else? These women enjoy the special status that  
comes with being one of the few females at the top of the pecking order and are  
willing to serve as proof that gender is no barrier to those who are qualified (p.  
13-14). 
And while this type of woman leader may not reflect the dominant attitude of women who are in 
power, this ideology, given the dramatic lack of representation of women in politics, can serve to 
hinder societal change and increased representation (and the needed availability of mentors) 
necessary for true equality in the political sphere. 
 With an examination of the dominant barriers to female leadership in mind, it is 
important to next discuss the qualities or characteristics that embody both conventional 
leadership as well as newer conceptions of female leadership. Initially, Rhode (2003) has aptly 
pointed out that though the notion of leadership has been studied for centuries, and programs 
dedicated to creating leaders at countless universities are more and more common, very little is 
actually known about the actual traits of effective leadership. Still, one thing that is clear about 
predominant notions of leadership is that it is a role seemingly reserved for men. This is 
unsurprising because, as Buchanan (1996) has asserted, our societal notions of strong leadership 
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have been closely tied to the public sphere, and thus, are based “on the norm of male 
participation” (p. 19). Rosenthal (1998a) agreed, and contended, “Instead of being gender 
neutral, leadership is inherently masculinist” (p. 22). Male leadership has been described as 
involving the delegation of responsibilities instead of acting alone or in direct conjunction with 
others, and the speech of male leaders has often been said to use a “command” structure 
associated with stereotypical notions of male executive leadership (Tolleson & Rinehart, 2001). 
Male leaders are still expected to act as individuals, but are also expected to command others in a 
hierarchical structure, commensurate with their social status as men (Gilligan, 1993). Leaders, in 
a male-dominated system, are also supposed to espouse characteristics such as competence and 
integrity, typically defined in terms of past leadership performances (Bower, 2003). Leaders in 
politics need to be able to take on traditionally male acts, such as raising money, speaking in 
public, shaking hands with voters, distributing leaflets, and soliciting votes, activities that Witt, 
et al. (1994) have labeled as inherently male, culturally. Male leadership has also been seen as 
more instrumental in dealing with the issues important to a society like the United States. “Policy 
areas in which males are typically perceived as more skillful, such as military or economics, are 
regarded as more important for higher levels and types of office” (Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993, p. 
504-505). Research has also indicated that this type of masculinist political climate has been 
responsible for certain less-than-desirable traits in male leaders, such as a penchant for “credit 
claiming” and blaming others for failures (Fridkin & Woodall, 1998).  
The presidency is also incredibly slanted toward male styles and characteristics of 
leadership. Han (2003) argued that the presidency as an office, and in campaigning for this 
office, has been characterized as male, describing a necessary ingredient of attaining and holding 
this office as “presidential machismo” (p. 169). Huddy and Terkildsen (1993) found the 
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characteristics that voters associated with the desirable presidential candidate are inherently 
male; these candidates have to be tough, assertive, and concerned with issues more strongly tied 
to men than women, such as the economy and defense. Bystrom (2003b) echoed this assertion in 
her research, and noted, “the majority of voters associated men, rather than women, with the top 
image characteristics they desire in a president—leading the nation during a crisis—and were 
more likely to believe that men would do a better job in making difficult decisions, the second-
rated trait” (p. 100). Duerst-Lahti (2006) offered one explanation for the masculinization of the 
presidency: “Masculinity has been embedded through the traditions that dominate the 
presidency, but inside those traditions lie more implicit assumptions that make the presidential 
elections masculine space: the test of executive toughness, a preference for military heroes, the 
sports and war metaphors of debates, and more” (p. 22). Thus, since women not only face social 
barriers in appearing masculine, but also the tangible barriers described above (they cannot play 
certain prized sports, like football or baseball, and only recently have they been able to take 
combat roles in the military, etc.), a woman attaining the presidency is almost a socio-cultural 
impossibility. 
Recently, in the study of leadership generally, there has been an inclusion of looking at 
the traits of women leaders. And while these studies are limited both in their number and scope, 
they reveal the styles women have used in leadership roles, their goals as leaders, and the 
potential benefits women leaders may offer. Women have tended to enter politics at the local 
levels of government (school boards, city councils, etc.), and as such, much of the research about 
women’s leadership has been conducted outside of the executive levels of government (Witt, et 
al., 1994). Rosenthal (1998b) studied gender differences between male and female committee 
chairs in state legislatures and discovered that while differences are present, men and women in 
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these roles shared more similarities in how they conducted their duties as leaders. Rosenthal also 
discovered that, contrary to dominant thought, female legislative committee chairs have tended 
to have just as much task orientation as interpersonal orientation. Other scholars have produced 
similar findings, noting that female legislators were just as likely to engage in issue 
specialization as their male colleagues, although they did report spending more time on the job 
than their male counterparts, and in dealing with the problems of their constituents (Epstein, et 
al., 1998). This same study also indicated that women were much more adept at and likely to 
work across party lines than their male colleagues, signifying, perhaps, a stronger ability in 
leadership roles as compared to men. This ability to work across party lines in forming broad-
based coalitions, especially geared toward solving problems specific to women, was also 
demonstrated by Gelb & Palley (1982) and Han (2003). Palmer and Simon (1996), who studied 
women in Congress, found that male and female representatives have made many of the same 
strategic decisions and have similar career goals. Another study evaluating differences among 
male and female mayors of major cities has also indicated that female leaders were just as 
intelligent and just as apt to point out their city’s major problems as males, but differed in 
emphasizing a more hands-on approach to leadership and teamwork (Tolleson-Rinehart, 2001). 
This style is in keeping with traditional notions of femininity; as Gilligan (1993) asserted, 
women often are driven to “maintain relational order and connection” (p. xiv).  
This attention to the relational aspects of government and working across ideological 
lines has prompted some to argue that feminine leadership is more closely related to legislative 
rather than executive leadership (Tolleson-Rinehart, 2001). This is true, even when women are in 
more executive leadership positions, such as city managers; Fox and Schuhmann (1999) 
discovered in their study of male and female city managers that female managers were more 
  45 
likely to have seen themselves as facilitators rather than “policy entrepreneurs,” and that they 
have been more likely to incorporate the views of citizens than their male counterparts. Han 
(2003) agreed, and described the typical characteristics of women leaders as inclusive of 
“consensus decision making, viewing power as something to be shared, encouraging productive 
approaches to conflict, building supportive working environments, and promoting diversity in 
the workplace” (p. 170). Such characteristics of female leadership prompted Rosenthal (1998a) 
to label a woman’s style of leadership as “integrative leadership,” which she described as “a style 
that emphasizes mutuality and shared problem solving and collaborative win-win strategies” (p. 
19), a style Rosenthal has contended contradicts conventional notions of leadership that are male 
in orientation. Several scholars have noted that this style can be advantageous for women in high 
elected office. Han (2003) argued that the willingness to work across party lines and share power 
would greatly aid a woman who wins the presidency, as it will enable her to work effectively 
with Congress. Helgesen (1995) argued that women’s style of leadership may benefit us all, on a 
societal level, because women have tended to approach solving problems using a “big picture” 
approach, necessitating the consideration of larger effects of policy decisions before adoption.  
One idea that has resonated among scholars studying leadership, in addressing women 
who might seek executive office, such as the presidency, is the notion that women, to be 
successful in these male-dominated offices, must blend their leadership styles. Fridkin and 
Woodall (1998) argued, “…women candidates [must] stress their possession of stereotypical 
‘male’ traits, and male candidates [need to] emphasize their possession of stereotypical ‘female’ 
traits (p. 87). Han (2003) argued that this use of gender-adaptive strategies has been necessary: 
“Although party affiliation and policy preferences are still important factors among voters, the 
decline of partisan loyalty and the desire for party nominees to appeal to moderate, middle-of-
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the-road voters during the general election has placed more emphasis on the candidate as an 
individual” (p. 166). As such, being able to appeal to these voters as a person, for both men and 
women, has required that candidates build credibility in all kinds of areas and present images 
accessible to all sorts of voters, regardless of gender. Bower (2003) echoed this mentality in 
assessing the possibility of a female president in the U.S.: “…for women to fully enjoy the 
possibilities of the public domain, they must be able to demonstrate their ability with masculine 
personality traits, since the male stereotypical traits dominate in most public venues” (p. 108). 
This sentiment is shared by several scholars and is particularly true for women running for the 
presidency, or any high-ranking national office, in a climate where national security and 
terrorism have dominated the political choices of American voters (Davis, 2003; Huddy & 
Terkildsen, 1993; Rosenthal, 1998a; Rosenthal, 1998b; Wood, 2003). How women accomplish 
this task is still being debated across the nation and the discipline, but the scholarship presented 
in this chapter regarding leadership indicates that a woman pursuing the presidency will need to 
present a blended view of leadership—one that accentuates the possession of male leadership 
traits commensurate with the office of the presidency, while also demonstrating the positive 
aspects of women’s leadership. How Clinton addressed this predicament through her rhetoric, 
therefore, will be an important question to ask in dissecting how she constituted leadership 
through her discourse, and how she responded to the socio-cultural expectations of male 
leadership associated with the presidency. 
The literature in the preceding pages described the backdrop or foundation of the 
rhetorical situation facing Hillary Clinton in the 2008 Democratic primary. Truly, it is clear that 
women who seek elective office in the public, political sphere have faced countless double binds, 
gendered assumptions and expectations as they seek to challenge and bypass their conventionally 
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constructed station. But to begin an analysis of the specific structure of Clinton’s unique 
situation, the methodology guiding this study is presented in Chapter Two.  
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Chapter Two: Methodology 
 The review of literature clearly suggests that our understanding of female political 
discourse and leadership has been, and continues to be, firmly grounded in gendered stereotypes. 
Despite both female and male politicians adapting their communication techniques to overcome 
gendered expectations in order to successfully navigate the dynamic challenges associated with 
attaining and holding office in the public, political sphere, gendered stereotypes are omnipresent 
when it comes to politics. Thus, it is clear that gendered stereotypes create their own rhetorical 
situation that politicians, especially women, as they defy the traditional mold of the conventional 
political actor, must respond to in order to gain elective success. It is this understanding that 
guides the methodological approach used in this study in describing and critiquing the rhetoric of 
Hillary Rodham Clinton as she sought the Democratic nomination for president.   
 Specifically, the literature presented in Chapter One poses several questions that this 
study of Clinton’s rhetoric explicates. First, how did Clinton’s rhetoric both acknowledge and 
seek to bypass the double binds experienced by political women? Second, how did Clinton’s 
rhetoric both acknowledge the male/female trait expectations of voters, while combating the 
constraints these gendered traits entailed? Third, how did Clinton address both traditionally 
masculine and feminine issues in her campaign speeches and debate performances? Fourth, how 
did Clinton’s rhetoric respond to the gendered expectations and assumptions of voters in 
convincing them that she could be president? Fifth, in what ways did Clinton’s rhetoric respond 
to the media coverage of her campaign? Sixth and finally, in what ways did Clinton’s campaign 
rhetoric present her as a leader in order to present a positively feminine or blended approach to 
political leadership?   
  49 
To answer these questions and to both define and evaluate Hillary Rodham Clinton’s 
communicative behaviors during her quest for the presidency, I conduct a rhetorical criticism of 
Clinton’s key campaign speeches and debate performances. The procedure for conducting this 
criticism is guided by two perspectives: Bitzer’s (1968) “rhetorical situation” and Campbell’s 
(1972) methodology for conducting ‘organic’ rhetorical criticism. To foster a greater 
understanding of the methods required by these two perspectives, and in order to create a 
concrete rationale for choosing these methods, I look to each of these author’s texts separately, 
beginning with Bitzer. 
Bitzer (1968) maintained, “it is the situation which calls the discourse [rhetoric] into 
existence” (p. 2). In other words rhetors do not create speeches out of thin air, with no 
substantive cause for the creation of rhetoric; there must be some catalyst that mandates a 
specific response from a speaker. Thus, in Bitzer’s view, “…a work of rhetoric is pragmatic; it 
comes into existence for the sake of something beyond itself; it functions ultimately to produce 
action or change in the world; it performs some task” (p. 3). The task that is suggested by 
rhetoric is determined, or in Bitzer’s terminology, constrained by the situation—the specific 
psychological and physical contexts wherein people find themselves. Bitzer argued, “The 
situation dictates the sorts of observations to be made; it dictates the significant physical and 
verbal responses… it constrains the words which are uttered in the same sense that it constrains 
the physical acts” (p. 5).  
Bitzer (1968), in defining the rhetorical situation, singled out three key elements that 
composed his perspective: “[The] rhetorical situation may be defined as a complex of persons, 
events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely 
or partially removed in discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision 
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or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence” (p. 6). Thus, according to 
Bitzer’s vantage point, the three elements central to the rhetorical situation are the exigence, 
audience, and constraints. The exigence is “an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an 
obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be” (p. 6). The 
audience is also central in that “rhetoric always requires an audience…” (p. 7). Bitzer is clear, 
though, in adding that an audience “must be distinguished from a body of mere hearers or 
readers; properly speaking, a rhetorical audience consists only of those persons who are capable 
of being influenced by discourse and of being mediators of change” (p. 7-8). Finally, a rhetorical 
situation has various constraints “made up of persons, events, objects, and relations which are 
parts of the situation because they have the power to constrain decision and action needed to 
modify the exigence” (p. 8). Bitzer goes on to further define and clarify potential constraints in 
the rhetorical situation as including “beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, images, 
interests, motives, and the like” (p. 8).  
In returning to the goal of this study, Bitzer’s vantage point is helpful for understanding 
the rhetoric of a political campaign. On a basic, general level, the exigence for politicians 
running for office involves the problem of getting voters (the audience) to vote for them. This 
problem may be more of an issue for one politician over another, based on her or his particular 
background, experience, platform, etc., but the fundamental exigence remains the same. 
Multiples specific exigencies may also erupt during a political campaign, reflecting topics that 
emerge that concern voters (i.e. war, economic decline, social issues, etc.). The audience during 
a political campaign is of course voters—those receiving (demanding, in Bitzer’s view) 
rhetorical activities of politicians who are courting their votes. And the constraints are the 
various factors encountered before and during a campaign that may complicate the candidate’s 
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rhetorical activities. If one considers Hillary Clinton’s failed candidacy in 2008, Bitzer’s 
rhetorical situation becomes even more appropriate. As evidenced in the literature that has 
evaluated Clinton’s time as First Lady and during her Senate campaign in 2000, Clinton had a 
large amount of rhetorical “baggage” that could potentially have marred her bid for the 
presidency: she was deemed politically divisive, she was publicly decried for her overbearing 
and unfeminine personality, and was both lauded and reproached for her communicative style. 
Thus, Hillary Clinton arguably had an uphill battle to be won in order to secure her nomination. 
All of the information that has come to the foreground in the almost two decades since Bill 
Clinton began his first campaign for president, the background information surrounding Hillary 
Clinton’s candidacy, its historic value, combined with the problem of the double binds for 
political women, and inherent barriers facing any woman’s political ambitions, creates a rare 
point in history. Bitzer’s rhetorical situation allows us to understand not only the constraining 
nature of Clinton’s unique context, but also the ways in which Clinton attempted to overcome 
these constraints through her campaign communication.  
Bitzer’s rhetorical situation serves as the guiding lens that drives this study, but a specific 
procedure is also needed to go about defining and critiquing Clinton’s rhetoric. To that end I turn 
to Campbell’s (1972) notion of conducting organic rhetorical criticism to more fully describe the 
process used in this study. Campbell, like Bitzer, has argued that rhetoric “refers to persuasive 
discourses…that alter attitudes and actions” (p. 2). She also, like Bitzer, has argued that 
situational factors foster rhetoric and thus, must be central to the criticism of any rhetorical act: 
“Rhetoric rises out of conflict—within an individual, between individuals, or between groups. 
The basic conflict involves the perception of a problem—a gap between existing conditions and 
desired changes, or between current policies and practices and proposed goals” (p. 9). Thus, for 
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Campbell, critics must address the problems (exigencies) that give rise to rhetorical action in 
order to understand and more fully critique the success or failure of the rhetorical response to the 
problem. To accomplish such a criticism, Campbell asserted, “The critical approach [she uses in 
her text] rests on a strong personal commitment to organic or situational criticism in contrast to 
formularity or prescriptive criticism” (p. 13). In other words, Campbell contended that critics 
using her approach should avoid strict rhetorical schemas at the genesis stage of rhetorical 
criticism and ought to, instead, study the specific situation(s), rhetors, audiences, acts, etc. to 
foster a more genuine criticism that springs forth from the rhetorical situation itself. Such a 
methodology for conducting rhetorical criticism is in line with the goals of clearly defining and 
evaluating the rhetoric as created and constrained within the rhetorical situation. Campbell 
stated: “The organic approach to criticism is concerned with the specific goals of particular 
persuaders in specific contexts; it views rhetorical acts as patterns of argument and interaction 
that grow out of particular conditions. In such an approach the critic applies critical categories 
that grow out of the nature of the discourse, and [she or he] adapts the critical system to reveal 
and respond to the peculiarities of the discourse” (p. 14). 
Campbell’s (1972) organic approach to rhetorical criticism has three stages—stages that 
will guide this analysis of Clinton’s rhetoric. The first stage of the analysis is descriptive in 
nature, focusing solely on the intrinsic nature of Clinton’s rhetoric; specifically, how Clinton, 
through her use of rhetoric, “[determined] the role the speaker or writer has chosen to play, the 
ways [she] perceives and selects [her] audience, and [her] choice of persuasive strategies” (p. 
14). This first stage of analysis highlights the tone, purpose, structure, and strategies used by 
Clinton. During the second stage of organic criticism, the critic “examines the extrinsic elements 
of discourse” by looking to the historical-cultural context (e.g. rhetorical situation) the rhetor 
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operates within by looking to secondary sources of information (newspapers, magazine articles, 
interviews of relevant actors, etc.) in order to determine the extent to which the rhetoric studied 
responded to the rhetorical problems effectively or not. Finally, the third stage of organic 
criticism calls for the critic to pull both of the previous stages together in order to determine the 
patterns of behavior that are found in the discourse studied in relation to the historical-cultural 
context. Campbell noted, “in the third stage of critical analysis the critic selects or creates a 
system of criticism and determines the criteria for interpreting, evaluating, and making [her or 
his] final judgments on the rhetoric” (p. 21). It should be noted that this methodology does not 
suggest three separate parts or chapters that make up the analysis; rather, “in the final criticism 
each process is integrated into a coherently developed structure” (p. 13). Thus, the analysis 
portion of this study is comprised of separate chapters reflecting the three primary components of 
the rhetorical situation and Clinton’s response to this system of constraints in terms of her 
primary campaign communication (excerpts from her speeches and debate performances).  
Thus, in combining the two approaches to rhetoric—Bitzer’s rhetorical situation and 
Campbell’s method of organic criticism—I use close textual analysis, looking to several of 
Clinton’s campaign speeches and debate performances, in addition to various major newspaper 
and news periodical sources, to paint the over-arching picture that defined Clinton’s presidential 
primary rhetoric in terms of gender. Scholarly sources that have examined various aspects of 
Clinton’s primary campaign are utilized when appropriate to shed light on Clinton’s response to 
her rhetorical situation. As Burgchardt (2005) has made clear, “close textual analysis studies the 
relationship between the inner workings of public discourse and its historical context in order to 
discover what makes a particular text function persuasively…In practical terms, close textual 
analysis aims to reveal and explicate the precise, often hidden, mechanisms that give a particular 
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text artistic unity and rhetorical effect” (p. 563). I contend that these often hidden mechanisms 
reveal the depth of Clinton’s gendered rhetorical situation, and indeed, I argue that gendered 
expectations and conventions were omnipresent during the campaign and mandated particular 
responses by Clinton through her rhetoric. In sum, close textual analysis is used to organically 
re-create and evaluate Clinton’s use of rhetoric when posed with various rhetorical contexts in 
terms of gender.  
Before the artifacts for study are presented, the next section of this chapter presents 
information necessary to understand the nature of the 2008 Democratic Presidential Primary 
campaign generally to foster an understanding of Clinton’s specific role therein as she sought the 
nomination. 
The 2008 Democratic Presidential Nominating Race 
 The Democratic primary campaign in 2008 spanned almost eighteen months. As such, 
some context is necessary for understanding not only the broader rhetorical situation Clinton 
found herself in during the campaign, but also to provide specific context to some of the 
decisions made and strategies employed by the candidates. To that end, this section lays out the 
salient Democratic National Committee (DNC) rules for the 2008 primaries, caucuses, and 
debates as well as a timeline of events during the race that includes the relevant information 
necessary for fully understanding Clinton’s campaign.  
 First, the Democratic Party had specific rules for holding and participating in primaries 
and caucuses in order to nominate a single candidate at the national convention in Denver, 
Colorado. In 2008, the successful Democratic nominee for president needed to capture a simple 
majority of the more than 4,000 delegate votes. “State primaries and caucuses select pledged 
delegates, who are obligated to vote for the candidate their state chose. Additional unpledged 
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delegates—consisting mostly of party leaders and elected officials—are free to vote for any 
candidate” (“Primary Calendar: Democratic,” 2010, para. 1). The vast majority of convention 
delegates were from the first group of voters, though the second group—the so-called “super 
delegates”—also represented a significant nineteen percent of convention voters. As such, and as 
the analysis demonstrates clearly, all candidates who sought the Democratic nomination 
routinely courted both types of delegates (“Democratic Super Delegates,” 2010) during the 
campaign. 
 To secure these delegates at the convention, the candidates campaigned to win the 
primaries and caucuses within each individual state, and thus, a proportion of pledged delegates 
at the convention. According to the DNC’s rules in 2008, the delegates of each state were 
compelled to vote proportionally at the convention based on the number of voters who supported 
a particular candidate during these primaries and caucuses (“More primaries,” 2008). In other 
words in 2008, the DNC did not employ a “winner-takes-all” system. Indeed, while both Barack 
Obama and Hillary Clinton earned over 17 million votes among all of the individual contests, 
Obama garnered more delegate votes based on where he won by large percentages, especially in 
a collection of caucus states where Clinton had little or no organization such as Iowa, Kansas, 
and Washington. This resulted in 1,763 pledged delegates and 438 super delegates for Obama 
versus Clinton’s 1,640 pledged delegates and 256 super delegates (“Election Center 2008: 
Results,” 2008). 
 In 2008, the Democratic pledged delegates were awarded based on the results of 
individual state and territory primary elections and caucuses. The rules for such contests varied 
by state, and one state, Texas, chose in 2008 to hold both a primary election and caucuses. These 
primary elections functioned in much the same way as general elections—voters cast their secret 
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ballot for a particular candidate—while the caucuses were quite different, as Longley (2010) 
explained:  
 Caucuses are simply meetings, open to all registered voters of the party, at which  
delegates to the party’s national convention are selected. When the caucus begins, the 
voters in attendance divide themselves into groups according to the candidate they 
support. The undecided voters congregate into their own groups and prepare to be 
‘courted’ by supporters of other candidates. Voters in each group are then invited to give 
speeches supporting their candidate and trying to persuade others to join their group. At 
the end of the caucus, party organizers count the voters in each candidate’s group and 
calculate how many delegates to the county convention each candidate has won (para. 6-
7). 
Thus, in order to win the nomination, candidates had to not only persuade registered citizens to 
vote for them in primary elections, in caucus states they also needed to persuade surrogates to 
speak on their behalf effectively in order to secure undecided voters.  
 Another rules-based issue that occurred during the 2008 Democratic primary season 
involved the states of Florida and Michigan—two delegate-rich states that many believed Clinton 
would carry. The DNC had ruled in 2007 that no states except Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, 
and South Carolina could host primaries before February 5, 2008. In spite of this edict, Michigan 
held their primary on January 15, 2008 and the Florida primary took place on January 29, 2008. 
Once these states had scheduled their primaries before the February 5 date, the DNC mandated 
that the presidential nominees could not actively campaign in either state before their primaries. 
After the primaries in these states were held (Clinton won both of them just ahead of Obama), 
the DNC ruled that the delegates from each of these states would not be seated at the national 
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convention, and thus, the pledged delegates won would not count to the overall total for any 
candidate because of the rules violations (“Timeline: 2008,” 2008). It was later decided on May 
31, 2008 that the delegates from these states would be seated at the summer convention, but with 
only half-votes. And because Obama had placed second in each of these states, the compromise 
decided on by the DNC helped to push Obama over the necessary delegate total to secure the 
nomination. 
 Additionally, because this study focuses not only on Clinton’s key speeches but also 
some of her key debate performances during the campaign, a brief explanation regarding the 
rules for these events is also useful. During the 2008 primary cycle, there were twenty-six 
debates that involved Democratic candidates. Each of these debates were held by various 
sponsors, including news organizations, state and local Democratic Party chapters, and 
universities or colleges. Each debate also featured its own set of rules (i.e. some allowed opening 
and closing statements while others did not, some had strict time limitations in which candidates 
could respond to questions while others were less formal, etc.) and the debates were sometimes 
centered around specific themes (i.e. foreign policy, domestic policy, specific issues like the War 
on Terror or the economy, etc.). Each of the debates also maintained guidelines for including or 
not including certain candidates running for the nomination; these guidelines varied by each 
debate, but common factors used to determine who could or could not participate included: the 
amount of money raised by the candidate, the presence of staff or offices in the states where the 
debates took place, the sufficiency of polling numbers at the time of the debate, and, once the 
contests began, the amount of delegates won by the candidate. 
Finally, because the campaign was incredibly lengthy, I have included in this section a 
timeline of major events during the race to foster a greater sense of clarity in the analysis 
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chapters. While it does not include every possible event during the campaign, it does include the 
salient national and international events, caucus and primary dates (as well as the Democratic 
winners in each contest), and all of the dates of the key speeches and debates analyzed in this 
study. The information that follows was compiled primarily from the website of Johns Hopkins 
University’s Department of Governmental Studies (“Timeline: 2008 Primary, 2008) and is 
supplemented by the CNN Election Center (“Results: Democrats,” 2008) and 
www.youdecidepolitics.com (“Full 2008 Democratic,” 2007). The timeline is as follows: 
April 17, 2006  Mike Gravel, former senator from Alaska announces his candidacy for the  
Democratic nomination for president—the first candidate among both 
Democrats and Republicans to do so. 
November 5, 2006  Saddam Hussein is found guilty of crimes against humanity and sentenced  
to death by an Iraqi tribunal. 
November 7, 2006  In the US midterm elections, the Democrats take control of both the House  
and Senate, with 230 seats and 51 seats respectively. 
November 30, 2006  Tom Vilsack, former governor of Iowa, announces his candidacy for the  
Democratic nomination. 
December 12, 2006  Ohio Congressman Dennis Kucinich announces his candidacy for the  
Democratic nomination. 
December 28, 2006  Former North Carolina Senator and 2004 Vice Presidential nominee John  
Edwards announces his candidacy for the Democratic nomination. 
January 10, 2007  Republican President George W. Bush announces a new strategy for the  
war in Iraq, dubbed a “surge.” The number of troops to be sent is set at  
21,500. 
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January 11, 2007  Connecticut Senator Chris Dodd announces his candidacy for the  
Democratic nomination. 
January 20, 2007  New York Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton announces her candidacy for  
president via a video address on her campaign website.  
January 21, 2007  New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson announces his candidacy for the  
Democratic nomination. 
January 23, 2007   Tom Vilsack exits the race. 
January 31, 2007   Delaware Senator Joe Biden announces his candidacy for the Democratic  
nomination. 
February 10, 2007  Illinois Senator Barack Obama announces his candidacy for the  
Democratic nomination. 
March 4, 2007  Bill Clinton makes his first (perceived) public campaign appearance, along  
with both Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, at a rally commemorating 
“Bloody Sunday” in Selma, Alabama. 
April 26, 2007   The first Democratic Primary Debate is held in Orangeburg, South  
Carolina (Participants: Biden, Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, Gravel, Kucinich,  
Obama, and Richardson). 
May 3, 2007   Oprah Winfrey endorses Barack Obama (a first for the talk show host). 
June 3, 2007  A Democratic Primary Debate is held in Manchester, New Hampshire  
(Participants: Biden, Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, Gravel, Kucinich, Obama, 
and Richardson) 
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June 28, 2007 A Democratic Primary Debate is held in Washington, D.C. (Participants: 
Biden, Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, Gravel, Kucinich, Obama, and 
Richardson) 
July 12, 2007  A Democratic Primary Debate is held in Detroit, Michigan (Participants:  
Biden, Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, Gravel, Kucinich, Obama, and  
Richardson). 
July 23, 2007  A Democratic Primary Debate is held in Charleston, South Carolina  
(Participants: Biden, Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, Gravel, Kucinich, Obama, 
and Richardson). 
August 4, 2007 A Democratic Primary Debate is held in Chicago, Illinois (Participants:  
Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, Gravel, Kucinich, Obama, and Richardson). 
August 7, 2007 A Democratic Primary Debate is held in Chicago, Illinois (Participants:  
Biden, Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, Kucinich, Obama, and Richardson). 
August 9, 2007 A Democratic Primary Debate is held in Los Angeles, California 
(Participants: Clinton, Edwards, Gravel, Kucinich, Obama, and 
Richardson). 
August 19, 2007 A Democratic Primary Debate is held in Des Moines, Iowa (Participants: 
Biden, Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, Gravel, Kucinich, Obama, and 
Richardson). 
September 9, 2007 A Democratic Primary Debate is held in Coral Gables, Florida 
(Participants: Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, Gravel, Kucinich, Obama, and 
Richardson). 
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September 12, 2007 A Democratic Primary Debate is held online (Participants: Biden,  
Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, Gravel, Kucinich, Obama, and Richardson). 
September 20, 2007 A Democratic Primary Debate is held in Davenport, Iowa (Participants:  
Biden, Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, and Richardson). 
September 26, 2007 A Democratic Primary Debate is held in Hanover, New Hampshire  
(Participants: Biden, Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, Gravel, Kucinich, Obama, 
and Richardson). 
October 30, 2007 A Democratic Primary Debate is held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  
(Participants: Biden, Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, Kucinich, Obama, and 
Richardson). 
November 15, 2007 A Democratic Primary Debate is held in Las Vegas, Nevada (Participants: 
Biden, Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, Kucinich, Obama, and Richardson). 
December 4, 2007 A radio-only Democratic Primary Debate is held in Des Moines, Iowa  
(Participants: Biden, Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, Gravel, Kucinich, and 
Obama). 
December 13, 2007 A Democratic Primary Debate is held in Johnston, Iowa (Participants:  
Biden, Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, Obama, and Richardson). 
December 16, 2007   Hillary Clinton delivers a speech in Council Bluffs, Iowa. 
January 3, 2008  Barack Obama wins the Iowa Caucuses, while Chris Dodd and Joe Biden  
exit the race; Hillary Clinton’s presents a speech after the Iowa caucus  
results are announced. 
January 5, 2008 A Democratic Primary Debate is held in Manchester, New Hampshire  
(Participants: Clinton, Edwards, Obama, and Richardson). 
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January 7, 2008   Hillary Clinton allegedly tears up at an informal gathering of undecided,  
female voters in New Hampshire. 
January 8, 2008   Hillary Clinton wins the New Hampshire Primary and delivers a speech  
thanking supporters. 
January 10, 2008   Bill Richardson exits the race. 
January 15, 2008   The Michigan primaries are held but the DNC rules that no delegates from  
this primary will be seated at the national convention because Democratic  
Party rules prohibit states other than Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, and  
South Carolina from holding nominating contests before February 5. 
Also, a Democratic Primary Debate is held in Las Vegas, Nevada  
(Participants: Clinton, Edwards, and Obama). 
January 19, 2008  Hillary Clinton wins the Nevada Caucuses. 
January 21, 2008   A Democratic Primary Debate is held in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina  
(Participants: Clinton, Edwards, and Obama). 
January 25, 2008   Dennis Kucinich exits the race. 
January 26, 2008   Barack Obama wins the South Carolina Primary. 
January 27, 2008   Barack Obama receives endorsements from Caroline Kennedy (daughter  
of former President John F. Kennedy) and Massachusetts Senator Ted  
Kennedy. 
January 29, 2008   Florida primaries are held but the Democratic National Committee rules  
that no delegates from the Democratic Primary will be seated at the 
National Convention because Democratic Party rules prohibit states other 
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than Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, and South Carolina from holding 
nominating contests before February 5. 
January 30, 2008   John Edwards exits the race. 
January 31, 2008   The first debate between just Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama is held in  
Los Angeles, California. 
February 2, 2008 A Democratic Primary Debate is held in New York, New York between  
Clinton and Obama. 
February 5, 2008   Super Tuesday (the largest day of the primary season); Primaries for 22  
states are held. Barack Obama wins Alabama, Alaska, Colorado,  
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, 
Missouri, North Dakota, and Utah. Hillary Clinton wins Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. Clinton delivers a speech thanking 
supporters for their efforts. 
February 6, 2008   With the race between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton being very  
close (909 delegates for Obama and 884 delegates for Clinton), DNC  
Chairman Howard Dean proclaims, “we’re going to have to get the 
candidates together and make some kind of arrangement if there is no 
nominee by April” (“Timeline: 2008 Primary,” 2008, para. 55). 
February 7, 2008   The DNC announces that it is considering a possible revote in Michigan  
and Florida. 
February 9, 2008   Barack Obama wins the Louisiana, US Virgin Islands, Washington, and  
Nebraska Democratic Primaries. 
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February 10, 2008   Barack Obama wins the Maine Democratic Caucus. 
February 21, 2008 A Democratic Primary Debate is held in Austin, Texas between Clinton  
and Obama. 
February 26, 2008   A Democratic Primary Debate is held in Cleveland, Ohio between  
Clinton and Obama. 
March 4, 2008   Hillary Clinton wins the Rhode Island, Ohio, and Texas Primaries while  
Barack Obama wins the Vermont Primary and Texas Caucuses. Arizona 
Senator John McCain passes the 1,191-delegate threshold and becomes the 
presumptive GOP nominee. 
March 8, 2008   Barack Obama wins the Wyoming Democratic Caucus. 
March 11, 2008   Barack Obama wins the Mississippi Democratic Primary. 
March 14, 2008   Controversy arises over Obama’s pastor Jeremiah Wright’s past remarks  
on race and patriotism. 
March 17, 2008   Hillary Clinton tells a crowd at George Washington University that,  
during a trip to Bosnia in 1996, she landed at the airport amid sniper fire. 
March 26, 2008   Mike Gravel exits the race. 
April 13, 2008  A Democratic Primary Debate is held in Grantham, Pennsylvania  
between Clinton and Obama. 
April 16, 2008   The final Democratic Primary Debate between Hillary Clinton and Barack  
Obama is held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
April 22, 2008   Hillary Clinton wins the Pennsylvania Democratic Primary.  
May 6, 2008    Hillary Clinton wins the Indiana Democratic Primary. Barack Obama  
wins the North Carolina Democratic Primary. 
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May 7, 2008    Dmitry Medvedev is sworn in as President of Russia. A day later, his  
predecessor Vladimir Putin is elected Prime Minister by Parliament. 
May 13, 2008   Hillary Clinton wins the West Virginia Democratic Primary. 
May 15, 2008   2004 Vice Presidential Candidate John Edwards formally endorses Barack  
Obama. 
May 20, 2008   Hillary Clinton wins the Kentucky Democratic Primary. Barack Obama  
wins the Oregon Democratic Primary. 
May 31, 2008   Democratic Party leaders agree to seat the disputed Michigan and Florida  
delegations with half-votes at the summer convention. 
June 1, 2008    Hillary Clinton wins the Puerto Rico Democratic Primary. 
June 3, 2008    Barack Obama wins the Montana Primary, the last Democratic contest of  
2008. 
June 5, 2008    Hillary Clinton officially concedes to Obama, effectively ending her  
presidential bid. 
All political parties have rules and regulations, but given the events of the 2008 
Democratic nomination race, it is clear that the rules for both the nomination and assignment of 
delegates and the rules violations by Florida and Michigan created a unique backdrop for the 
Democratic candidates’ discourse. And, as the timeline indicates, the race for the Democratic 
nomination was both incredibly lengthy and, at times, turbulent for both the DNC and the 
candidates involved. Indeed, because the pledged delegates were assigned proportionally, and 
because many of the super delegates delayed making their choice of candidates until late in the 
race or shifted their allegiances during the campaign, both Clinton and Obama had to continue 
their primary campaigns far longer than most candidates representing any party in recent history.  
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Thus, to facilitate an analysis of Clinton’s campaign rhetoric in 2008, the next section of this 
chapter presents the specific artifacts analyzed in this study as well as the rational for their 
selection. 
Artifacts for Study 
 To begin our exploration and criticism, Clinton’s speeches during the 2008 Democratic 
Primary campaign were located on the candidate’s website (www.hillaryclinton.com). The 
speeches span in time from January 2007, when she began her campaign, until her speech after 
the conclusion of the Super Tuesday contests. A cross-section of five specific speeches was 
chosen from the possible hundreds of Clinton’s addresses during the race for their ability to 
demonstrate key moments during the campaign, as well as much of the chronological breadth of 
the campaign. Specifically, this study analyzes 1) Clinton’s announcement speech—a videotaped 
address wherein she formally announced her candidacy and set the tone for her campaign, 2) her 
major address in Council Bluffs, Iowa in December 2007, 3) her speech directly after her poor 
showing at the Iowa Caucuses, 4) her speech after winning the New Hampshire primary, and 5) 
her Super Tuesday speech.   
Similarly, while Clinton participated in all twenty-six Democratic presidential primary 
debates during the race, five of Clinton’s debate performances are analyzed via transcripts, 
accessed electronically from various news organizations (including The New York Times, CNN, 
and MSNBC) that also represent the key moments and chronological nature of the primary 
campaign. Specifically, this study analyzes Clinton’s rhetoric during 1) the first Democratic 
primary debate on April 26, 2007, 2) the last debate with more than just the last two candidates 
involved on January 21, 2008, 3) the first debate with just Clinton and Obama participating on 
January 31, 2008, 4) the middle debate of the five involving only Clinton and Obama, that took 
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place on February 26, 2008, and 5) the final debate between Clinton and Obama on April 16, 
2008.  
 Rather than analyzing each of the above speeches and debates separately, I follow 
Campbell’s lead and use examples from each of them, in concert with historical-cultural sources 
found from various major newspapers (i.e. The New York Times, The Washington Post, USA 
Today, etc.) in order to establish the audiences, exigencies, and constraints guiding each of 
Clinton’s speeches and debate performances, and thus, to critique Clinton’s response as effective 
or ineffective in terms of gender. The newspapers utilized in this study were chosen based on 
their readership (as all are widely available and read by millions each day), and the specific 
articles or reports were chosen based on relevance and the temporal connection between the 
report and the speeches and debate performances analyzed. Each article was located using the 
Lexis-Nexis database or by viewing the specific website of the news organization.  
While the overarching goal of this study is to explain Clinton’s communication 
rhetorically, such an analysis, as it is rhetorical in nature, will also involve criticism. The 
literature presented in Chapter One provides a basis for evaluating and critiquing Clinton’s 
rhetoric in terms of gender. Thus, these studies are used to evaluate the ways in which gendered 
expectations and conventions constitute the rhetorical situation, and to analyze the ways in which 
Clintons’ rhetoric addresses gender. While I am not attempting to answer the complex, umbrella 
question of why Clinton failed in her efforts, this analysis points out several ways in which 
Clinton’s campaign rhetoric failed to respond to the rhetorical problems she attempted to address 
throughout her candidacy for president. 
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Chapter Three: Analysis of Clinton’s Audience  
Bitzer (1968) maintained that rhetoric is constrained by several factors, among these are 
audiences who must be convinced through rhetoric to support individuals or actions to solve 
various problems. The audience, for Bitzer, is crucial to consider in terms of deciding whether or 
not rhetors construct and deliver messages that are “fitting” responses to rhetorical situations. 
Campbell (1972) concurred, asserting that rhetoric is inherently practical, seeking “to alter 
symbolic behavior, attitude, and/or action” among audience members (p. 2-3). In other words, it 
is the audience that provides the grounds for rhetorical acts; without audiences who could take 
action, rhetoric would be unnecessary. For the purposes of this study, the audience is comprised 
of those voters Hillary Clinton had to persuade in order to secure support for funding, service, 
positive word-of-mouth assessments, and ultimately votes. When looking at Hillary Clinton’s 
specific audience during the 2008 presidential primary campaign, closer inspection reveals that 
the audience is made up of ordinary citizens, party leaders, and members of the press—a 
complex amalgam of individuals. 
The audience perceptions of Hillary Clinton and how she adjusted to them through her 
rhetoric were made more complex by the fact that she was a woman seeking the highest elective 
position in the United States. After close textual analysis of dozens of news stories about 
Clinton’s campaign, and looking at Clinton’s own rhetoric addressing her audience, it is clear 
that the various audiences that comprised Clinton’s rhetorical situation were a constant source of 
frustration for her as she sought the Democratic nomination for president. Strategically, the 
immediate audience in a presidential primary is likely voters. However, everything that is said in 
a primary contributes to perceptions and potential support in a general election, Thus, Clinton 
had to target likely voters but also maintain a sense of the larger audience. 
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Additionally, the voting behaviors exhibited in the 2008 Democratic primary season 
represented a dramatic shift from previous presidential primaries, further complicating Clinton’s 
task. Typically, presidential primary voters tend to be fewer in number than in general elections, 
representing “diehard” party supporters. But the Democratic primary race in 2008 saw two trends 
complicating Clinton’s approach to her audience, generally. First, record numbers of voters, 
especially new or first-time primary voters, took part in the process. Kent Garber, writing for 
U.S. News and World Report summed up this trend clearly: 
In the first five weeks of 2008, ‘voter turnout’ was a phrase that was used almost  
exclusively in connection with the Democratic Party. There were routine stories of 
precincts running short on ballots, poll hours being extended, and voters packing haunch 
to paunch inside community centers and local churches. Crowd sizes were described, 
often with growing awe, as ‘staggering,’ ‘record breaking,’ or ‘unprecedented.’ The 
actual numbers justified the claims. From January 3, the day of the Iowa caucuses, to 
February 5, i.e. Super Tuesday, when more than 20 states held nominating contests, more 
than 19.1 million American cast a ballot in a Democratic primary (or caucused as a 
Democrat)…On a state-by-state basis, Democrats had higher turnouts than Republicans 
in 19 out of 25 states (2008, para. 1-3). 
Garber’s sentiments were echoed by New York Times writer Katharine Q. Seelye, who reported, 
“Over all, turnout was 27 percent of eligible citizens, breaking the record of 25.9 percent set 
during the 1972 primaries, according to the Center for the Study of the American Electorate at 
American University” (2008a, para. 2). With more voters taking part in the primary season, some 
of which had never voted in a primary election before, the audience became far less predictable 
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for Clinton, and thus, it became far more difficult to target voters with whom her campaign was 
unfamiliar.  
Second, record numbers of young voters cast ballots and caucused during the primary 
season in 2008, especially for Barack Obama. “According to the NBC exit polls [on Super 
Tuesday], young voters’ share of the Democratic electorate on Feb. 5 was higher in nearly every 
state for which a good comparison with 2004 is available. In all of the 2008 contests for which 
exit poll data are available, young people have constituted an average (median) of 14% of 
Democratic primary voters, up from a median of 9% in the set of comparable contests in 2004” 
(Keeter, 2008, para. 3). It became clear early on during the primary voting season that more 
young people were voting than ever before and were excited about voting and taking part in the 
election, and primarily this was because of the excitement caused by Barack Obama’s candidacy. 
As later analysis demonstrates, Obama’s appeal to young voters of all races, socio-economic 
backgrounds, and regardless of gender, represented a key problem for Clinton’s campaign.  
With this general backdrop in mind, and despite her many years of experience with 
campaigning and dealing with Democratic voters, Clinton was at a loss during her campaign as 
to how to effectively approach her audiences. Generally, the audiences to whom Clinton spoke 
were problematic due to shifts in perception between the beginning and the end of the race, and 
because of the expectations espoused by audience members that went unsatisfied by Clinton 
during her campaign. To fully understand the audience component of Clinton’s rhetorical 
situation, several salient topics during the campaign are analyzed over the next few pages: 
Perceptions regarding Clinton’s initial status as the frontrunner, the erosion of Clinton’s female 
voting base, Clinton’s response to sexism, voters’ perception of Clinton’s use of negative 
campaigning, and Clinton’s appeal to super delegates. 
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Perceptions Regarding Clinton’s Initial Status as the Frontrunner 
Clinton began the campaign with confidence and ease, seemingly avoiding the 
complications most female politicians face when attempting to secure support from citizens. 
Months before she made the online announcement that she was, indeed, forming a presidential 
exploratory committee, speculation abounded that she was going to run, and that when she 
finally made such an announcement, she would be the lead contender (Wolf, 2007). Indeed, 
absent Barack Obama, who had made a name for himself among Democrats because of his 
compelling speech at the 2004 Democratic National Convention, and John Edwards, who had 
run as John Kerry’s vice presidential nominee in the 2004 presidential election, none of her 
Democrat rivals were perceived as standouts. As such, according to some of the early polls, 
Clinton dominated her fellow Democratic candidates by double-digit margins, and a majority of 
voters viewed Clinton favorably (Balz, 2007b; Balz & Craig, 2008; Kantor, 2008b; Kiely, 2007; 
Kornblut & Cohen, 2007). Many of these same polls also indicated that, nationally, Clinton 
enjoyed a slight lead or was running even in hypothetical matchups with Republican rivals John 
McCain, Mitt Romney, and Rudy Giuliani (Balz, 2007b).  
Hillary Clinton’s lead in the polls led many, including many of Clinton’s campaign staff 
members, to believe that the Democratic nomination race would be short—most likely wrapped 
up by early February 2008 (“Super Tuesday voters,” 2008). Indeed, the early polling success that 
Clinton enjoyed shocked few political insiders. Hillary Clinton, after all, was a political celebrity 
(Murray & Kane, 2008). Balz (2007b) characterized Clinton’s persona early in the campaign 
succinctly: 
As a former first lady now serving her second term in the Senate, she has one of the best- 
known names in American politics. She has a national network of supporters, the  
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capacity to raise as much or more money than any of her rivals, and a résumé of political  
activity dating back decades that now includes six years in the Senate and a landslide  
reelection victory in November. And for the past 15 years, she has shown an ability to  
weather sometimes harsh attacks from her critics, especially among conservatives (para.  
10-11). 
Clinton’s celebrity compelled many to travel long distances to meet and support her, and it was 
also noted in the early days that Clinton received far more requests for photos and autographs 
than any of her competitors (Leibovich, 2007). Thus, Clinton did not face many of the barriers 
that women like her have typically faced in running for political office (barriers like establishing 
name recognition, setting up networks of supporters and donors, challenging male incumbents, 
etc.). As such, Clinton was able to approach her audience conversationally, reminiscent of a 
traditionally feminine rhetorical style. Clinton stated, “I’m not just starting a campaign, though, 
I’m beginning a conversation—with you, with America” (Clinton, 2007a, para. 2).  
When Clinton finally announced that she was forming a presidential exploratory 
committee, instead of a formal, conventional message, viewers witnessed Clinton lounging 
comfortably on a couch, acting more as a peer conversing with friends rather than “the single 
most powerful woman in America” announcing her bid for the most powerful political position 
in the nation (Murray & Kane, 2008, para. 22). Hornaday (2007) characterized the 
announcement for The Washington Post succinctly: “Perched almost comfortably on a shabby-
chic couch with a carefully rumpled pillow at her back, Clinton spoke in that intimate tone 
befitting her rhetoric, which focused on words like “conversation” and “chat” (para. 3). As 
support for Hornaday’s assertion, within her short announcement speech, Clinton noted that she 
would hold live video chats during the following weeks in order to see what Americans felt were 
  73 
the salient issues in the 2008 election (Lawrence, 2007a). This strategy was wise, given what we 
know about how women, and presidential contenders, have most effectively approached citizens. 
Such an approach to her announcement seemed in keeping with Campbell’s (1989; 1998) 
feminine rhetorical style previously articulated, and was a wise way to approach the 
announcement via a polished, highly produced video message, establishing a sense of intimacy 
between Clinton and voters on par with the advice offered previously by Han (2003) and 
Jamieson (1988). This approach to communicating with voters also was sound given the 
pervasive negative opinions regarding Clinton that haunted her since Bill Clinton first ran for 
president. A conversational approach would seem to have helped counteract these negative 
perceptions since Hillary Clinton had widely been perceived as unfeminine, dominating, 
controlling, and uncaring (Anderson & Sheeler, 2005; Corrigan, 2000; Dubriwny, 2005; Parry-
Giles, 2000; Parry-Giles & Blair, 2002; Parry-Giles & Parry-Giles, 1996). As such, because 
Clinton approached her audience in a more traditionally feminine way, she was able to enjoy an 
early lead in polls. 
However, once the speeches, debates, and ad wars began, Hillary Clinton’s rhetoric 
shifted from this conversational approach to a more traditional campaign format, which left the 
audience more in a spectator role rather than that of a participant as initially offered by Clinton. 
Consequently, the audience seemed to turn on Clinton on a number of fronts, especially as the 
Iowa and New Hampshire contests loomed closer. Part of the problem, as discussed in Chapter 
Five (analysis of constraints), was the nature of the contest in Iowa and her subsequent defeat in 
these caucuses. Nagourney and Healy (2007) opined that the Clinton campaign was ignorant of 
the nature of the caucus system in Iowa, and theorized that Iowans viewed the Clinton team as 
even arrogant about Clinton’s chances despite Obama’s narrow lead in the polls in the run up to 
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the caucuses. Indeed, both Obama and Edwards were doing better than Clinton in the polls, and 
both ended up beating her on January 3 (Healy, 2007b). Kornblut (2009b) suggested that Mark 
Penn, Hillary Clinton’s campaign manager, was primarily at fault for Clinton’s lackluster 
performances in caucus states, and contended that he was not even aware until later in the race 
that the Democratic Party did not utilize the ‘winner-take-all’ model of primary contests utilized 
by Republicans. Whatever the case may have been, Clinton’s status as frontrunner quickly 
diminished once the primaries began.  
The perceptions that led to Clinton’s decline in favor among her audience was due to 
many factors, one being the perception that she was ill-equipped to handle the political climate in 
Iowa and New Hampshire which had changed since her husband had taken office. “Some New 
Hampshire Democrats expressed concern that Mrs. Clinton’s first dinner with political players 
from that state, on Dec. 9, was limited to three who were active in her husband’s campaigns in 
the 1990s and not a broader group that reflected the vanguard of state party politics today” 
(Healy & Nagourney, 2007, para. 28). Such a concern among voters was warranted in that it 
contradicted the personalized, intimate tone set by Clinton early in her campaign. It is important 
to remember the glut of research suggesting the specific traits associated with female politicians; 
among other characteristics, voters expect women to embody honesty, integrity, cooperation with 
others, and an emphasis on relationships with voters (Banwart & McKinney, 2005; Buchanan, 
1996; Bystrom, 2004; Clift & Brazaitis, 2000; Dolan, 1998; Fox & Schuhmann, 1999; Gilligan, 
1993; Han, 2003; Helgesen, 1995; Witt, et al., 1994). Thus, when Clinton seemed to embody 
traditionally feminine characteristics and styles while also defying many of the expected traits of 
female politicians, voters likely became confused, unable to reconcile the two images. The result, 
arguably, was a loss of support when Clinton’s actions (utilizing conventional tactics positioning 
  75 
voters as spectators) did not seemingly match her rhetoric (evoking the unconventional, feminine 
context of a conversation) when communicating with voters. 
Others contended that Clinton’s central issue was not appearing likeable and warm, 
causing voters to shift their allegiances to Obama or Edwards who seemed to embody these 
characteristics. After all, Obama and Edwards regularly self-disclosed aspects of their lives and 
personalities; whereas Clinton regularly avoided such displays. One prominent exception to this 
personality trait of Clinton’s was witnessed on the eve of the New Hampshire primary when 
Clinton allegedly cried—or almost cried. After coming in third in the Iowa caucuses, and facing 
pressure from all sides about her chances in New Hampshire, Clinton became emotional at an 
informal gathering of undecided female voters. Healy (2008b) summed up this event succinctly: 
Everything is on the table inside Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton’s campaign if she loses  
the New Hampshire primary on Tuesday, her advisers say—including her style of 
campaigning, which shifted dramatically on Monday when Mrs. Clinton bared her 
thoughts about the race’s impact on her personally, and her eyes welled with tears: ‘I 
couldn’t do it if I just didn’t passionately believe it was the right thing to do,’ she said 
here in reply to a question from an undecided voter, a woman roughly Mrs. Clinton’s age. 
Her eyes visibly wet, in perhaps the most public display of emotion of her year-old 
campaign, Mrs. Clinton added: ‘I have so many opportunities from this country, I just 
don’t want to see us fall backwards. This is very personal for me—it’s not just political, 
it’s not just public.’ Mrs. Clinton did not cry, but her quavering voice and the flash of 
feeling underscored the pressure, fatigue, anger and disappointment that, advisers say, 
Mrs. Clinton has experienced since her loss on Thursday in the Iowa caucuses and that 
she continues to shoulder at this most critical moment (para. 2-5). 
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Once word of Clinton’s ‘break down’ spread, countless voters and news reporters began 
speculating about the incident, wondering if it was an authentic moment of self-disclosure or a 
calculated action designed to convince voters who doubted Clinton’s warmth and sincerity to 
vote for the former First Lady. Dalia Lithwick, a blogger for Slate.com, summed up the fears of 
this latter segment of the audience after this incident on the eve of the New Hampshire primary: 
“…How does a woman who has worn so many masks; who is so dependent on pollsters; and 
who is backed by a huge political machine going to sustain being the warm, likable person we 
glimpsed?” (“Did ‘near-tear,’” 2008, para. 2). Lithwick was certainly not alone in her doubts 
about Clinton’s authenticity, and several major news sources carried stories speculating as to 
whether Clinton’s alleged tears on the trail were motivated by genuine emotion or political 
profiteering (Dowd, 2008; Healy, 2008b; Kantor, 2008a; Kantor, 2008b; Kornblut, 2008). 
Regardless of the reality behind Clinton’s actions, the general perception widely reported was 
that Clinton was rarely emotional, causing a perceptual disconnect between herself and voters, 
and necessitating a rhetorical response or demonstration by the candidate that never came during 
the rest of campaign. 
Understanding that her support among voters was waning, Clinton needed to address the 
issue rhetorically, namely through her campaign speeches and debate performances. One way 
Clinton addressed the issue was to cite several examples and stories from individuals whom she 
had encountered on the campaign trail in order to implicitly deny her lack of connection with 
voters. During her speech in Council Bluffs, Iowa, she spoke of “Connie Gronstal and her 
daughter Kate and her husband Mike” who all joined the campaign to support her, and of the 
anonymous Iowan who told her how his newly-registered 18-year-old daughter was going to 
caucus for Clinton, along with the 102-year old man she had met who would be doing the same 
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thing (Clinton, 2007b, para. 2). This type of strategy, that stressed her connection to voters, was a 
common element of Clinton’s rhetoric. In New Hampshire, Clinton said, “I’ve met families in 
this state and all over our country…” (Clinton, 2008b, para. 3). Even after her glaring defeat in 
the Iowa caucuses (coming in third behind Obama and Edwards), Clinton approached her Iowa 
audience as a gathering of friends, and noted that she had “more than six million union members 
who support my candidacy,” seemingly trying to disprove or mitigate, rhetorically, the outcome 
of the caucuses (Clinton, 2008a, para. 18).  
This was an apt move for Clinton as during times of trouble during the campaign, the 
tone of media headlines perpetuated the idea that Clinton was too distant from actual voters, and 
relied instead on polling numbers to determine her strategies. Nagourney and Healy (2007) made 
this implication by clearly titling their article, “Feeling Heat, Clinton Tries Iowa Up Close,” 
while Lawrence (2008b) seemingly decried Clinton’s poor showing as a result of poor strategy 
with her article entitled, “Strategy Plays Big Role in Caucus Win; Obama’s Score Vs. Clinton’s 
Reflects Campaign Choices.”  
In New Hampshire, after her surprise win in the primary, Clinton was clearer than ever in 
trying to demonstrate a real bond with the voting public when she claimed, “Over the last week, I 
listened to you and in the process, I found my own voice. I felt like we all spoke from our hearts, 
and I am so grateful that you responded” (Clinton, 2008b, para. 1-2). Clinton continued to 
develop this theme throughout the rest of this victory speech, perpetuating the idea that she did, 
regardless of what polling may have indicated, have many vocal supporters who would, in the 
end, propel her to victory. Clinton (2008b) stated, “I believe deeply in America, in our can-do 
spirit, in our ability to meet any challenge and solve any problem. I believe in what we can do 
together. In the future, we will build together” (para. 6). Perhaps most clearly, Clinton ended her 
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New Hampshire victory speech by declaring: “Every single day, I am not going out there on my 
own. I am going out there accompanied by millions and millions of people who believe, as I do, 
that this country is worth fighting for” (Clinton, 2008b, para. 17). Thus, Clinton’s key speeches 
during the campaign seemed ignorant of the reality of her rhetorical situation. In the face of 
waning support, Clinton used her speeches to make it seem as if she had countless supporters and 
friends who would help her succeed. And while this may have reflected a Clinton campaign 
strategy of diminishing the importance of the early contests in lieu of presenting the image of a 
campaign that enjoyed a national base of support, Clinton’s rhetoric failed to match the reality 
her audience witnessed in Iowa and other states wherein Clinton lost. As such, Clinton’s 
rhetorical strategy was ineffective in responding to the early challenges that the Iowa caucuses 
represented for her candidacy in terms of declining support. 
In response to the challenges that her campaign support was eroding, Clinton was also 
careful in her speeches to demonstrate the intense support she allegedly enjoyed from a variety 
of different voting blocks. In her remarks on Super Tuesday, Clinton stated, “Tonight, we are 
hearing the voices of people all across America. People of all ages and of all colors, all faiths and 
all walks of life” (Clinton, 2008c, para. 2-3). On Super Tuesday, Clinton also made a rare 
reference to the historic nature of her candidacy as a woman, perhaps in an attempt to shore up 
the fickle women’s vote that was dwindling. Clinton noted, “I want to thank all my friends and 
family, particularly my mother, who was born before women could vote, and is watching her 
daughter on this stage tonight” (Clinton, 2008c, para. 21). Still, remarks like these were 
infrequent and did not sway voters sufficiently.  
She adopted this same type of strategy throughout her debate performances, as well. 
During the January 2008 South Carolina debate, Clinton prefaced one of her comments by 
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stating, “…What I hear as I go in and out of people’s homes and talk to so many…” (“The 
Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, para. 203). Later in this same debate, Clinton attempted to 
soften the image created by and through the press (and in the minds of voters) that she was 
unfeeling or uncaring. She asserted that the election was… 
…about the people of America. And my voice is their voice. What I want to do is take  
not only my 35 years of experience into the White House, but I want to take all those 
voices of these extraordinary Americans who come up to me and tell me their stories and 
give me hope and inspiration that I can do something for them. Because that’s what it’s 
about for me…I want to be the champion that once again gives Americans the feeling 
that they have a president who cares about them and can produce results for them. And 
that’s what I intend to do (“The Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, para. 596-597). 
In her first debate with only Senator Obama, she also attempted to dispel the idea that her 
support was eroding with subtle lines like “…I’ve been going to town halls all over America, and 
I see the people out there, thousands of them who come to hear me speak…” (“Transcript of 
Thursdays,” 2008, para. 274). Later in this debate, she also tried to soften her image by 
presenting a nurturing persona reminiscent of the feminine style: “…day after day, what I spend 
my time working on is trying to help pick up the pieces for families and for injured soldiers, you 
know, trying to make sure that they get the help that they need…” (para. 493).  
This strategy wherein Clinton attempted to convey warmth and sincerity to her audience 
was also evident in the February 26, 2008 debate against Obama—a debate that was incredibly 
heated (as is discussed in the next section and in Chapter Five). At the end of this debate, after 
being harangued by the late Tim Russert on countless issues and challenged for embodying less 
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than ethical behavior by Obama himself, Clinton attempted to engage in damage control with her 
rhetoric. Clinton stated: 
You know, when I wasn’t successful about getting universal health care, I didn’t give up.  
I just got to work and helped to create the Children’s Health Insurance Program. And,  
you know, today in Ohio 140,000 kids have health insurance. And yet this morning in  
Lorain, a mother said that she spent with the insurance and everything over $3 million  
taking care of her daughter, who had a serious accident. And she just looked at me, as so  
many mothers and fathers have over so many years, and said, “ Will you help us?” That’s  
what my public life has been about. I want to help the people of this country get the  
chances they deserve (“The Democratic Debate,” 2008, para. 310-311). 
This was seemingly an excellent way to end the debate, given the perception that she was losing 
support and was not likable. Unfortunately, the words that followed this touching appeal fed into 
the skepticism surrounding her persona, as evident from the newspaper reports and interviews 
with voters previously presented. Clinton continued, “You know, the wealthy and the well-
connected have had a president. It’s time we have a president for the middle class and working 
people, the people who get up every day and do the very best they can. And they deserve 
somebody who gets up in the White House and goes to bat for them” (para. 312). Thus, Clinton’s 
own rhetoric, though designed to counter arguments against her not being a warm, sincere, 
authentic individual, served to remind them that, while she may claim to not be wealthy or well 
connected, she was both of these things, and thus, not like the average American voter. 
Consequently, this aspect of Clinton’s campaign rhetoric also failed to meet the demands 
presented by her rhetorical situation. 
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In terms of dealing with this specific audience perception of dwindling support, Clinton 
was caught in a unique double bind between acknowledging the failings of her campaign and 
using her rhetorical acts to stop the bleeding. If she had admitted diminished support, and thus, a 
weakness in her campaign, it is likely to assume that her campaign would have suffered more 
given the tendency among voters to support the perceptually stronger candidate. On the other 
hand, by not acknowledging this weakness, Clinton seemed arrogant and lacking in genuine 
authenticity. Thus, Clinton was unable to react to this specific deficit through her campaign 
rhetoric properly and move her audience to support her nomination. 
The Erosion of Clinton’s Female Voting Base 
Another challenge Clinton faced on the audience front was from an unsuspecting source: 
her base of women voters. For the most part, this voting bloc had always been a stalwart source 
of support for Clinton (Dilanian, 2008). And in the end, Clinton did have the most support from 
women, as a whole, over Obama but not by a huge margin (only nine percentage points across 
states with exit polls) (Hirshman, 2008b). Indeed, though the female voting bloc had been one 
site of consistent support for Clinton during her two senate campaigns, women around the 
country began to jump ship for the Obama campaign, aided in part because of negative 
perceptions of Clinton’s personality, and also because of an early and unprecedented 
endorsement of Obama by Oprah Winfrey (Murray & Kornblut, 2007). Kornblut (2009b) argued 
in her analysis of the campaign that the divide among women was primarily a generational one, 
and noted that older women supported Clinton much more so than younger women. Kornblut 
stated, “Mothers and grandmothers who saw themselves in Clinton and formed the core of her 
support faced a confounding phenomenon: their daughters did not much care whether a woman 
won or lost. There was nothing, in their view, all that special about electing a woman—
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particularly [Hillary Clinton]—president. Not when the milestone of electing an African-
American was at hand” (p. 15).  
This trend was in keeping with scholarship that has indicated that women do not 
necessarily vote for a candidate because of gender (Clift & Brazaitis, 2000; Dolan, 2006; 
Lawless, 2004; Rosenthal, 1998a). In response, Clinton’s campaign increased the number of 
television ads, paid calls, and targeted mailing geared toward women voters. Clinton failed, 
however, to target this specific demographic overtly in her key speeches and debate 
performances, and thus, she was unable to overcome the challenges posed by this specific 
audience. As Obama strategist Steve Hildebrand rightly pointed out during the campaign, “the 
Clinton logic is wrong, because it is based on ‘the assumption that women voters are going to 
support Hillary Clinton because she’s a woman. That’s not how voters make up their minds’” (in 
Murray & Kornblut, 2007, para. 13). Kornblut (2009b) asserted that this was one of the key 
mistakes of Clinton’s campaign, in that her primary staffers assumed that the key challenge they 
would face would be persuading men to vote for Clinton.  
One New Hampshire voter, a Ms. Tostenson, interviewed by The Washington Post, shed 
light on why women may have failed to turn out en masse for Clinton. Tostenson stated, “I 
couldn’t get past a basic distrust I had for her and for some of her personal choices” (Williams, 
2008, para. 4-5). Specifically, Tostenson disagreed with Clinton’s decision to stay with Bill 
Clinton after the Lewinsky scandal, and claimed, “she could have set a better example” (para. 
12). She was also not swayed by Clinton’s attempts to identify with working-class women like 
herself: “[Tostenson] does not think that Clinton knows what it means to stretch $63 at the 
grocery store and leave with only three bags of food. She doesn’t think Clinton can relate to 
someone who has to spend virtually her whole check on heating oil” (para. 13). Tostenson, like 
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millions of other voters, did feel that the Obamas’ lives “[felt] authentic to her in a way that the 
Clintons, who have long been public figures, [did] not” (para. 16). Views like this, combined 
with the reality that younger women were not supporting Clinton en masse, resulted in a surge of 
early support by young women toward Obama and John Edwards: “Half of all women between 
the ages of eighteen and forty-four voted for Obama in [Iowa]; 15 percent of those young women 
voted for former North Carolina Senator John Edwards; Clinton came in third overall, including 
among young women” (Kornblut, 2009b, p. 83). 
This lack of support offered to Clinton by women voters was significant. Hirshman 
(2008a) argued the Democratic primary race gave proof to the fragmented nature of the women’s 
vote, and asserted that the primary division line between women who voted for Clinton or 
Obama was, in actuality, class-based: “…each passing week since Super Tuesday has seen a 
further erosion in support from the senator from New York among the educated classes” (para. 7-
8). Key evidence of the split among women voters came late in the campaign when NARAL (the 
National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws) endorsed Obama. NARAL broke rank 
with many other reproductive rights organizations, such as Planned Parenthood, in endorsing any 
candidate, let alone one who was running against an ardent pro-choice woman (Seelye, 2008b).  
The erosion of this aspect of Clinton’s voting base was in large part because of Clinton’s 
rhetoric during the campaign. Clinton’s key speeches, overall, seemed less targeted toward 
specific demographic groups, even those that had supported her in the past, and more focused on 
presenting her candidacy as a vote for the middle-of-the-road American. From the very 
beginning, Clinton stated, “I grew up in a middle-class family in the middle of America…” 
(Clinton, 2007a, para. 8), and attempted to warm herself to voters as she vowed to try to visit as 
many Americans’ living rooms as she could. In Iowa, she told her audience a similar story: “I 
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grew up in a middle class family outside of Chicago, right here in the Midwest….So we lived the 
middle class values…we had to work hard, be self-reliant, be resilient… (Clinton, 2007b, para. 
12). She continued this theme in later speeches, arguing that she wanted to “rebuild a strong and 
prosperous middle class…” (Clinton, 2008a, para. 7). And while this tactic has been sound for 
many politicians running for president, in that it can appeal to a broader base of potential voters, 
it mitigated the uniqueness of Clinton’s candidacy as a woman and failed to address any 
particular voting bloc. As such, because she failed to address any specific group, namely women, 
whose support was deeply divided between her candidacy and Obama’s, Clinton’s rhetoric again 
failed to adapt to her unique rhetorical situation generally, and the needs or desires of the female 
voting bloc specifically.  
Clinton’s debate performances also showed a candidate who was clearly trying to present 
herself as the best candidate for the middle class rather than any particular group of voters. From 
the outset of the debate on January 21, 2008, Clinton stated, “Well, Joe [Johns], I’m glad you 
started with the economy, because that is  the number-one issue… at the kitchen tables of 
Americans today and what they’re talking to me about” (“The Democratic Debate in South,” 
2008, para. 4). She went on to argue that she was the candidate who was fighting to prevent 
families from losing their American Dreams, and that she had reached out to those on fixed 
incomes and who were having trouble paying energy costs. Also, in her last debate, Clinton 
seemed intent on reminding voters of her middle-class roots as she noted, “I am the 
granddaughter of a factory worker from Scranton” (“Democratic Debate in Philadelphia,” 2008, 
para. 48). None of these statements directly targeted women, nor did they address the concerns of 
the vast majority of younger voters who supported Obama in record numbers throughout the 
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primary and general elections. As such, Clinton’s rhetoric represented a tangible disconnect 
between herself and any key voting base, including women. 
 The loss of the women’s vote did not represent the death of Clinton’s presidential 
aspirations altogether, but it was indicative of Clinton’s over-arching rhetorical strategy during 
the campaign. Clinton’s campaign rhetoric, as is supported throughout the analysis chapters in 
this study, was characterized by a lack of awareness of the specific rhetorical situation in which 
she campaigned. Thus, Clinton failed to provide rhetoric that ‘fit’ with the situation. Her failure 
among women voters clearly signaled Clinton’s penchant for framing her rhetoric around a 
general, hypothetical audience rather than key voting blocs she could have persuaded to support 
her nomination. Similarly, Clinton failed to address the sexism that permeated the 2008 primary 
campaign, an idea that is explored fully in the next section, and thus, could have also alienated 
women voters who sought a more direct response from Clinton. As such, Clinton’s rhetoric, if 
nothing else, did not satisfy this segment of her audience, costing her dearly in terms of votes 
and support. 
Clinton’s Response to Sexism 
 Though one might expect the topic of sexism to be a dominant theme during the Clinton 
campaign, as she was the first woman in U.S. history widely perceived as having a chance at 
winning a major party’s nomination for president, the reality was quite different. Aside from a 
few notable exceptions, the majority of the eighteen-month campaign was not spent on the 
subject of sexism among the electorate or campaign officials. This is surprising given several 
studies post-2008 that have documented the tangible sexism targeting Clinton, and Sarah Palin 
later in the general election. Kornblut (2009b) has asserted that in hindsight, the 2008 elections 
“revived old stereotypes, divided the women’s movement, drove apart mothers and daughters, 
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and set back the cause of equality in the political sphere by decades” (p. 1). Carlin and Winfrey 
(2009) agreed, and contended that while Clinton and Palin both experienced “overt sexism,” 
especially from news media sources, both ignored it, choosing instead to focus on their 
respective campaign messages. The analysis in this section confirms the assertions of these 
authors, and indicates that Clinton, almost without exception, did ignore sexism during her 
campaign. There were, of course, those few exceptions that require inspection in order to fully 
understand the role that Clinton’s response to sexism played in terms of her audience. 
 A clear example of sexism among the electorate came early in the campaign. While 
campaigning in New Hampshire, hecklers at one of Clinton’s stops yelled, “Iron my shirt” while 
Clinton addressed the crowd (Dowd, 2008). This occurrence seemingly had the opposite 
intended reaction among voters, especially women, which the heckler had intended. Dowd 
(2008) made the assertion that this incident “stirred sisterhood,” and may have aided Clinton in 
achieving her turnaround in the New Hampshire primary (para. 14). Kantor (2008b) argued that 
these hecklers had “angered untold numbers of women after the incident was widely reported” 
(para. 15).  
 The blatant sexism of this comment took place among a host of other less obvious 
examples of sexism. During the primary campaign, Clinton was criticized by some due to the 
shrill pitch of her voice. John Edwards, during one debate, also felt the need to critique the bright 
yellow color of Hillary Clinton’s jacket, while at another debate, a woman in the audience felt 
compelled to ask Clinton whether she preferred diamonds or pearls (Kantor, 2008b). Instances 
like these compelled Kantor (2008b), shortly after the New Hampshire primary, to assert: 
 If the race wasn’t about gender already, it certainly is now. Senator Hillary Rodham  
Clinton has been running for president for nearly a year. But in the past week,  
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women in Iowa mostly rejected her, a few days before women in New Hampshire  
embraced her. All over the country, viewers scrutinized coverage for signs of  
chauvinism in the race, and many said they found dismaying examples (para. 1-2). 
Another example was pointed out by Kornblut (2009a) who, in reflecting on the 2008 campaign, 
remarked, “It would be very easy, in the gauzy view of history, to forget how ugly the contest 
became for the two women [Clinton, and later Sarah Palin] who broke new ground in the 2008 
presidential campaign. Remember Clinton’s sagging eyes, splashed across the Drudge Report, as 
Rush Limbaugh asked whether the country would want to watch a woman grow old in office?” 
(para. 2). 
 These examples are striking, but somewhat expected given what we know about how 
news sources report about women in politics. Though several studies have indicated women are 
no longer plagued, as they once were, with unfair and unequal treatment in the press, female 
politicians are still scrutinized most closely in terms of their attire and physical appearance 
(Duerst-Lahti, 2006). Thus, while this attention to her physical appearance may have helped 
Clinton, in terms of unifying women to defend against this unfair examination, these same stories 
likely diminished the weight of Clinton’s campaign messages (Banwart, et al., 2003; Bystrom, 
2003a; Bystrom, 2003b; Bystrom, 2004; Carroll & Schreiber, 1997; Han, 2003; Niven & Zilber, 
2001). As such, these stories would have, in theory, compelled Clinton to have tailored responses 
to sexism during her speeches and debate performances—to answer her critics, raise awareness 
about sexism in politics, or even to shore up support among women. However, any such 
responses were largely absent. 
 When the Clinton campaign would offer a response to sexism, the message would 
sometimes fall on deaf ears—or ears that perceived the issue from a different vantage point. 
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Voter Gaby Kloiber of Bluffton, South Carolina summed up the beliefs of many voters, 
especially younger voters, with regard to sexism on the campaign trail: “Contrary to what some 
pundits are saying, this election is not about gender or race; it is about old politics vs. a new way 
of thinking” (“Rave vs. gender,” 2008, para. 11). One of the pundits to whom Kloiber was 
referring was Geraldine Ferraro. Ferraro, the one-time female vice presidential candidate for the 
Democrats in 1984—the only woman to, at the time, ever held such a distinction—was widely 
regarded as a staunch supporter of Clinton’s candidacy. For a time she had held an honorary 
position within Clinton’s campaign until some of her comments against Obama’s candidacy 
made national news. Specifically, Ferraro told a California newspaper late in the primary 
campaign “If Obama was a white man, he would not be in this position,” sparking hostility 
against the one-time vice presidential nominee and diminishing her regard among Clinton’s 
female supporters (“Race vs. gender,” 2008, para. 2). This specific situation demonstrated the 
problems Clinton and her campaign had with responding to the gender issues generally, and 
sexism on the trail specifically, again highlighting the potential need for Clinton to address the 
issue herself through campaign speeches and debate performances. 
 Indeed, part of the frustration experienced by Clinton’s audience was caused by her 
abject lack of response to charges of sexism. None of the key speeches analyzed in this study 
mentioned sexism at all, and it only came up sparingly in Clinton’s debate performances in 
indirect statements from Clinton. During the debate in Cleveland, after receiving, yet again, the 
first question on a new subject, Clinton complained: 
Well, can I just point out that in the last several debates, I seem to get the first  
question all the time. I don’t mind. I—you know, I’ll be happy to field them, but I do  
find it curious, and if anybody saw “Saturday Night Live,” you know, maybe we  
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should ask Barack if he’s comfortable and needs another pillow. (laughter, boos.) I  
just find it kind of curious that I keep getting the first question on all of these issues  
(“The Democratic Debate in Cleveland,” 2008, para. 80).  
In addressing potential sexism during the debates in this way, Clinton attempted to show her 
frustration with her (perceived) unequal treatment, but still only hinted at the inequality, having 
never charged Obama or the moderators with sexism. In doing so, Clinton missed an opportunity 
to connect with the segment of her audience who felt the treatment directed at Clinton was sexist 
and unequal, fostering an even greater sense of frustration that Clinton would not or could not 
make such charges cogently during the campaign. 
Another perceived disparity between her treatment and Obama’s on the part of debate 
moderators surfaced during the final debate. The moderator, Charles Gibson, noted, “And 
Senator Clinton, I’m getting out of balance in terms of time,” to which Clinton replied, “I’ve 
noticed” (“Democratic Debate in Philadelphia,” 2008, para. 170-171). Again, Clinton hinted at 
charges of inequality, but failed to make such an argument using clear, unmistakable rhetoric. 
Still, these disparities, while they may have hinted at sexist undertones during the debates, seem 
less about expressed sexism toward Clinton and more about a possible favoritism toward Obama 
(a constraint that is analyzed specifically in Chapter Five).  
 A lack of response to charges of sexism during the campaign could have hurt Clinton. For 
older Democratic women voters, a response may not have been necessary, but her younger 
audience may have needed it. According to Kantor (2008b), “In interviews, some Democratic 
women over 40, who said they had experienced stinging sexism at school and in the workplace, 
seemed to long for the election of a female president—they said Mrs. Clinton would fill the role 
just fine –as a grand moment of validation. But younger women, who have grown up in a world 
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of greater parity, seemed less likely to allow gender to influence their vote” (para. 22). If Kantor 
was correct, then it may not have made much of a difference if Clinton had featured her response 
to sexism more dominantly in her rhetoric. However, the lack of direct response to sexism during 
the campaign, or of her gender in general, was a striking element of Clinton’s rhetoric. And as is 
evident in Chapter Five, the constraints faced by Clinton as a woman running for the presidency 
created a tangible double bind that greatly constrained Clinton’s ability to talk about her unique 
situation as a woman in the campaign. 
Voters’ Perceptions of Clinton’s Use of Negative Campaigning 
 Another key factor in Clinton’s rhetorical situation during her campaign was the 
audience’s reaction to her use of negative campaigning. Early on during her campaign in Iowa, 
according to Kornblut (2007), there was speculation that Clinton was struggling to deliver 
attacks on Obama, specifically, with the appropriate tone in order to avoid backlash “in a state 
where voters have been known to recoil at negative campaigning” (para. 24). Kornblut went on 
to assert, “Some of her attacks on Mr. Obama, including one in which she questioned his 
character and another staff mocked him for writing a kindergarten essay saying he wanted to be 
president, were described even by some of her supporters as clumsy” (para. 24).  
 Another early gaffe, as interpreted by the press as a predilection for negative 
campaigning on Clinton’s part, occurred shortly before the Iowa caucuses. After claiming that 
Clinton would begin drawing more contrasts between herself and her rivals for the nomination, 
Clinton commented, “‘now the fun part starts’” (Lawrence, 2007b, para. 13). Upon hearing of 
this comment from Clinton, Obama’s campaign manager berated Clinton for saying that 
attacking her opponents was ‘the fun part,’ and quickly added that the Obama campaign 
disagreed with such a sentiment (Lawrence, 2007b). The use of negative campaigning in this 
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way was problematic in that it reinforced the audience’s negative impression that Clinton was an 
utterly conventional candidate, doing whatever she had to in order to win an election, further 
complicating her rhetorical response to perceptions that she lacked typically feminine traits such 
as warmth and nurturance. And while the use of negative campaigning is not uncommon by 
women politicians, as noted by Bystrom (2004) and Banwart and McKinney (2005), the use of 
attacks by Clinton specifically, because of her established lack of audience-perceived femininity, 
greatly impeded her rhetorical attempts to establish rapport with her audience.  
Whether Clinton’s label as a negative campaigner was deserved or not, stories 
proliferated that echoed this sentiment and resonated with voters. Such sentiments were 
expressed clearly in the words of Gaby Kloiber of Bluffton, South Carolina who shared her 
views about Clinton’s attacks during the campaign in an interview with the USA Today: 
I am a white female, who for many years has believed that a female president would lead  
this country and the world in a different direction. Hillary Clinton, however, is the  
embodiment of everything that is wrong with our political system. Granted, she is tough  
and will do anything to get elected, but she doesn’t represent the majority of women. I  
don’t think she is the best leader because she is divisive (“Race vs. gender,” 2008, para.  
7-8). 
Comments about Clinton’s candidacy like these are likely linked to her lack of traditionally 
feminine traits, as previously discussed. The above comments are particularly interesting because 
they link negative image traits with a lack of leadership qualities.  Despite research that has 
indicated that male leadership traits, such as toughness and assertiveness, are expected of those 
running for president, our culture has also prized the relational skills embodied by female 
leadership (Gilligan, 1993; Tolleson & Rinehart, 2001). Thus, while voters may have expected 
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Clinton to engage in negative campaigning because this has been deemed normal behavior for 
presidential candidates, her gender complicated her use of such attacks and necessitated a 
rhetorical response from Clinton in order to reverse the damaging nature of these perceptions. 
 When we turn to Hillary Clinton’s speeches and debate performances in order to see how 
she responded to criticism of her negative attacks, a stark contrast between the two rhetorical 
contexts (Clinton’s speeches and debates) is apparent. There was not a single instance of 
negative campaigning—whether it be attacking any of her Democratic rivals, questioning their 
credentials, or engaging in any type of mud-slinging behavior—present during any of her key 
speeches analyzed in this study, though such messages may have been present in other speeches. 
Clinton’s debate performances, however, tell a different story. There were several examples, 
both implicit and explicit, wherein Clinton employed an attack strategy, as one might expect 
from the adversarial nature of a political debate. Similarly, there were just as many instances 
wherein Clinton attempted to deflect the criticism of her negative campaigning strategy made by 
Obama (and the moderators) during the debates.  
 Initially, one tactic that Clinton used to attack Obama was in asserting that he would say 
one thing while doing another. In the first South Carolina debate, Clinton argued, “it is 
sometimes difficult to understand what Senator Obama has said, because as soon as he is 
confronted on it, he says that’s not what he meant” (“The Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, 
para. 97). More often than not, she would then go on to provide some sort of quantifiable 
evidence to support her assertion, as she did following the attack cited above: “The facts are that 
he has said in the last week that he really liked the ideas of the Republicans over the last 10 to 15 
years, and we can give you the exact quote” (“The Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, para. 
98). This line of attack extended into the area of funding proposals championed by the candidates 
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in which Clinton attacked Obama for creating potentially false promises for voters: “And with 
respect to putting forth how one would pay for all of the programs that we’re proposing in this 
campaign, I will be more than happy, Barack, to get the information, because we have searched 
for it. You have a lot of money that you want to put into foreign aid, a very worthy program. 
There is no evidence from your Web site, from your speeches, as to how you would pay for it” 
(“Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, para. 102-103). Later on in this same debate, Clinton 
asserted, “Well, you know, Senator Obama, it is very difficult having a straight-up debate with 
you, because you never take responsibility for any vote, and that has been a pattern” (para. 256). 
Clinton made similar charges against Obama in the Cleveland debate, attacking Obama’s affinity 
for speech-making while not backing up these speeches with actions: “So the fair comparison 
was when we both had responsibility, when it wasn’t just a speech but it was actually action, 
where is the difference” (“The Democratic Debate in Cleveland,” 2008, para. 134). These 
instances, based on the audience perceptions that Clinton was, indeed, running a negative 
campaign, indicate that when Clinton would attack and then return to substantive issues during 
her campaign debate performances, the negative impression remained. Thus, the audience, once 
attack strategies were employed, did not seem to be able (or willing) to differentiate between 
Clinton’s tactics. 
 Obama, for his part, was careful to consistently respond to Clinton’s negative attacks, and 
to often link Hillary Clinton to her and her husband’ negative campaigning (a specific constraint 
Hillary faced that is analyzed in Chapter Five). During the first South Carolina Debate, Obama 
asserted, “What she said wasn’t true. We account for every single dollar we propose. Now, this, I 
think, is one of the things that’s happened during the course of this campaign, that there’s a set of 
assertions made by Senator Clinton, as well as her husband, that are not factually accurate” 
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(“The Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, para. 85-86). For Obama, in considering the audience 
reaction to Clinton’s negative attacks specifically, this was a wise strategy, especially given the 
negative reaction to Bill Clinton’s predilection for acting as ‘surrogate attack dog’ on the 
campaign trail—a role that many voters felt hurt Hillary Clinton’s image (Baker, 2008).  
 Obama was also quick to attack Clinton for her ties to corporate interests, stressing his 
connection with ‘the people.’ Obama stated, “…while I was working on those streets watching 
those folks lose their job shift overseas, you were a corporate lawyer sitting on the board at Wal-
Mart” (“The Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, para. 127). Later in this debate, Clinton fired 
back, “…I was fighting against those ideas [of Republicans in the 1990s] when you were 
practicing law and representing your contributor, Resco, in his slumlord business in inner city 
Chicago” (para. 163). This back-and-forth exchange would have seemingly hurt both 
candidates—Clinton because she was engaging in mud-slinging, an activity rarely associated 
with conventional femininity, and Obama because he was a man attacking a woman. However, 
Obama seemed to be much more adept, rhetorically, at answering back negative campaign 
attacks than Clinton.  
 When Obama was attacked, he often responded by attacking Clinton on the issue of 
truthfulness, an issue we have already seen as an important one when considering the voting 
behaviors of Clinton’s audience. Obama in the first South Carolina debate argued, “Truthfulness 
during campaigns makes a difference,” after being accused of working for a slumlord by Clinton 
(“The Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, para. 220). Later in this same debate, Obama 
complained, “I don’t mind having policy debates with Senator Clinton or Senator Edwards. But 
what I don’t enjoy is spending the week or two weeks or the last month having to answer to these 
kinds of criticisms that are not factually accurate” (para. 229). This attack strategy by Obama 
  95 
was also evident in Cleveland: “Senator Clinton repeatedly claims that I don’t stand for universal 
health care. And, you know, for Senator Clinton to say that, I think, is simply not accurate” 
(“The Democratic Debate in Cleveland,” 2008, para. 32). In answering Clinton’s attacks in this 
way, Obama diminished the premise of Clinton’s arguments against him by stating, simply, that 
her charges were untrue. Such a strategy not only defended Obama from the accusation, it also 
served to position Clinton in the unseemly role of a liar, doing whatever she could to discredit 
her opponents and serve her political ambition. 
 Clinton did not seem, for her part, as nuanced in dealing with attacks from her opponents. 
Indeed, each time Clinton would defend herself from an attack, she would use the rhetoric of 
defense to also attack her opponent. An exchange from the first debate in South Carolina 
illuminates this strategy: 
 Clinton: …You know, if you look at the recent article about Senator Obama’s work on  
health care reform in the Illinois legislature, it’s a very interesting piece about how  
he basically did the bidding of the insurance companies during that effort. 
 Now, I’m just saying that if we’re going to… 
 Obama: That’s… 
 Clinton: …be hurling these charges against one another, I’m used to taking in coming  
fire. I’ve taken it for 16 years. But when you get into this arena… 
 (APPLAUSE) 
 …you can’t expect to have a hands-off attitude about your record. And it is perfectly  
fair to have comparisons and contrasts. I voted against a 30—I voted for limiting to  
30 percent what credit card companies could charge. 
 Senator Obama did not. That’s a fact (“The Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, para.  
  96 
227-233). 
During the Cleveland debate, Clinton attempted to use the same tactic in defending her health 
care proposal: “And what I find regrettable is that in Senator Obama’s mailing that he has sent 
out across Ohio, it is almost as though the health insurance companies and the Republicans wrote 
it” (The Democratic Debate in Cleveland,” 2008, para. 28). Thus, when Clinton would offer a 
defense against Obama’s attacks, she would offer her own attack in the same breath, mitigating 
the opportunity she had to let Obama’s attack strategies against her create a negative impression 
of the Illinois senator in the minds of her audience members. This strategy of providing 
“comparative messages”, though seemingly less directly attacking, has still been labeled as a 
negative attack by several scholars in the field (Pfau & Kenski, 1990; Salmore & Salmore, 
1985). “Comparative messages, which some consultants feel are less distasteful to voters, move 
away from purely negative attacks on the opponent. They look instead at the record of the two 
candidates, to the advantage of one of them” (in Pfau & Kenski, 1990, p. 2). Clinton’s tactic, 
thus, was seemingly designed to limit the perception that she was, indeed, engaging in negative 
campaigning. However, such a strategy is still an attack strategy, and as such, it ran counter to 
the principles of Campbell’s (1989; 1998) feminine style, as well as the dominant cultural 
prescriptions expected of women offered by countless scholars in Chapter One, as she engaged 
in typically masculine strategies of attacking her opponent and exhibiting machismo. In doing so, 
Clinton neglected an opportunity to counter the audience’s negative impressions of her through 
her debate rhetoric. 
Obama on the other hand seemed to have an ability for mitigating charges of negative 
campaigning—in essence, of appearing to be ‘the nice guy.’ Understanding the perception that 
his race against Clinton had gotten too negative, Obama was quick to point out in his first debate 
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against only Clinton that “…I was friends with Hillary Clinton before we started this campaign; I 
will be friends with Hillary Clinton after this campaign is over… we’re running a competitive 
race, but it’s because we both love this country, and we believe deeply in the issues that are at 
stake” (“Transcript of Thursday’s,” 2008, para. 11-13). It should be noted that Hillary Clinton 
failed to seize this particular opportunity to follow Obama’s words with kind words of her own. 
Later in this same debate, when Obama had once again attacked her for her initial support of the 
Iraq war, Clinton attempted to deflect the attack weakly and only indirectly: 
Obama: …I will offer a clear contrast [during the general election] as somebody who  
never supported this war, thought it was a bad idea. I don’t want to just end the war, but I 
want to end the mindset that got us into the war in the first place. That’s the kind of 
leadership I’m going to provide as president of the United States. 
(APPLAUSE) 
Clinton: And of course… 
Bitzer: Senator Clinton, that’s a clear swipe at you. 
Clinton: Really? 
(LAUGHTER) 
Clinton: We’re having—we’re having such a good time. 
Obama: I wouldn’t call that a swipe. 
Clinton: We’re having such a good time. We are. We are. We’re having a wonderful  
time. 
Obama: Yes, absolutely (para. 428-438). 
Clinton’s response to the attack rang hollow; she even somewhat denied being attacked, and 
claimed (contrary to the tone the debate had clearly taken), that it was an enjoyable experience.  
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 Cleary, as evident in other debate situations, Clinton was not as adept at responding to 
charges of negative campaigning. At the beginning of the Cleveland debate, a video clip of 
Clinton at a press conference was shown wherein Clinton lambasted Obama: “(From videotape) 
So shame on you, Barack Obama. It is time you ran a campaign consistent with your messages in 
public. That’s what I expect from you. Meet me in Ohio. Let’s have a debate about your 
tactics… (“The Democratic Debate in Cleveland,” 2008, para. 2). Clinton’s response to the video 
clip being shown was simple and vague: “Well, this is a contested campaign” (para. 5). During 
this same debate, Clinton was asked about another infamous video clip showing Clinton at a 
campaign rally mocking Obama’s penchant for eloquent speech making and unifying audience 
members—a speech act considered humorous, but clearly one that also had a negative 
undercurrent. On the videotape, Clinton stated, “Now I could stand up here and say: Let’s just 
get everybody together. Let’s get unified. The sky will open—(laughter)—the light will come 
down—(laughter)—celestial choirs will be singing—(laughter)—and everyone will know we 
should do the right thing, and the world will be perfect!” (“The Democratic Debate in 
Cleveland,” 2008, para. 185). Clinton, when pressed for comment during the debate about this 
clip, remarked, “Well, I was having a little fun. You know, it’s hard to find time to have fun on 
the campaign trail, but occasionally you can sneak that in” (para. 202). Herein was a unique 
opportunity to clearly argue against one of Obama’s key strengths—eloquent speech making—
and offer an alternative by demonstrating substance on a key issue or two. Instead, Clinton’s 
response seemed abashed—as if she had been caught making fun of someone behind his back, 
and thus, had needed to offer an apology for doing so despite the fact that such tactics are now 
commonplace campaign strategies.  
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 One of the overall impressions created by Obama for voters during the debates was the 
impression that Clinton was, indeed, engaged in negative campaigning—almost inundating 
voters with negative attacks against him. Obama argued, “But I think it’s very important to 
understand the context of all of this, and that is that Senator Clinton has—her campaign, at 
least—has constantly sent out negative attacks on us, e-mail, robocalls, flyers, television ads, 
radio calls” (“The Democratic Debate in Cleveland,” 2008, para. 21). Obama repeated this 
sentiment later in the same debate during a back-and-forth discussion between the candidates 
when Clinton failed to yield the floor; Obama’s response was simple: “I’m going to get 
filibustered—I’m getting filibustered a little bit here” (para. 55). Such a tactic was not without 
merit, seemingly, given the following exchange shortly thereafter wherein Clinton failed to yield 
the floor to either Obama or the moderator, Brian Williams: 
 Mr. Williams: Senator [Clinton], I’m going to change the subject. 
 Sen. Clinton: About 20 percent of—about 20 percent of the people who are 
uninsured have the means to buy insurance. They’re often young people— 
 Mr. Williams: Senator— 
 Sen. Clinton: --who think they’re immortal— 
 Sen. Obama: Which is why I cover them. 
 Sen. Clinton:--except when the illness or the accident strikes. And what Senator  
Obama has said, than then, once you get to the hospital, you’ll be forced to buy  
insurance, I don’t think that’s a good idea. We ought to plan for it— 
 Sen. Obama: With respect— 
 Sen. Clinton: --and ought to make sure we cover everyone. That is the only way to  
get universal health care coverage. 
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 Sen. Obama: With respect— 
 Sen. Clinton: That is what I’ve worked for for 15 years— 
 Sen. Obama: With respect— 
 Sen. Clinton: --and I believe that we can achieve it. But if we don’t even have a plan  
to get there, and we start out by leaving people, you’ll never ever control costs,  
improve quality, and cover everyone (para. 62-74). 
Obama came off during this exchange as someone, offering respect for Clinton’s views, who 
simply wanted the opportunity to speak, while Clinton came off as domineering—either too 
defensive to allow a competing view to be offered or too concerned that the competing message 
would resonate with viewers. Clinton’s approach here embodied one of the negative stereotypes 
of women leaders—that they can be too controlling or too defensive when challenged by a man 
(Beck, 2001; Palmer & Simon, 1996; Rosenthal, 1998a). Obama, for his part, never had a 
moment like this during the debates analyzed in this study. Thus, throughout the debates, a clear 
contrast was established: Obama was adept at offering and countering negative attacks while 
Clinton, at least in terms of presenting positive female leadership traits, was not. 
 The myriad instances of negative campaigning during the debates provided a tangible 
problem for Clinton in terms of her audience. Given the numerous examples of attacks from 
Clinton, it is difficult to believe that her attempts to ameliorate the subsequent negative reactions 
of voters could be established. Clinton did try, however, to do just that. In her last debate with 
Obama, Clinton asserted, “…I think what’s important is that we all listen to one another and we 
respect one another and we understand the different decisions that people make in life, because 
we’re a stronger country because of that” (“Democratic Debate in Philadelphia,” 2008, para. 53). 
Later in this final debate of the Democratic primary season, Clinton further asserted, “And as 
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president, I will work to try to bridge this divide [over, in this specific case, liberal and 
conservative views on gun control], which I think has been polarizing and, frankly, doesn’t 
reflect the common sense of the American people (para. 300). It is important to keep in mind that 
these benign comments were undercut just minutes later when Clinton, once again, brought up 
criticism against Obama because of his associations with his former pastor, Reverend Wright, the 
endorsement Obama received from the socially divisive Reverend Farrakhan (who also had ties 
to Wright), and the convicted terrorist and known Obama associate, William Ayers. On the 
subject of Reverend Farrakhan’s connection with Obama’s pastor, specifically, Clinton was blunt 
in her use of negative attacks: 
 It is clear that, as leaders, we have a choice who we associate with and who we  
apparently give some kind of seal of approval to. And I think that it wasn’t only the  
specific remarks, but some of the relationships with Reverend Farrakhan, with  
giving the church bulletin over to the leader of Hamas to put a message in. You  
know, these are problems, and they raise questions in people’s minds. And so this is  
a legitimate area, as everything is when we run for office, for people to be exploring  
and trying to find answers (para. 118-119). 
Such attacks hardly seem to be in keeping with one of Clinton’s parting lines in this debate: 
“And [when I’m president] we’re going to make everybody feel like they’re part of the American 
family again” (para. 374). Thus, while Clinton needed to overcome her use of negative attacks 
during the campaign—through negative ads, mailings, and robocalls— through her use of 
rhetoric, she failed to do so in an articulate or successful manner during her key speeches and 
debate performances. 
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It is incredibly rare to find any politician running for office who does not use negative 
campaigning in some fashion. It could be assumed, then, that as Hillary Clinton pursued the 
presidency, she too would have used such tactics. However, given what we know about audience 
perceptions regarding Clinton (that she was unlikable, lacking warmth, and overtly masculine in 
some of her behaviors), and what we know about our culture’s expectations and constraints for 
women, it seems that Clinton was once again caught in a tangible double bind. To attract voters 
Clinton needed to present herself as warm and approachable; however, if she were to direct her 
rhetoric to this primary goal, she could have been perceived as weak and lacking the qualities 
Americans associate with the presidency. Thus, yet again, Clinton was derided for engaging in 
behaviors common to men seeking the presidency. Furthermore, on a basic rhetorical level, 
Clinton seemed less adept at responding to the criticism leveled against her campaign for 
negative attack strategies than Barack Obama. 
Clinton’s Appeals to Super Delegates 
 A final mediator of change that Clinton appealed to in her rhetoric during the campaign 
were the so-called “super delegates”—elected leaders and party officials who received their own 
nominating votes at the convention. Clinton’s appeals to these delegates was sporadic but steady, 
especially as the race for the nomination began to span months and she and Obama began to split 
more and more of the popular vote.  
 Initially, the targeting of super delegates occurred often through Clinton’s surrogates and 
campaign staff rather than from the candidate herself. Before Super Tuesday, it was widely 
reported that super delegates were among the audience members who were going to be targeted 
by Clinton’s rhetoric (Balz, 2008; Balz & Craig, 2008). Obama’s advisers, for their part, 
recognized that, at least early on, Clinton had held an edge with these super delegates, but 
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dismissed the importance of this part of the audience by asserting that “super delegates will fall 
in line behind the effective winners of the primary battle,” opting instead to keep focused on 
securing the popular vote (Balz, 2008, para. 25).  
 In many ways, Clinton’s attention to the super delegates in her audience was wise; even 
after the prolonged nomination battle extended into April, Clinton, while falling just short of 
even with Obama in the popular vote, still maintained a slight edge among committed super 
delegates (Leibovich, 1008). The problems created by this particular segment of Clinton’s 
audience, though, were clear. If Obama had won the popular vote but lost the nomination, this 
would have signaled doubts about the veracity of Clinton’s nomination, and might have 
compelled voters to have believed their wishes were being overlooked in favor of the views of 
party insiders. Probably wise to this perception, Obama argued in May, 2008, “Super delegates 
understandably would prefer not to be seen as the deciding factor…I think they respect the 
process…” (Murray & Bacon, Jr., 2008, para. 4). Still, Clinton pressed her case until the last 
primary races in early June believing that these party insiders would recognize that her last-
minute wins in the waning days of the primaries “[demonstrated] that she would be the more 
electable candidate in November” (Murray & Kornblut, 2008, para. 3). Indeed, during these final 
days of the campaign, Clinton focused almost exclusively on persuading super delegates to 
support her (Murray & Kornblut, 2008).  
 On the other hand, Clinton’s focus on super delegates throughout the campaign raised old 
doubts about the private, back-room politics perception engendered by the Clintons. As one 
voter, David Sizemore of Pine Bluff, Arkansas, put it: “The existence of “super delegates” in the 
Democratic Party sounds undemocratic to me…Listening to members of Congress talk about 
their intent to vote for a candidate, despite the contrary wishes of their constituents, is 
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questionable. It sounds like a ‘good ole boys’ club fraught with possibilities for manipulating the 
system for personal or party agendas” (“‘Super delegates’ undermine,” 2008, para. 1-2). Thus, 
appealing directly to this particular part of her audience complicated her relationship with the 
average voters, and if nothing else, presented a challenge to her abilities to rally Democrats 
during the general election due to fears of back-room politicking. 
 Still, targeting her rhetoric, at least indirectly, to super delegates was a necessary evil for 
Clinton. It was necessary because of her failure to secure a solid lead in the primaries and 
caucuses; thus, she was compelled to target the only audience left to persuade in order to push 
herself over the edge. It was an ‘evil’ because appealing to a demographic outside the bounds of 
average voters forced her to shift her focus and engender less of a populist message—where she 
had started the campaign. Being forced to target this group specifically compelled Clinton to 
adopt messages that defied the sharing of power paradigm engendered by successful women 
leaders that Han (2003) contended was key for women, and violated the tenets of “integrative 
leadership” that Rosenthal (1998a) argued was crucial for women to adopt in order to provide a 
counter-point to conventional male leadership.  
 In terms of Clinton’s key speeches and debate performances during the primary 
campaign, the exact terminology of “super delegates” was never mentioned—evidence of a split 
in Clinton’s rhetorical focus, and of the potential dangers for Clinton that were associated with 
courting this specific voting bloc. Because super delegates held a large part in determining the 
nomination regardless of the wishes of voters, Clinton realized that she could not, publicly, 
overtly feature this subject in her key rhetorical acts. On the other hand, she was cognizant of 
their importance and attempted to speak to these audience members in a more indirect manner. 
Indeed, the subject of courting party leaders and elected officials to vote for her candidacy at the 
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convention was never present at all in the key campaign speeches featured in this study. 
However, there were a few specific instances wherein Clinton arguably was courting this specific 
aspect of her audience when debating Obama.  
 The campaign speeches examined in this study were, again, virtually bereft of specific 
appeals to super delegates, beyond implicit messages, like those after her comeback win in New 
Hampshire wherein Clinton vowed, “…we’re going to rally on and make our case. We are in it 
for the long run” (Clinton, 2008a, para. 6). Comments like this one could just as easily have been 
made in response to the shifting dynamic of the primary season, instead of reminding super 
delegates that she was, indeed, in the campaign until the very end, pressing them to make up 
their minds regarding their vote at the conventions. Still, the language featured in this speech 
also made it clear that Clinton, her campaign and the citizens who voted for her, had to make a 
case to some aspect of her audience beyond average voters that her candidacy was sound, 
implying that she was not just speaking to citizen voters alone. 
 In the later debate performances where only she and Obama took part, however, 
Clinton’s rhetoric seemed to be more overt in making a case for her candidacy among 
uncommitted super delegates. In the first of these debates featuring the last two candidates, after 
one of the questioners asked for Clinton’s response to Ted and Caroline Kennedy’s endorsement 
of Obama, Clinton remarked:  
…despite the enthusiasm of our supporters and endorsers…this is about the two of  
us. You have to, as voters, determine who you think can be the best president, to  
tackle all those problems on day one, waiting in the Oval Office, who can be the best  
nominee for the Democratic Party to be able to withstand whatever they decide to  
throw at us on the other side of the aisle, and come out victorious…Neither one of us  
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would have predicted—you know, not very long ago—we would be sitting here. And  
it is a great tribute to the Democratic Party and to America (“Transcript of  
Thursday’s,” 2008, para. 345-352).  
By placing special emphasis on the general election strategy the Democratic Party would face, 
and in addressing the Party specifically rather than individual voters alone, Clinton was arguably 
targeting super delegates specifically and attempting to demonstrate her own resilience over her 
less experienced opponent in terms of the general election. But later in this same debate, she 
seemed to have mitigated her possible sway among super delegates, possibly trying to allay fears 
among citizens that she was a party insider who would eventually be elected solely on the basis 
of her ties to super delegates: “…what’s great about our political system is that we are all judged 
on our own merits. We come forward to the American public and it’s the most grueling political 
process one can imagine. We start from the same place. Nobody has an advantage no matter who 
you are or where you came from. You have to raise money. You have to make the case for 
yourself” (para. 383-384). These comments specifically showed the precarious challenge posed 
by these divergent audience groups for Clinton’s rhetoric. It was almost as if it was a no-win 
situation for Clinton; she had to address the party leaders and elected officials because Obama 
was leading among primary and caucus voters, but at the same time, doing so directly would 
have potentially increased the divide between Clinton and the general electorate. 
 In later debates, Clinton, while still not directly mentioning her attempts to persuade 
super delegates, seemed to draw more and more negative contrasts between herself and Obama, 
foreshadowing the inevitable attacks against the Illinois senator from conservatives during the 
general election. These were similar strategies already mentioned in the previous section on 
negative attacks. However, Clinton’s rhetoric detailing how she would be the stronger candidate 
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compared to Obama bears new analysis in terms of the potential influence such attacks may have 
had on super delegate voters. In the debate between Clinton and Obama in Cleveland, as already 
mentioned, Clinton attacked Obama’s ties to both Farrakhan and Reverend Wright and their 
(alleged, at least in the case of the latter) anti-Semitic views. One particular tussle between Tim 
Russert and Clinton shed light on Clinton’s tactics in courting super delegates:  
 Clinton: …I was willing to take that stand, and, you know, fortunately the people of  
New York supported me and I won. But at the time, I thought it was more important  
to stand on principle and to reject the kind of conditions that went with support like  
that. 
 Russert: Are you suggesting Senator Obama is not standing on principle? 
 Clinton: No. I’m just saying that you asked specifically if he would reject [support  
from Wright and Farrakhan]. And there’s a difference between denouncing and  
rejecting. And I think when it comes to this sort of, you know, inflammatory—I have  
no doubt that everything that Barack just said is absolutely sincere. But I just think,  
we’ve got to be even stronger. We cannot let anyone in any way say these things  
because of the implications that they have, which can be so far reaching (“The  
Democratic Debate in Cleveland,” 2008, para. 229-231). 
The last part of Clinton’s comment seemed the most telling in terms of appealing to super 
delegates, a group ultimately concerned about the party’s chances in November. This rhetoric 
signaled that Clinton may be more cognizant of the need to shore up support for Democrats 
among Jewish voters for the general election (an audience that Obama had potentially 
marginalized with his lack of rejecting Wright and Farrakhan) and thus, that she would have 
been in a better position to rally the entire party given Obama’s alleged associations.  
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 Clinton continued this strategy of making negative attacks on Obama in the final debate 
by, again, pointing out Obama’s association with William Ayers. Clinton commented, after the 
attack was made, “I know Senator Obama’s a good man and I respect him greatly but I think this 
is an issue that certainly the Republicans will be raising. And it goes to this larger set of concerns 
about, you know, how we are going to run against John McCain” (“Democratic Debate in 
Philadelphia,” 2008, para. 159-160). The general election seemed foremost on Clinton’s mind 
during this final debate of the primary season, and she consciously raised the questions several 
times, making the case that she would be a far stronger candidate than Obama, seemingly 
regardless of the amount of primaries and caucuses he had won, and thus, it was she who should 
have had the support of super delegates. Earlier in the debate, she similarly argued:  
…what is important is that we understand exactly the challenges facing us in order  
to defeat Senator McCain. He will be a formidable candidate. There isn’t any doubt  
about that. He has a great American story to tell…But I also know, having now gone  
through 16 years of being on the receiving end of what the Republican Party dishes  
out, how important it is that we try to go after every single voter everywhere we  
possibly can to get to those electoral votes that we’re going to need to have the next  
president elected (para. 59-61).  
When she was pressed for clarification by George Stephanopoulos on whether or not Obama was 
indeed qualified to run in the general election, Clinton reinforced her central message for her 
audience, super delegate or not: “I think I am better able and better prepared in large measure 
because of what I’ve been through and the work that I’ve done and the results I’ve produced for 
people and the coalition that I have put together in this campaign…” (para. 64). In the end, both 
Clinton and Obama recognized the decision that would seal Obama’s fate as the nominee for the 
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Democratic Party, and both campaigns acknowledged that there would, in fact, be enough super 
delegate support to push Obama over the top in delegates (Nagourney, et al., 2008).  
 Clinton’s rhetoric that indirectly spoke to super delegates was, in hindsight, yet another 
example of how Clinton was unable to adequately address her audience through her campaign 
discourse. As with her failure to address the women’s voting bloc sufficiently, Clinton was also 
unable to effectively court the super delegate vote openly in her campaign speeches and debates. 
To do so would have signaled clearly to voters who had not yet voted in primaries and caucuses 
that Clinton was doing anything she had to in order to win, and thus, would have further 
alienated her audience by not continuing the ‘conversation’ with voters, and by playing the ‘back 
room politics’ game. And while this may not overtly seem like an issue uniquely associated with 
Clinton’s gender, I can be argued that it was, considering the advice for effective female 
leadership that has been previously articulated. Had Clinton overtly courted the super delegate 
vote, she would have defied the expectations for cooperative leadership and the feminine 
rhetorical style by purposefully cutting out one segment of her audience. Male politicians, who 
have the latitude to be ‘mavericks’ (John McCain) or ‘deciders’ (George W. Bush), have not 
seemed nearly as constrained in how they have approached political campaigns, or addressed 
specific audiences. As such, Clinton’s attempt to appeal to super delegates had to be more 
indirect, because of the intangible but ultimately concrete double bind she faced as a female 
presidential contender. 
Chapter Summary 
 The audience aspect of Clinton’s rhetorical situation was, indeed, complex. And in the 
end, it is clear that she failed to sufficiently address her audience in a way that would have 
motivated them to enact change by voting for Clinton. Clinton’s political celebrity, while it was 
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initially helpful to her chances, seemed to alienate her from average citizens, and she was never 
able to adequately address this issue to her advantage in her campaign discourse. Additionally, 
because she was so well known, and much of what citizens ‘knew’ about Clinton was negative in 
terms of her gender, Clinton faced an uphill battle in persuading audience members to believe 
that she was warm and feminine enough to serve as their nominee, evidence of the palpable 
double bind facing women who are culturally expected to demonstrate feminine traits all the 
while proving their toughness as political candidates. Clinton possibly could have mitigated this 
effect had she targeted specific voting blocs (women, young people, etc.). But her penchant for 
clumsy negative campaigning and a lack of direct rhetorical response to the sexism on the 
campaign trail further separated her from those voters who could have saved her chances. 
Finally, the presence of super delegates during the campaign—a part of Clinton’s 
audience who also could have helped secure her nomination—also created problems for her 
rhetorical strategies because targeting such an elite group could have further marginalized citizen 
voters and defied conventional expectations of female leaders. Still, she could not have ignored 
this group because they held sway over the vote, and also because news media sources ran 
countless stories during the campaign highlighting the significance of this voting bloc. Thus, in 
terms of attracting the support of super delegates, Clinton’s rhetorical choices were limited, 
which caused her to only appeal to these party leaders and elected officials in indirect terms. In 
short, Clinton failed to successfully connect with her various specific audiences, and further 
marginalized some voters, through her insufficient use of rhetoric, seemingly a lack of awareness 
about the true nature of her rhetorical situation during the campaign, and the double binds that 
constrain the rhetorical choices of political women. 
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Chapter Four: Analysis of Clinton’s Exigencies 
 Bitzer (1968) regarded the rhetorical exigence as “an imperfection marked by urgency; it 
is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be” 
(p. 6). An exigence, considered rhetorically, is a problem that needs to be solved via rhetoric—in 
this case, rhetoric from Hillary Clinton during her campaign for the Democratic nomination for 
president in 2008. From Bitzer’s point of view, a rhetor will focus on the establishment of an 
exigence and the remedy for the exigence as presented through the rhetor’s discourse. Thus, the 
rhetor can establish the defects that are problems the rhetor and audience must solve together, 
and such positive modifications of these problems can be accomplished through, or aided by, the 
rhetor’s discourse. On the other hand, an exigence may also exist outside of the rhetorical act, 
but can be solved through rhetoric by discussing such problems and then constructing solutions 
with the audience. This assessment of the power and purposes of rhetoric is bolstered by 
Campbell (1972) who argued that rhetoric is inherently “propositional” and “problem solving” 
(p. 2-3). 
 The creation and presentation of a problem for the rhetor is fundamental to persuasive 
discourse, and thus, certainly relevant for campaign discourse. Campbell (1972) clarified that 
these exigencies may be loosely described “as the difference between what is and what is wanted 
and what exists” (p. 2-3). Thus, for Clinton, her central problem was establishing herself as a 
viable candidate worthy of her party’s nomination and the votes of citizens. But the rhetorical 
construction of the exigence does more than merely state the obvious for audiences. Campbell 
contended that the exigencies are established by a rhetor’s “attempts to structure or restructure 
the perceptions and attitudes of [her] audience through [her] use of language. In other words one 
reason why persuasion is possible is that language has the capacity to name, categorize, define, 
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and evaluate; and among the most important rhetorical stratagems are the techniques the 
rhetorician uses to change the verbal behavior of this audience” (p. 8). Thus, in considering the 
rhetorical exigencies within a body of discourse, the problems that rhetors assert need resolution 
are rhetorically created in such a way as to attract the attention and action of audience members. 
For Clinton, this problem went beyond her simply attracting support for her candidacy and as 
becomes clear in the following pages, requires closer inspection. 
While Bitzer does argue that there may be many problems addressed within one or a 
series of speeches, there are usually only a small number of exigencies pointed out by rhetors. 
Bitzer (1968) stated, “in any rhetorical situation there will be at least one controlling exigence 
which functions as the organizing principle; it specifies the audience to be addressed and the 
change to be effected” (p. 7). Still, when addressing the rhetoric for an entire campaign, several 
exigencies were established through Clinton’s use of campaign discourse and, indeed, the 
presentation of her chances via news media sources. These exigencies, those created by Clinton 
and those created via other sources, created a series of double binds that greatly impeded 
Clinton’s campaign rhetoric. Initially, Clinton had to address the omnipresent double bind as a 
woman running for president. As indicated previously in Chapter Three, Clinton rarely 
mentioned her status as a female presidential candidate, despite the fact that, because Americans 
have never had a woman president, this was a unique issue that she had to address rhetorically in 
a carefully strategic way. After all, as the following analysis demonstrates, Clinton tried to take 
advantage of some of the positive elements of running as a woman, but could not use her status 
as a woman as the sole basis for attracting voters. Nor could Clinton effectively utilize her 
gender to her benefit because of the popular perceptions among voters and news media outlets 
that she was not, and has rarely been, conventionally feminine. Thus, Clinton attempted to 
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display more dominantly masculine attributes, such as strength and toughness, to prove her 
viability, but this again forced her to craft her messages to reflect traditional femininity—a feat 
that she failed at in myriad ways. The analysis also reflects the fact that Clinton faced other 
double binds, in terms of her initial support for Bush’s pre-emptive war in Iraq, and as she 
struggled to convince voters that she was, indeed, the best candidate to beat Republicans in a 
general election race. In sum, analysis of Clinton’s rhetorical exigencies confirms the tangible 
double binds women face in running for high elective office. 
Specifically, there were four dominant exigencies created by or addressed by Clinton’s 
key speeches and debate performances: The historic nature of Clinton’s candidacy, Clinton’s 
policy for universal health care, Clinton’s stance on the war in Iraq, and Clinton’s chances in the 
general election. As the following analysis indicates, each of these exigencies constrained 
Clinton’s rhetoric in terms of her gender, and as such, each are reflective of the double binds 
faced by female politicians. 
The Historic Nature of the Campaign as Exigence 
 Early on in the campaign, the press made more of an issue out of the historic nature of 
Clinton’s candidacy than Clinton did with her own rhetoric. Clinton was, after all, not the first 
woman to run for president, nor was she the first to attempt a run representing a major political 
party. But, as previously noted, from the outset of the campaign, Clinton was the first woman to 
run as a perceived front-runner. As such, many Americans, including Clinton herself on rare 
occasions, labeled her potential win of the presidency as breaking “the highest and hardest glass 
ceiling” (Kantor, 2008b, para. 8). Because of this possible historic feat, the press added special 
emphasis to Clinton’s chances of representing the Democratic Party in her bid for the presidency.  
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 From the very beginning, the press was clear in conveying the potential importance of 
Clinton’s candidacy, as well as Obama’s. Steinberg and Elder (2008) wrote in The New York 
Times that the Democratic primary race was a “convergence of two historical candidacies, those 
of a woman and an African-American” (para. 3-4). A Washington Post article noted, “Hillary 
Rodham Clinton yesterday launched a long-anticipated 2008 presidential campaign that could 
make her the first female president in the nation’s history and the only former first lady to follow 
her husband in the White House” (Balz, 2007b, para. 1). Dan Balz, this article’s author, went on 
to report later that the historic nature of Clinton’s candidacy, according to her campaign staff, 
could prove beneficial for her chances: “Campaign officials also believe that Clinton’s potential 
for making history as the nation’s first female president will give the campaign added energy, a 
talking point emphasized in a memo sent to supporters yesterday. ‘In particular, younger 
generation women believe it’s time we have our first woman president and believe Hillary is the 
right choice,’ the memo states” (para. 22). However, as demonstrated in the previous chapter 
analyzing this specific section of Clinton’s audience, Clinton’s support among these voters was 
all but non-existent, possibly because Clinton herself was wary of including appeals regarding 
the historic nature of her candidacy in her campaign rhetoric. Regardless, the historic nature of 
the race, as painted in the press, continued. After Super Tuesday, The USA Today noted, “two 
democrats stood on the doorstep of history…both likely to emerge from the 22-state spectacle 
with enough wins and delegates to continue their quests to become the first female or African-
American presidential nominee of a major party” (para. 1).  
 While running as the first female front-runner for her major party’s nomination had 
potential benefits for Clinton, it also served as somewhat of a distraction in press reports, 
indicating the nature of one of the key double binds she faced in her rhetorical situation. An 
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excerpt from a January 2007 article in The Washington Post illustrated the intimate, diffused 
reports that have haunted women running for high elective office in the past that also plagued 
Clinton: 
  Unlike other candidates…whose videos might have been produced by a guy with a  
cellphone camera, Clinton’s announcement was a veritable showpiece of Hollywood- 
style set design, lighting and cinematography. While Clinton, looking radiant in a red  
jacket and flattering makeup, affected the demeanor of a kaffe-klatching neighbor while  
speaking about the Iraq War, energy, Social Security and health care, the camera swung  
with pendular subtlety between a background tableaux of framed family pictures and a  
fabulous table lamp exuding a warm glow. In fact, the background is so eye-catching, so  
crowded with totemic details, so bursting with semiotic potential, that I missed whole  
passages of Clinton’s statement the first time around. (And yes, I do want that lamp)  
(Hornaday, 2007, para. 4). 
And while this passage was not negative toward Clinton’s candidacy, it conveyed a common 
theme among news stories about political women—the penchant for focusing on intimate, 
seemingly irrelevant details while ignoring the more salient issues espoused by female politicians 
(Bystrom, et al., 2004; Duerst-Lahti, 2006; Han, 2003; Witt, et al., 1994). Clinton, because of the 
negative perceptions among voters and news media sources regarding her lack of femininity, 
needed to present her candidacy in a more intimate tone, to essentially put her femininity on 
display. This initial speech act announcing her candidacy dispelled the beliefs that Clinton was 
unlikeable and lacking warmth or the ability to address average citizen voters in conversational 
ways. Unfortunately, a rhetorical act like this, because it conjured such feminine images, was 
risky in that it reminded potential voters that Clinton was a woman who was running for the most 
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masculine of elective political offices. Thus, in presenting her initial campaign speech in this 
way, Clinton needed to combat the negative images that a woman could not serve as president 
through her campaign rhetoric. And as is discussed later in this section, this was something that 
Clinton failed to do adequately in addressing this specific exigence.  
 Additionally, when the press did discuss Clinton’s views on the historical nature of her 
candidacy, it did so in a way that featured the doubts that surrounded her assuming the role of 
president. Kiely (2007) stated, “Though Clinton said she is ‘sure there still are’ doubts in the 
minds of some voters about whether to make a woman the nation’s chief executive, she believes 
that her gender is more of a plus than a minus” (para. 3). Other press sources were direct in 
featuring such doubts, especially after the New Hampshire “crying” incident described in depth 
in Chapter Three. Maureen Dowd (2008) wrote after Clinton’s New Hampshire win: 
 When I walked into the office Monday, people were all clustered around a computer to  
watch what they thought they would never see: Hillary Clinton with the unmistakable  
look of tears in her eyes. A woman gazing at the screen was grimacing, saying it was bad.  
Three guys watched it over and over, drawn to the ‘humanized’ Hillary. One reporter  
who covers security issues cringed. ‘We are at war,’ he said. ‘Is this how she’ll talk to  
Kim Jong-Il?’ Another reporter joked: ‘That crying really seemed genuine. I’ll bet she  
spent hours thinking about it beforehand.’ He added dryly: ‘Crying doesn’t usually work  
in campaigns. Only in relationships’ (para. 1-3).  
Similar statements were present in Kantor’s (2008a) article for The New York Times after 
Clinton’s New Hampshire win:  
‘If she is breaking down now, before winning her party’s nomination, then how would  
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she act under pressure as president?’ Mark Mayfield, 52, a sales manager in Nashville 
who supported Barack Obama’s nomination, wrote in a post on nytimes.com. As if in 
reply, Katha Pollitt wrote on thenation.com that the spectacle of Mrs. Clinton misting 
over brought up “the oldest, dumbest canard about women: they’re too emotional to hold 
power’ (para. 7-8).  
From these brief excerpts, we see a couple of issues related to the historical exigence of 
Clinton’s campaign. On one hand, gender stereotypes were rife throughout these reactions and 
comments (Clinton was being weak; she, as a woman, couldn’t handle the pressure; she, as a 
woman, probably couldn’t handle international leaders, etc.) On the other hand, we see some 
voters attempting to resist such stereotypes. Unfortunately, we know that it can be very difficult, 
if not impossible, for women to discuss gender during campaigns because of the ‘double bind’ 
women face. Because of this double bind, wherein voters expect women to display conventional 
femininity while these women politicians must, at the same time, convince voters they are 
masculine enough for the public, political sphere, it is ironic that Clinton won New Hampshire 
after such a feminine display of emotion. Such a display undoubtedly reminded voters of 
Clinton’s femininity, and thus, potential weakness (as indicated by the reactions following the 
display). Also, because voters and news reporters instantly began questioning the authenticity of 
Clinton’s display, it seems unusual that it propelled her to a win. However, given the amount of 
scholarship that has been focused on Clinton’s rhetorical performance of femininity (or lack 
thereof), her win after such an emotional display makes more sense. Countless studies have 
concluded that one of the key barriers between Clinton and voters, as is discussed throughout the 
present study, has been a perceived lack of warmth, genuine emotion, and sincerity on Clinton’s 
part (Anderson, 2002; Corrigan, 2000; Dubriwny, 2005; Gardetto, 1997; Kelly, 2001; Mattina, 
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2005; Parry-Giles, 2000; Parry-Giles & Blair, 2002; Trent & Short-Thompson, 2003; 
Wertheimer, 2005). As such, when Clinton made such a display of emotion, however sincere or 
disingenuous, it was striking for voters because it was completely uncharacteristic for Clinton, 
even if it was fleeting. Thus, within this single situation was a prime example of a double bind 
faced by Clinton: the absence of emotion on Clinton’s part alienated her from voters; yet when 
she displayed emotion, Clinton began to embody stereotypical female weakness in the minds of 
some voters and pundits, undercutting her credibility as a candidate. 
 Having seen the ways in which women politicians before her had been treated by the 
press, Clinton, rhetorically speaking, adopted a strategy of neglecting the historic nature of her 
candidacy for the majority of the campaign. In fact, she only mentioned her gender (or gender at 
all) sporadically. In Iowa, Clinton featured gender as an issue in only a small portion of her 
lengthy speech; she reminded the crowd of one of her popular speeches in Beijing while she was 
First Lady, stating, “women’s rights are human rights and human rights are women’s rights. It’s 
not only what we believe, here in our country, it’s what we know is important for our national 
security” (Clinton, 2007b, para. 27). She went on to note, “…when I am president I will continue 
to make the changes on behalf of women that are good and right for women and smart for 
American security” (para. 27). Her final words in this speech also reminded the audience of the 
historical nature of her candidacy, but only through implication; Clinton stated: “Let’s make 
history together” (para. 52). However, it seemed as if Clinton in addressing gender, possibly 
aware of the political pitfalls associated with such a move, did so only in juxtaposition with an 
inherently masculine issue, national security. In doing so, Clinton’s rhetoric in this speech 
typified the double bind facing female politicians. Again, while she could not directly persuade 
her audience to vote for her because she was a woman, and that she would be making history 
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with her successful nomination, she had to appeal to the historic nature of her campaign through 
language befitting a male candidate, namely the appeal that she was strong on national security. 
 Clinton would neglect the historical exigence completely in her key campaign speeches 
until her speech after Super Tuesday, when again, she refused to make her gender an explicit 
barrier to her candidacy. Clinton stated, early on in this speech, “Tonight, in record numbers, you 
voted to not just make history—but to remake America” (para. 4). This statement reflected the 
general tone of her campaign speech rhetoric in terms of gender—hint at the historical nature, 
but immediately reframe the issue into something else. Both she and Barack Obama represented 
historical milestones with their respective candidacies. But Clinton, like Obama with his race, 
knew that she could not frame her gender as a central reason for voters to nominate her for 
president. After all, neither would be able to persuade voters who were overtly sexist or racist in 
their personal views. But it seems that Clinton, more so than Obama, had greater difficulty with 
this particular exigence, and I contend that this was due to Clinton’s gender. Since, as discussed 
in detail in Chapter One, the presidency and most political positions are gender-coded masculine, 
Obama seemed to have much more freedom than Clinton in choosing his rhetorical strategies. 
Clinton, on the other hand, not only had to deal with her particular set of political baggage, she 
also had to convince voters that she was representative of historical change while, at the same 
time, she convinced voters that she was not so different that she lacked the experience to be 
president and also that she did not represent revolutionary change that may have scared voters 
away. Truly, in terms of the particular rhetorical exigence presented by the historical nature of 
Clinton’s campaign, the gendered double bind was omnipresent in Clinton’s rhetorical situation.  
 Clinton similarly refused to make the historical nature of her candidacy a part of her 
debate rhetoric, rarely bringing up the issue at all unless pressed by a specific question. The issue 
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was not mentioned at all during the first debate in South Carolina, and only twice in her debate 
with John Edwards and Barack Obama. During this debate Clinton revealed a way of dealing 
with this exigence that would soon become a pattern; she would acknowledge her historical 
campaign intertwined with the historical candidacy of Barack Obama, attempting to seemingly 
diffuse her own significance as a woman running for president. Clinton noted, “You know, this 
campaign is obviously an incredible opportunity for so many people to become involved, to be 
part of making history. You’ve got a son of the South. You’ve got an African-American. You 
have a woman. What better way to celebrate the legacy of Dr. King than to look at this stage 
right here tonight?” (“The Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, para. 545-546). The only other 
time she brought her gender up in any way during this debate was after Obama mentioned pay 
equality—the lack of parity among different races and between men and women—to which 
Clinton added: 
…the challenge is for us to address all of these issues. We obviously still have problems  
of gender equality. You know, equal pay is not yet equal…A woman makes $0.77 on a 
dollar and women of color make $0.67. So there is a big agenda waiting for the 
Democratic Party. And we feel so passionately about this because we not only are 
running for office, but we each, in our own way, have lived it. We have seen it. We have 
understood the pain and the injustice that has come because of race, because of gender. 
And it’s imperative that, as we move forward with our campaign, we make it very clear 
that each of us will address these issues (para. 569-571).  
By talking about gender in this way (by sublimating it to race, by talking about it generally and 
not personally, and by constantly using pronouns such as ‘we’ instead of ‘I’), Clinton’s rhetorical 
choices served to distance herself and her candidacy from her gender.  
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 Clinton’s rhetoric dealing with her gender was similarly obfuscating in her first solo 
debate against Obama. Here, only one comment during the evening brought up her gender at all. 
Clinton, in the middle of the debate, noted, “What I think is exciting is that the way we are 
looking at the Democratic field, now down to the two of us is, is we’re going to get big change. 
We’re going to have change. I think having the first woman president would be a huge change 
for America and the world” (“Transcript of Thursday’s Democratic,” 2008, para. 344). Clinton, 
thus, once again missed an opportunity to discuss the implications of electing a woman as 
president, or to dwell in any way on the significance of electing a woman to the highest elected 
office in the United States. Instead, oddly enough, she once again lumped the historical 
significance of her own campaign in with Obama’s to the point of adopting one of the key 
Obama monikers during the campaign: change.  
 Clinton, in her debate against Obama in Cleveland, used the same strategy—discussing 
her gender only once. In this case it was at the very end of the debate in her closing statement, 
when she once again linked the historic significance of her own candidacy with Obama’s. 
Clinton stated: 
 As I said last week, you know, it’s been an honor to campaign. I still intend to do  
everything I can to win, but it has been an honor, because it has been a campaign that is  
history making. You know, obviously I am thrilled to be running, to be the first woman  
president, which I think would be a sea change in our country and around the world, and  
would give enormous…you know, enormous hope and, you know, a real change to the  
way things have been done, and who gets to do them, and what the rules are. So I feel  
that either one of us will make history (“The Democratic Debate in Cleveland,” 2008,  
para. 304-308). 
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As evidenced by the transcript, it was clear that Clinton had tangible difficulties talking about the 
historical nature of her campaign as exigence—the number of “you know” comments is proof of 
this by itself. And again, as if to demonstrate that she was, indeed, not significantly different than 
Obama on this one issue alone, she undercut the significance of her historical campaign by 
admitting that Obama’s winning of the nomination would be just as significant. This strategy, 
once again, indicated the double bind plaguing Clinton’s candidacy. She, like Obama, obviously 
symbolized change. Yet Clinton had to temper the change her candidacy represented in order to 
not frighten voters because of the revolutionary nature of her candidacy, and because Clinton 
hoped to utilize her previous experiences in D.C. politics as an indication of her qualifications to 
be president (a constraint analyzed specifically in Chapter Five). As such, though Clinton 
attempted to couple the symbolic change that her campaign represented with Obama’s, it seemed 
less authentic, and more often than not, contradictory. 
 This rhetorical strategy of dismissing the historical exigence presented by her campaign 
was also evident in the final debate between Clinton and Obama. Gender, once again, was only 
brought up once. In this debate Clinton brought it up early on, as if to again potentially dismiss 
the significance. In her opening statement, Clinton stated, “…we meet here tonight in 
Philadelphia where our founding fathers determined that the promise of America would be 
available for future generations if we were able to make it happen. You know, I am here, as is 
Senator Obama. Neither of us were included in those original documents. But in a very real 
sense, we demonstrate that that promise of America is alive and well” (“Democratic Debate in 
Philadelphia,” 2008, para. 7-8). This rhetoric is significant, and represents another of Clinton’s 
rhetorical strategies in dealing with this specific exigence: Clinton would deny that she was a 
victim of gender bias to prove that she was a capable and viable presidential candidate. As 
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discussed in Chapter Three, the women’s vote was deeply divided during the Democratic 
primary in 2008. One could argue that, had Clinton made her gender an issue, or highlighted 
more the historic nature of her candidacy, she could have motivated a number of women to join 
her cause. However, given everything that we have seen in relation to the gendered double bind, 
and all of the information indicating the strong cultural perception of weakness among women, 
Clinton may have had no other choice but to downplay her gender as a factor in the primary. At 
the point Clinton acknowledged the historical significance of her candidacy as a woman, she 
would have crossed the line Bower (2003) discussed; she would have, to turn Bower’s phrase, 
created a rhetorical sense of revolution instead of evolution. Thus, Clinton, while she was still 
able to compete for the nomination, had to be all but silent on this most central of issues. 
This first exigence, as evident by Clinton’s lackluster handling of the historic nature of 
her candidacy, was largely a product of forces within the rhetorical situation but outside of the 
purview of Clinton, herself (i.e. news media sources, perspectives and expectations of voters, 
etc.). But as Bitzer (1968) noted, key exigencies addressed within rhetorical situations are not 
just those created or perpetuated by forces outside of the rhetor; exigencies can also be presented 
and characterized by rhetors themselves to draw the audience’s attention to important problems 
that must be solved. Though the campaign lasted for almost eighteen months and countless 
issues were brought up in various campaign communication sites, two key issues dominated the 
Democratic primary campaign in 2008, and were directly constructed as such by Clinton’s own 
rhetoric. These most pivotal issues were universal health care and the war in Iraq. Tackling these 
two issues would seemingly have been a wise strategy. The discussion in Chapter One identified 
several issues that have been culturally coded as masculine or feminine, with war or national 
security issues serving as masculine issues and health care typically, though not always, coded as 
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feminine (Banwart, et al., 2003a; Banwart, et al., 2003b; Banwart & McKinney, 2005; Bystrom, 
2003a; Bystrom, 2004; Davis, 2003; Duerst-Lahti, 2006; Palmer & Simon, 1996). By choosing 
to feature these issues, with almost equal frequency during her campaign, Clinton was seeking to 
embody the idea of the ‘sister mister’ which Clift and Brazaitis (2000) discussed as a potentially 
positive way to present a female candidate for president. By discussing health care, a topic that 
has long been associated with Clinton, she was able to champion a cause that was, perceptually, 
feminine. But by also focusing on establishing Iraq as a dominant exigence, Clinton was 
demonstrating the toughness or ‘presidential machismo’ seemingly required by the president of 
the United States (Han, 2003). However, as is already clear, Clinton was plagued by rhetorical 
double binds throughout her bid for the nomination, and these exigencies further reflect the 
extent to which Clinton’s rhetoric was constrained during her campaign. As such, the analysis 
now turns to focus attention on these exigencies that Clinton created to address the ways in 
which they problematized her success in persuading voters. The establishment of a universal 
health care system will be addressed first. 
Clinton’s Health Care Exigence as Double Bind 
 Anyone who has followed Hillary Clinton’s career since her husband first took over the 
presidency understands that health care has always been an important issue for her. Because of 
Clinton’s interest and experience with the topic of universal health care, and because many of her 
Democratic opponents (particularly John Edwards) featured the establishment of health care 
reform among their policy objectives, Clinton chose to make this topic a cornerstone of her 
candidacy. The decision to feature health care reform as a priority on the trail was also tactical, 
given the polling data at key moments during the campaign that indicated health care was one of 
the most important issues to voters during the campaign, necessitating Clinton’s rhetorical 
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attention (Saad, 2008; Steinhauser, 2008a). During her campaign for president, Hillary Clinton 
rhetorically constructed George Bush personally, and Republicans generally, as key barriers to 
establishing meaningful health care reform. Early on in her campaign rhetoric, Clinton 
established universal health care as a crucial problem to be solved: “…I was very pleased that I 
could, in 1993, work with a lot of very knowledgeable people to try to bring universal health care 
to our country…I am very proud we tried because it was the right thing to do and now we are 
going to get it done when I become president…” (Clinton, 2007b, para. 26). Clinton did not 
simply list universal health care as a policy priority; she dwelt on this issue and provided details 
and stories to support the assertion that this was a vital goal and one that was opposed by Bush 
and like-minded Republicans. Clinton stated:  
Everyday people come up to me with their problems. They tell me horror stories about  
insurance companies that reject their claims, about premiums going up so fast they can’t  
possibly keep insurance for themselves and their families, about being without insurance,  
not able to afford the prescription drugs and the treatment their doctors say they  
need…The stories I hear, the personal acquaintances and friends that I have convince me  
that nothing other than health care for everyone should be the standard…I don’t want to  
leave anybody out. I am not running for president to put band-aids on this problem. I am  
running for president to solve it (Clinton, 2007b, para. 33-34). 
Who had been putting band-aids on problems like these? For Clinton, the answer was obvious: 
Bush, and like-minded Republicans, because “Under this president, all of [our] hard work has 
been squandered” (Clinton, 2007b, para. 40). Though Clinton was not specific in detailing the 
hard work that had been squandered, she was likely referring to the reforms the Clinton 
administration had put in place after the push for universal health care failed in the early nineties 
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(i.e. Bush’s limiting of coverage offered by the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) in 
2007, a policy Bill Clinton’s administration put into effect in the mid nineties) (Lee, 2007). 
Indeed, throughout her early speeches (before 2008), Clinton blamed Bush for a host of issues 
beyond Iraq and health care, including the economic downturn, the failure of the No Child Left 
Behind Act, a ‘war’ against scientific research, banning stem cell research, and several other 
issues that would resonate well among Democratic voters. But when assessing the amount of 
time spent on each of these issues and the number of details adding fuel to the rhetorical fire of 
Clinton’s exigencies, it is clear that Iraq and health care were Bush’s biggest problems that 
Clinton asserted she could solve. And who better, according to Clinton’s campaign rhetoric, than 
Hillary herself to solve these pressing problems. Speaking of health care specifically, she stated, 
“We all want a health care system that is universal, high quality, and affordable…This isn’t just 
an issue for me—it is a passion and a cause—and it is a fight I will continue until every single 
American is insured—no exceptions, no excuses” (Clinton, 2008c, para. 18).  
Clinton’s speeches, in terms of addressing her health care exigence, utilized a blended 
rhetorical approach—one that exhibited nurturance while also stressing her personal strength and 
determination to enact health care reform. This blended approach embodied what Rosenthal 
(1998a) described as “integrative leadership,” as previously discussed in Chapter One. It stressed 
the idea that Clinton was a problem-solver, a conventional male trait of leadership, while equally 
stressing the mutuality and cooperation that Rosenthal argued was essential for female success in 
leadership roles. However, at the same time, because Clinton presented herself as the dominant 
protagonist in her quest for health care reform, she may have undercut the qualities Han (2003) 
argued would aid a female presidential contender: the willingness to share power and work 
across party lines. Additionally, because Clinton regularly lumped all Republican presidential 
  127 
candidates as being like George W. Bush in her campaign rhetoric, her ability to work across 
party lines could have also been diminished. 
Clinton’s debate performances also stressed the issue of health care and, similarly, 
stressed that the Bush administration was the cause of problems on this front. In the first 
Democratic debate in South Carolina, Clinton asserted that a lack of health care was 
symptomatic of the Bush administration’s favoritism for corporate interests at the expense of 
American families: “…this administration and corporate America today don’t see middle class 
and working Americans. They are invisible. They don’t understand that if you’re a family that 
can’t get health care, you are really hurting…to the administration in the White House, you’re 
invisible” (“South Carolina Democratic,” 2007, para. 580-581).  
Similarly, as her opponents (Obama and Edwards, specifically) developed and released 
their own health care policies, Clinton used the same strategy. She argued, seemingly lumping 
Obama specifically with Bush in terms of health care reform and problems, “my health care 
program will cover everyone. I don’t leave anybody out. It is a universal system” (“The 
Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, para. 325). She continued this line of argument later in this 
same debate, attempting to set Obama apart for the lack of inclusivity under his health care 
policy, urging voters to understand that his policy would not have solved the problems faced by 
many Americans: “I think it is imperative that we have plans, as both John [Edwards] and I do, 
that from the very beginning say, ‘You know what? Everybody has got to be covered’ (para. 
392). She summed up this attack succinctly just a few moments later, using the same rhetoric to 
attack Obama that she had previously used when she had attacked Bush’s policies: “I am not 
running for president to put band-aids on our problems. I want to get universal health care for 
every single American” (para. 397). 
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This specific approach by Clinton—arguing on behalf of including everyone under her 
health care plan—was wise, in terms of gender. It made Clinton appear as if she were embodying 
not only the nurturing personae required of  “True Womanhood,” by arguing that the government 
had to take care of the people to save them from suffering, but it also encouraged voters to see 
that she, more so than Obama, was the more inclusive of the two candidates. To back up this 
contention, Clinton focused on health care throughout her campaign more than any other issue, 
and asserted: “…this is the passionate cause of my public service” (“Transcript of Thursday’s,” 
2008, para. 96). Clinton repeatedly featured establishing universal health care as her primary 
mission, in spite of her past failures during her husband’s first term, and despite the cautionary 
statements of fellow Democrats:  
Now, in Barack’s plan, he very clearly says he will mandate that parents get health  
insurance for their children. So it’s not that he is against mandatory provisions, it’s that  
he doesn’t think it would be politically acceptable to require that for everyone. I just  
disagree with that. I think we as Democrats have to be willing to fight for universal health  
care…And what I’ve concluded, when I was looking at this—because I got the same kind  
of advice, which was, it’s controversial, you’ll run into all of this buzz saw, and I said,  
been there, done that. But if you don’t start by saying, you’re going to achieve universal  
health care, you will be nibbled to death (“Transcript of Thursday’s,” 2008, para. 105- 
108). 
On one hand, stressing the distinctions between her plan and Obama’s was wise, given that 
health care reform was one of the few issues wherein Clinton and Obama had distinctly different 
policy agendas, though they shared similar overall goals of establishing a universal health care 
system. Thus, Clinton did well on the health care front to draw distinctions between herself and 
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her Democratic rival. On the other hand, focusing on health care reminded voters of Clinton’s 
previous failing on the executive level, and could have also caused voters to remember the bitter 
infighting that occurred between Democrats and Republicans during her husband’s 
administration, a time when the esteem of Democrats on the national level became greatly 
diminished. As such, featuring health care as a central exigence during her campaign was a 
costly gamble.  
 Unfortunately for Clinton, health care, and indeed, most of the salient issues of the 
campaign, was overshadowed by the constraints of her rhetorical situation in her later debate 
performances. In fact, during the Cleveland debate, Clinton was not able (for one reason or 
another) to bring up universal health care at all. Indeed, the only time universal health care was 
mentioned during this debate was when Obama attacked Clinton’s plan, turning her vehement 
defense of her health care policies against her. Obama argued: 
 You know, she [Clinton] mentioned that she is a fighter on health care. And look—I do  
not in any way doubt that Senator Clinton genuinely wants to provide health care to all  
Americans. What I have said is that the way she approached it back in ’93, I think, was  
wrong in part because she had the view that what’s required is simply to fight. And  
Senator Clinton ended up fighting not just the insurance companies and the drug  
companies, but also members of her own party. And as a consequence, there were a  
number of people, like Jim Cooper of Tennessee and Bill Bradley and Pat Moynihan,  
who were not included in the negotiations. And we had the potential of bringing people  
together to actually get something done (“The Democratic Debate in Cleveland,” 2008,  
para. 218-219). 
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This was wise for Obama, because his rhetoric turned the tables on Clinton—using one of her 
central exigencies against her. Though Clinton attempted to position herself as the more 
inclusive candidate in terms of health care, Obama challenged this assertion by reminding voters 
of the divisive nature that Clinton had engendered among even her Democratic allies. In essence, 
Obama’s claims regarding Clinton’s failings in health care robbed Clinton of the advantage 
ascribed to female leaders of establishing cooperative government (Han, 2003; Rosenthal, 
1998a). This reminded the audience that Clinton was not conventionally feminine, and indeed, 
was often so determined to win, that she had often alienated her supporters. 
Clinton’s failure in rhetorically utilizing the exigence of health care effectively was 
clearly evident in the final debate. Clinton failed to mention health care even once during her 
final debate of the primary season in Philadelphia. By this time, as previously established, the 
economic crisis was beginning to dominate national news (Isidore, 2008). In fact, according to 
one CNN.com poll, the economy had become the number one issue among voters in Texas and 
Ohio over a month before this debate took place (Steinhauser, 2008b). As such, high dollar 
policies like establishing Clinton’s universal health care system would have likely seemed too 
costly for most Americans to support, and thus, one of her chief problems to be solved was 
removed from her rhetorical arsenal. And, indeed, if she had mentioned establishing a universal 
health care system, Clinton likely would have fallen into the same trap as other female 
politicians—appearing to be too liberal or out of touch with the realistic, important concerns 
faced by the majority of citizens who were facing financial burdens that did not exist during the 
beginning of the campaign (Clift & Brazaitis, 2000; Dolan, 1998; Duerst-Lahti, 2006; Epstein, et 
al., 1998; Palmer & Simon, 1996). Thus, it was not only for economically practical reasons, but 
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also because of the gendered double bind Clinton faced on this issue, that health care had to be 
abandoned as a core exigence late in the campaign. 
Health care as a key exigence, in the end, proved costly to Clinton’s success. Because of 
her past experience with this issue, Clinton likely believed that she would look more 
experienced, and thus, more qualified on the subject than her Democratic rivals, specifically 
Barack Obama. But the double bind was, once again, at work, and forced Clinton to 
acknowledge her past instances of failed, divisive leadership as she, at the same time, touted her 
own experience with health care. And as this was the key exigence from which Clinton could 
derive perceived femininity among her audience for championing a universal health care system, 
the failure of this exigence likely did more damage to Clinton’s persona and reputation among 
voters than adding any potential inference of femininity. 
Clinton’s War in Iraq Exigence as Double Bind 
The war in Iraq as exigence was a dominant aspect of Clinton’s speeches and debate 
performances, while also serving as a source of ire throughout the campaign. Clinton originally 
supported the Bush administration’s efforts in Iraq and voted in the Senate to authorize the war, a 
vote that she knew isolated her from some Democratic voters (Healy, 2007a). Additionally, 
because Barack Obama was against the war from the beginning, and his campaign constantly 
reminded voters of Clinton’s initial support, Clinton had to constantly address the inherent 
contradiction of her stance throughout the campaign rather than stressing her proposals to end the 
war if she were elected president.  
Further complicating Clinton’s message on this issue, the press coverage of Clinton’s 
campaign message against Bush’s Iraq strategy perpetuated Clinton’s stance against the 
administration, but consistently reminded voters of Clinton’s initial support of the war. A 
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quotation from one article written by Balz (2007a) illustrates this issue effectively: “Sen. Hillary 
Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.) offered her harshest assessment to date of President Bush’s Iraq war 
strategy yesterday, continuing her steady evolution from one of the war’s staunchest supporters 
to one of the administration’s most prominent critics” (para. 1). Later in the same article, Balz 
provided a sober assessment of Clinton’s rhetorical problem with the Iraq war that was almost 
prophetic of her failures with the handling of this crucial issue: “That resolution [that authorized 
Bush’s actions in Iraq] haunted her politically as public support for the war began to erode, 
particularly among Democrats” (para. 8).  
Whether or not Clinton actually supported the initial war in Iraq is something only she 
can attest to; however, as Davis (2003) aptly pointed out, the first woman president would likely 
be pressed and tested on key issues of national security. Additionally, we know that one of the 
key masculine elements associated with the presidency is ‘strength’ or ‘toughness’ (Banwart & 
McKinney, 2005; Bystrom, 2004; Clift & Brazaitis, 2000; Dolan, 1998; Gilligan, 1993).  Thus, 
Clinton was caught in a double bind with regard to this exigence: she could not bend to the 
liberal view against the war effort, or even apologize for her vote, because she would be 
potentially deemed too soft or weak. Yet, as the war dragged on and public sentiment, especially 
among Democrats, waned, she had to defend her initial position regardless of her later views.  
 Another related issue complicating Clinton’s rhetoric on Iraq was the fact that she never 
showed regret for her initial decision to support the war until after she started her bid for the 
presidency—an action that was viewed by many as insincere and simply politically motivated 
(Balz, 2007b). Clinton had a reputation for years as a politically ambitious woman, willing to do 
almost anything to gain the power she sought (Anderson & Sheeler, 2005; Corrigan, 2000; 
Dubriwny, 2005; Parry-Giles, 2000; Parry-Giles & Blair, 2002; Parry-Giles & Parry-Giles, 
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1996). Thus, speculation abounded that Clinton had crafted her rhetoric regarding Iraq solely 
because she knew her initial support for the war would alienate her from Democratic and anti-
war independent voters. This was significant, because as Kornblut and Cohen (2007) rightly 
argued, Iraq, along with health care, were the two most dominant topics during the Democratic 
primary. And because Clinton’s position on Iraq was tenuous, a fitting rhetorical response was 
required from Clinton—a response that was vague and rarely apologetic, and consequently, did 
not assuage voters who were anti-war and already hesitant in their support for Clinton.  
In dealing with the issue of Iraq in news media outlets, Clinton was vague early on. In the 
beginning of her campaign, she remarked, “’I am cursed with the responsibility gene…I am. I 
admit that. You’ve got to be very careful in how you proceed with any combat situation in which 
American lives are at stake” (Healy, 2007a, para. 14-15). And while Clinton was likely trying to 
deflect her opponent’s charges by stressing the thoughtfulness with which she approached her 
vote, it became clear as the campaign dragged on that a clearer response and defense was 
required. As I demonstrate over the next few pages of this chapter, especially in her debate 
performances, Clinton was consistently harangued by moderators and her opponents and pressed 
for clarification about the Iraq war more than almost any other issue. 
 In her campaign speeches, Clinton took a very interesting but wise approach to 
addressing the Iraq war, given that she was a female trying to be elected commander-in-chief. 
Primarily, she sought to position herself on one hand as a nurturing protector and on the other 
hand as a vehement and tough critic of Bush’s failed efforts in Iraq.  
First, Clinton positioned herself rhetorically as someone who cared deeply for protecting 
the troops, while they were abroad fighting the enemy and protecting our country and after they 
returned home. She consistently argued that she would be capable of establishing “the right end 
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to the war in Iraq,” stressing the importance of not just simply removing our troops without a 
thought as to how this would be done or the implications of such an action (Clinton, 2007a, para. 
1). Clinton made it clear through her use of rhetoric who she blamed for our course in Iraq (and 
thus, who was putting the soldiers she sought to protect in danger): “After seven years of George 
Bush, America is ready for change. We are ready for a new beginning” (Clinton, 2007b, para. 
18). In fact, Bush treating our troops, and indeed all Americans, as if they were “invisible” was a 
central theme of Clinton’s early campaign rhetoric: “…if you think it is time to make sure we 
have no invisible Americans, then I need you to stand up and caucus for me,” she noted in Iowa 
(Clinton, 2007b, para. 48). She immediately continued, “If you can’t bear to see our young men 
and women, our sons and our daughters, continuing to fight another country’s civil war, if you 
believe that the best way to support our troops is to bring them home—but you want to be sure 
it’s done the right way—then I need you to stand and caucus for me” (para. 49).  
Assuming a tough but nurturing, protective stance was a wise approach to the issue of 
Iraq, especially considering what we know about the ideologies of “Republican Motherhood” or 
“True Womanhood.” All women, regardless of their political aspirations, are expected to be 
sensitive, caring, and helping in order to, as Helgesen (1995) has asserted, “emphasize 
relationships with people” (p. 28). Still, the role of motherhood also implies not just nurturing, 
but also protecting one’s children (Bem, 1993). Clinton’s adoption of a protective stance toward 
our nation’s troops, while exhibiting tough rhetoric toward Bush, was in keeping with 
perceptions of gendered normativity. Thus, by approaching the exigence of Iraq in this way, as a 
way to help our troops, she was not overtly challenging gendered stereotypes about the behaviors 
of women. 
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 Clinton’s use of George Bush’s policy in Iraq as central exigence continued in the speech 
following her win in New Hampshire and, as previously indicated, also included other issues 
beyond Iraq. Clinton asserted, “Too many have been invisible for too long. Well, you are not 
invisible to me. The oil companies, the drug companies, the health insurance companies, the 
predatory student loan companies have had seven years of a president who stands up for them. 
It’s time we had a president who stands up for all of you” (Clinton, 2008a, para. 4-5). She further 
asserted in this speech, once again, that it was necessary to not just end the war in Iraq, but that 
we needed to end the war correctly. Furthermore, again attacking Bush more so than any of her 
Democratic rivals, she argued that it was time “to take care of our brave veterans and restore 
America’s standing, respect, and credibility around the world” (para. 8). Clinton’s rhetoric made 
it clear what the central problem with America was—the failure of the Bush Administration—
and thus, asserted that she was the best candidate to take care of this problem: “We are 
determined to tackle our toughest problems and stand up [for] those who most need a champion 
because we are determined to make America work again for all of our people” (para. 11). Indeed, 
nowhere in these early speeches does Clinton directly attack her chief Democratic rivals, Barack 
Obama or John Edwards, or mention the problems with their plans or policy goals. Thus, Bush, 
and his mishandling of the war was clearly at the forefront of Clinton’s rhetorically-constructed 
exigencies—a problematic focus for a primary campaign that will be discussed in depth in the 
next section of this chapter.  
 This theme continued in her later speeches; more than any other issue that required 
immediate attention and action, Bush and those who supported his administration’s decisions, 
required citizens to vote for Clinton, or as in her last speech at least, a Democrat. Clinton, with 
reference to the cronyism and favoritism for certain Iraq war contractors, like the infamous 
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Halliburton corporation with which Vice President Cheney was directly connected as a past 
CEO, continued to assert that Bush had only listened to special interests, ignoring the wishes of 
the American people (Clinton, 2008b). In doing so, and by employing a failed Iraq strategy, 
Clinton argued time and time again that America’s reputation around the world had suffered 
more than at any time in history because of George W. Bush and must be repaired (Clinton, 
2008c).  
 Bush, and his failures in Iraq, was also prominent as an exigence in Clinton’s debate 
performances. In her very first statement in the first debate in South Carolina, Clinton asserted, 
“…the American people have spoken. The Congress has voted, as of today, to end this war. And 
now we can only hope that the president will listen” (“South Carolina Democratic,” 2007, para. 
4). Clinton, like all of the other Democratic contenders involved in this debate, expressed her 
doubts that Bush would, in the end, act to bring our troops home, and the idea of Bush as 
exigence persisted. However, Clinton’s opponents in the debate, foreshadowing one of the 
dominant themes throughout the campaign, repeatedly attacked Clinton’s initial vote for the war. 
Clinton, for her part, attempted to deflect the issue by looking forward to the decisions that 
needed to be made to end the conflict: “…I take responsibility for my vote. Obviously, I did as 
good a job as I could at the time. It was a sincere vote based on the information available to me 
…But I think the real question before us: Is what do we do now? …Bush is stubbornly refusing 
to listen to the will of the American people …And I can only end by saying that if this president 
does not get us out of Iraq, when I am president, I will” (para. 28-32). Using Bush’s Iraq strategy 
in constructing a defense of her own vote in this way created a scapegoat for her decision—a 
deflection that Clinton hoped would lessen the effect of her Iraq vote and prompt voters to view 
the Iraq war as less a site of blame for her and more a problem that required resolution. When the 
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issue came up later in this same debate, Clinton once again used this strategy: “And the problem 
is that the president seems determined not to change course, despite the fact that we are not 
gaining ground” (para. 88).  
A strategy of deflection was potentially damaging to Clinton in terms of gender as a lens 
for understanding her rhetorical behaviors. As the discussion of gendered personality traits 
indicated in Chapter One, people (and thus, voters) often associate honesty, cooperation with 
others, and responsibility with women more so than with men (Banwart & McKinney, 2005; 
Buchanan, 1996; Bystrom, 2004; Clift & Brazaitis, 2000; Dolan, 1998; Fox & Schuhmann, 1999; 
Gilligan, 1993; Han, 2003; Helgesen, 1995; Witt, et al., 1994). As such, when Clinton deflected 
her own responsibility and immediately targeted someone else for her own errors or lapses in 
judgment, she defied many of the positive characteristics of women politicians that she could 
otherwise have utilized to her benefit. Also, when we consider the fact that blaming others for 
failures, as Huddy and Terkildsen (1993) pointed out, has been one of the negative 
characteristics most often associated with male leaders, we also see Clinton embodying the 
negative traits of leadership that most find distasteful. Thus, the double bind plaguing political 
women once again becomes evident: Clinton had to appear tough on a masculine issue (the war 
in Iraq) or she would have faced criticism for her weakness or her inability to deal with a male 
issue. But addressing her initial Iraq vote in this way made Clinton seem to lack honesty and 
integrity, or that she was embodying negative male leadership traits. Thus, from the outset of the 
campaign, Clinton faced palpable double binds in terms of her stance on Iraq. 
 As the campaign heated up, however, blaming Bush for Iraq became more complicated. 
This was primarily true as the 2007 “troop surge” authorized by Bush took effect and, because of 
this, alleged progress was being made in Iraq (Bacon, Jr., 2007). When asked about her Iraq 
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policy in later debates, Clinton would still point out Bush’s failures: that he had given the Iraqis a 
“blank check” to make progress at America’s expense, and reminding audience members of the 
problems that they would all inherit because of Bush’s failures, arguing (to audience applause), 
“Obviously we’ve got to rein in…President Bush” (“The Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, 
para. 447-449). Reining in Bush became a prominent Clinton argument, in terms of Iraq, after 
Super Tuesday, as well. She noted in her first debate against only Obama, “I think both Barack 
and I have tried in these debates…to be as responsible as we can be, because we know this 
president, based on what he said in the State of the Union, intends to leave at least 130,000, if not 
more, troops in Iraq as he exits. It’s the most irresponsible abdication of what should be a 
presidential commitment to end what he started” (“Transcript of Thursday’s,” 2008, para. 406). 
Clinton was, here, seemingly trying to regain the positive image traits of ‘responsibility’ by 
attacking Bush in this way—a positive element of female political rhetoric previously discussed. 
However, Clinton was still doing so in a way that was accusatory and directly confrontational. 
And while this type of discourse may be acceptable for male politicians seeking office, we have 
seen that such a stylistic approach can have dire consequences when used by a woman, 
especially Hillary Clinton (Campbell, 1998).  
 The Iraq issue was not only complicated by Clinton’s rhetoric, though; Obama, for his 
part, was persistent on the issue of Iraq in tying Clinton to her original vote to authorize Bush’s 
war efforts. In the first debate between just Clinton and himself, Obama argued, “I will offer a 
clear contrast as somebody who never supported this war, thought it was a bad idea. I don’t want 
to just end the war, but I want to end the mindset that got us into war in the first place” 
(“Transcript of Thursday’s,” 2008, para. 428). Obama continued this line of argumentation in the 
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Cleveland debate after Clinton argued that both she and Obama had voted to provide funding and 
logistical support for the Iraq war; once again, Obama contended: 
…this [our nation beginning the Iraq war] was a big strategic blunder. It was not a matter  
of, well, here is the initial decision, but since then we’ve voted the same way. Once we  
had driven the bus into the ditch, there were only so many ways we could get out. The  
question is, who’s making the decision initially to drive the bus into the ditch? And the  
fact is that Senator Clinton often says that she is ready on day one, but in fact she was  
ready to give in to George Bush on day one on this critical issue (“The Democratic  
Debate in Cleveland,” 2008, para. 141). 
Obama’s rhetoric here, representative of his chief response to Clinton’s stance on the Iraq war, 
damaged Clinton’s cause rhetorically. As Bystrom (2003b) has previously indicated, voters 
associate men with the top two image traits sought in a president: the ability to lead the nation 
effectively during a crisis and the ability to make a difficult decision. On the exigence of Iraq, 
specifically, Clinton’s rhetoric was unsuccessful in withstanding Obama’s indictments on these 
two key fronts. 
 Indeed, it was her original vote to authorize the war that haunted Clinton as she tried to 
blame Bush and defend against Obama. When pressed on the issue during the first one-on-one 
debate between Clinton and Obama in Los Angeles, Clinton again attacked Bush as the true 
source of the problem:  
You know, I’ve said many times if I had known then what I know now, I never would  
have given President Bush the authority. It was a sincere vote based on my assessment at  
the time and what I believed he would do with the authority he was given. He abused that  
authority, he misused that authority. I warned at the time it was not authority for a  
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preemptive war. Nevertheless, he went ahead and waged one, which has led to the  
position we find ourselves in today (“Transcript of Thursday’s,” 2008, para. 458-459). 
When the topic persisted during the same debate, Clinton continued her blaming of Bush and 
defense of her initial vote: “…I think I made a reasoned judgment. Unfortunately, the person 
who actually got to execute the policy did not” (para. 508).  
Clinton continued this strategy of self-defense/attack Bush in later debates; in Cleveland 
specifically, after Obama began to put more pressure on her initial decision, Clinton once again 
defended by deflecting, and emphasized Bush as exigence: “Well, obviously, I’ve said many 
times that, although my vote on the 2002 authorization regarding Iraq was a sincere vote, I would 
not have voted that way again. I would certainly, as president, never have taken us to war in Iraq. 
And I regret deeply that President Bush waged a preemptive war, which I warned against and 
said I disagreed with” (“The Democratic Debate in Cleveland,” 2008, para. 268-269). Clinton 
then did her best to change the subject, knowing that she was on shaky ground, and stated, “But I 
think this election has to be about the future” (para. 270). Rhetorically, Clinton’s stance on Iraq 
as presented here was incredibly problematic in terms of her presentation of her leadership style. 
Clinton, all along, stated that she agreed with Bush’s pre-emptive war because it was based on 
intelligence indicating that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, which was why 
she voted to authorize the war. Thus, these statements in Cleveland, once again, placed Clinton 
in a double bind in terms of the Iraq exigence; either she did not know what she was voting for 
but wanted to exhibit military ‘machismo’ and avoid the negative stereotypes ascribed to female 
politicians for looking weak, or she did know what she was getting the country into via her vote, 
and simply was trying to avoid any connection to her vote because the policy turned out to be 
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flawed. Certainly neither of these explanations displayed traits Americans have associated with 
strong leadership (Bystrom 2003b).  
 Clinton’s rhetoric on the issue of Iraq was consistent through her final debate of the 
primary. Interestingly though, while she mentioned Bush’s failures as a source of concern more 
than any other problem during the debate, and she brought up specific issues like Iraq, there was 
a distinct lack of focus to her rhetoric. Instead of emphasizing one issue or another, Clinton 
focused more on the general failings of Bush. She argued early on in the evening, “I have seen 
the damage of the Bush years. I’ve seen the extraordinary pain that people have suffered from 
because of the failed policies; you know, those who have held my hands who have lost sons or 
daughters in Iraq, and those who have lost sons or daughters because they didn’t have health 
insurance” (“Democratic Debate in Philadelphia,” 2008, para. 33).  This newly generalized 
theme of Bush as exigence, rather than targeting his specific polices or issues, continued: “Now, 
that doesn’t mean that people are not frustrated with the government. We have every reason to be 
frustrated, particularly with this administration” (para. 53).  
More surprisingly, Clinton’s rhetoric in the last debate seemed to reverse course for the 
candidate, making it seem as if Iraq was in fact not the biggest problem to fix: “It’s not only 
about Iraq. It is about ending the war in Iraq, so that we can begin paying attention to all of the 
other problems we have” (para. 190). This was likely caused by the economic downturn that was 
beginning to spiral out of control in the United States during this part of the election (Isadore, 
2008). Suddenly, Clinton’s painting of Bush’s handling of the war in Iraq as a central concern 
was no longer as appealing to voters, perceptually, as the frightening possibilities of 
unemployment, rising interest rates, and mortgage foreclosures were. This forced Clinton to 
adjust her rhetoric, at a very late stage in the contest, to still indict Bush and like-minded 
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Republicans while also having to include the economic concerns Americans faced, as evidenced 
by one of her later answers in the debate: “…President Bush decided…that the war in Iraq and 
tax cuts for the wealthiest of Americans were his priorities, neither of which he’s ever paid for. I 
think it’s the first time we’ve ever been taken to war and had a president who wouldn’t pay for 
it” (para. 279). While this was seemingly a benign adjustment, it was damaging. Instead of 
spinning a more compelling narrative of senseless death and failures in leadership sparking war 
and terrorism, and seizing on the nurturing, feminine persona her rhetoric created early on in the 
campaign regarding Iraq, Clinton had to deal with the less compelling dollars and cents aspects 
of the war in order to address the economic changes in the country during the campaign. 
Additionally, Clinton was arguably at just as large a disadvantage when the more salient issue 
became the economy, considering that this is also an issue that is heavily gender-coded as 
masculine (Banwart & McKinney, 2005; Buchanan, 1996; Bystrom, 2004; Clift & Brazaitis, 
2000; Dolan, 1998; Fox & Schuhmann, 1999; Gilligan, 1993; Han, 2003; Helgesen, 1995; Witt, 
et al., 1994). 
 It became clear that, for Clinton, using Bush’s failed policy in Iraq as a primary exigence 
during her campaign was risky, and, just as with her focus on health care, proved costly. Her 
initial vote to authorize military action did, indeed, come back to haunt her and likely compelled 
many voters to turn to Obama who had never supported the war in the first place. Clearly, she 
had to address this issue; from the beginning of the campaign, the war in Iraq was a top concern 
among all citizens, and especially Democrats. However, by featuring Bush’s handling of the Iraq 
war as one of her two key exigencies during her campaign, it seemed as if Clinton had backed 
herself into a difficult corner, rhetorically. Similarly, Clinton’s other key exigence, universal 
health care, also backed her into an uncomfortable corner and forced Democratic voters to 
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remember some distant, yet still painful, memories from the early 1990s. In sum, both of these 
issues, exigencies that Clinton established as crucial to address through her own use of rhetoric, 
reminded voters not just of her failed leadership in the past, but of the general lack of positive 
feminine qualities embodied by Clinton.  
Clinton’s General Election Strategy for the Primary Campaign as Exigence 
 From the beginning of the primary campaign, Hillary Clinton’s rhetoric made it appear 
less that she was attempting to defeat her Democratic rivals for the presidential nomination and 
more that she was running against George W. Bush. She saw the Republican candidates as all 
representing a continuation of Bush’s failed leadership and she didn’t believe that the primary 
was where she needed to focus her efforts, given her large lead among Democrats in virtually all 
early polls. On one hand, this could have been inferred as a wise strategy, given the many policy 
differences that Clinton had with her Republican opponents and with George W. Bush. It also 
helped her avoid negativity, as mentioned in the previous section. As Chapter Three indicated, 
going negative hurt Clinton more than helped. As such, any distinctions she could draw, 
rhetorically, could not only have aided Clinton in establishing her own platform, but could also 
have served the dual purpose of demonstrating her strength and toughness in taking on 
Republicans in preparation for the general election. On the other hand, such a strategy made it 
appear as if Clinton was, at least initially, ignoring her Democratic rivals. Whether this was 
because she and her Democratic opponents had too many similarities to draw constructive 
contrasts between them, or simply because Clinton considered her early lead in the polls as 
indicating that she did not need to focus on her primary rivals, or to avoid negative 
campaigning—especially when she didn’t see primary opponents as the challenge—can only be 
guessed at. However, her strategy of attacking only Republicans and George Bush early on, and 
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then positioning herself against John McCain (the eventual Republican nominee) specifically 
was a dominant exigence established through Clinton’s campaign rhetoric. This was partly 
because of the two primary exigencies she chose to address during the campaign, namely 
establishing universal health care and the war in Iraq, but also because of the double bind 
plaguing any woman running for high elective office who has to demonstrate her toughness and 
strength. 
Just as her initial Iraq vote and her initial failures to pass health care reform during Bill 
Clinton’s presidency had haunted Clinton, forcing a rhetorical response during the campaign, so 
to did questions about her electability in a general election contest against Republican rivals. 
Despite the initial aura of inevitability surrounding Clinton’s candidacy, questions about her 
chances in the general election plagued her campaign almost immediately. Balz (2007b) noted, 
“The size and experience of the Democratic field underscores the reality that, for all of her 
support, fundraising potential and political muscle, Clinton continues to face questions about 
whether she can win a general election” (para. 14). This became especially apparent after her 
third place finish in the Iowa caucuses. Healy (2008a) pointed out a major issue in terms of 
electability for Clinton: a lack of support among Independent voters: “Mrs. Clinton’s lackluster 
finish raises anew questions about her electability, and whether independent voters—twice as 
many of whom backed Mr. Obama over her—will ever come to Mrs. Clinton” (para. 5).  
 Conversely, perceptions complicating Clinton’s general election chances were also 
sparked by the general disenchantment with Washington-as-usual politics, and the public 
perception that Clinton was part of this establishment. Obama, on the other hand, stood in stark 
contrast to such an image. He was an African-American presidential candidate, relatively new to 
national politics, and was able to create a sense of excitement among voters (and the press), as 
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evidenced by the following excerpt from The New York Times on the eve of the New Hampshire 
primary: 
 …the final hours of campaigning before the New Hampshire primary became a rush to  
capture the excitement surrounding Barack Obama. On a day that crackled with historical  
possibility, the candidates fell over themselves with pledges to change the nation’s course  
as the presidential contest, for the moment at least, coalesced around a dominant theme.  
Their words—in speeches to packed halls across the state and in television  
advertisements—were testimony to the extent Mr. Obama has transformed the race and  
capitalized on public disenchantment with Washington (Nagourney, 2008, para. 1-2).  
 As the primary campaign extended into the late spring of 2008, the speculation about 
Clinton’s chances spun into overdrive, and further complicated her rhetorical response as 
Democrats publicly debated what the protracted campaign could mean for their party’s chances, 
and whether Clinton would be the best candidate in November. Representative Chris Van Hollen 
(D-MD) told the USA Today in April, “‘It’s a little bit like playing with fire,’ he said of the 
Obama-Clinton battle and the fuel it could give to Republicans” (Memmott & Page, 2008, para. 
3). Leibovich (2008) expressed a similar sentiment in The New York Times, suggesting that the 
Clintons’ baggage would have been a serious liability to Democrats in the general election: 
 …there is something more wrenching at work as well, a reckoning of whether the  
Clintons, on balance, have been good or bad for the party. It has the feel of a very  
personal testing of loyalties to a former president who once always seemed to be adding  
to the ‘Friends of Bill’ list, and to a sitting senator who, if not so driven by her husband to  
win over everyone, use her fame to help elect other Democrats (para. 7). 
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Thus, in clear ways, though not always presented as such by Clinton herself, her general election 
chances served as a significant exigence for the candidate that required a rhetorical response 
from Clinton.  
In responding to such a problem, surprisingly, Clinton’s speeches were bereft of 
addressing this seemingly most pressing of issues: her electability. There were only small 
examples from her key campaign speeches wherein Clinton actually addresses this specific 
exigence, choosing to deal with only Obama as her rival, or choosing instead to speak to the 
various other constraints she faced during her campaign (see Chapter Five: Analysis of Clinton’s 
Rhetorical Constraints). More often than not, when Clinton would address the issue during her 
speeches, she would simply indict Bush, as previously articulated, and assert, “Well, the 
Republicans want eight more years of the same…Well, they’ve got until January 20, 2009—and 
not one day more” (Clinton, 2008c, para. 12-13). Clinton would also make hidden assertions 
about her work ethic, the implied conclusion asserting that she was in the race for the long haul 
and would fight hard for a general election win. Clinton, after her Super Tuesday victories, 
asserted: 
We must continue to be a nation that strives always to give each of our children a better  
future, a nation of optimists who believe our best days are yet to come, a nation of  
idealists holding fast to our deepest values, that we are all created equal, that we all  
deserve to fulfill our God-given potential, that we are all destined for progress together. It  
is this ideal inscribed on the base of the Statue of Liberty in this great city, that has  
overlooked our harbors through wars and depressions and the dark days of September 11,  
the words we all know that give voice to America’s embrace: ‘Give me your tired, your  
poor, your huddled masses, yearning to breathe free’—a constant reminder that here in  
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America we face our challenges and we embrace all of our people. So today we say with  
one voice, “Give us that child who wants to learn, give us the people in need of work,  
give us the veterans who need our care. We say give us the economy to rebuild and this  
war to end, give us this nation to heal, this world to lead, this moment to seize.’ I know  
we’re ready (Clinton, 2008c, para. 22-24). 
Clearly, though, Clinton’s speeches failed to address the exigence of electability that had been 
proliferating through major news media outlets, and thus, had likely resonated with voters. As 
such, in the absence of a response to this problem in her speeches, Clinton raised doubts about 
her chances against a Republican foe in November by specifically not saying a word about this 
exigence.  
 Of course, because of specific questions asking Clinton about her general election 
chances by moderators, Clinton’s debate performances had to feature rhetoric that was more 
specific in addressing this exigence. In the first debate, Brian Williams asked Clinton about the 
unfavorable views toward her embodied by a majority of voters in a (then) recent poll, and the 
subsequent Republican candidates’ comments in their first presidential primary debate that 
indicated they hoped they would face Clinton in the general election. Clinton responded, “I take 
it as a perverse form of flattery, actually, that if they weren’t worried, they would not be so 
vitriolic in their criticism of me” (“South Carolina Democratic,” 2007, para. 175). Essentially, 
Clinton attempted to rhetorically turn this negative into a positive—an asset she possessed for a 
potential general election campaign.  
Clinton would use a similar strategy in the second South Carolina debate, as well; as she 
discussed her failures in health care reform, she used her experience since the early 1990s as 
evidence of her determination when faced with strong Republican opponents to stand up for 
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Democratic Party ideals. Clinton stated, “I think that the whole idea of universal health care is 
such a core Democratic principle that I am willing to go to the mat for it. I’ve been there before. I 
will be there again. I am not giving in; I am not giving up; and I’m not going to start out leaving 
15 million Americans out of health care” (“The Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, para. 394). 
Clinton also used this tactic later in the campaign; in her first debate against only Obama, 
Clinton, once again addressing health care, stated:  
…it is so important that, as Democrats, we carry the banner of universal health care. The  
health insurance industry is very clever and extremely well-funded. I know this. I had  
$300 million of incoming advertising and attacks during our efforts back in ’93 and ’94.  
And one of the reasons why I’ve designed the plan I have put forward now is because I  
learned a lot about what people want, what people are willing to accept, and how we get  
the political process to work (“Transcript of Thursday’s Democratic,” 2008, para. 144- 
145). 
Unfortunately, Clinton’s rhetoric here lacked rhetorical force for one clear reason that likely 
occurred to some of her audience members: though she had stood up to Republicans in the past, 
she had typically failed in these instances to accomplish change, legislative or otherwise. As 
such, while Clinton may have appeared tough and strong (masculine) by using this rhetoric, such 
words remind voters of her own failed leadership in the past, and diminished the weight of her 
message that she would be the stronger candidate in the general election. Moreover, Clinton had 
to do this in ways that contradicted conventional femininity or Campbell’s (1989; 1998) 
feminine style because of the confrontational nature of her words and past actions, which further 
undermined Clinton’s persuasion. 
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 Clinton’s rhetoric during the early debates was double-edged in terms of success. On the 
one hand, it was wise of Clinton to rhetorically construct herself as a tough fighter, able to 
compete against the strongest of opponents in order to contradict traditional gendered notions of 
female weakness. On the other hand, her strategy faltered because she constructed the tough 
image by demonstrating, essentially, that she was in fact a Washington-insider. She constantly 
reminded her audience of how long she had been in politics, how many fights she had won and 
lost, and thus, fed Obama’s growing narrative as being a genuine agent of change to the 
Washington-as-usual way that politics worked. Thus, Clinton’s handling of this specific exigence 
reflected the tangible double bind that Bower (2003) and Gelb and Palley (1982) have referred 
to. In order to prove her toughness for a general election matchup, as called for by news media 
outlets and debate moderators (all of whom were members of the press, and the vast majority of 
whom were also male), Clinton’s rhetoric fed Obama’s narrative almost as if his own campaign 
staff had designed it themselves. 
 Once the race was narrowed to just Clinton and Obama, and once the Republicans settled 
on John McCain as their nominee, Clinton’s rhetoric became somewhat more focused, drawing 
specific contrasts between her opponent’s and her chances against McCain. In her first one-on-
one debate against Obama, Clinton attempted to seize on a previous comment Obama had made 
about not setting pre-conditions before meeting with the leaders of nations hostile toward the 
United States (i.e. Iran). Clinton asserted, “And I think we’ve got to have a full diplomatic effort, 
but I don’t think the president should put the prestige of the presidency on the line in the first 
year to have meetings without preconditions with five of the worst dictators in the world” 
(“Transcript of Thursday’s Democratic,” 2008, para. 46). Clinton added, “So we have 
differences both at home and around the world, but, again, I would emphasize that what really is 
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important here, because the Republicans were in California debating yesterday, they are more of 
the same” (para. 47).  
 Clinton also attempted to lessen certain differences between herself and Obama while she 
also acknowledged the exigence posed by a November election. On the topic of Iraq, 
specifically, Clinton asserted, “I’ve also been a leader in trying to prevent President Bush from 
getting us committed to staying in Iraq regardless for as long as Senator McCain and others have 
said it might be, 50 to a hundred years” (“The Democratic Debate in Cleveland,” 2008, para. 
161). When she did this, Obama quickly responded, asserting that Clinton, like himself, was 
surely qualified to lead, but that he would simply do a better job. Obama contended: 
 So I don’t think that Senator Clinton has to answer a question as to whether she’s capable  
of being president or our standard bearer. I will say this, that the reason I think I’m better  
as the nominee is that I can bring this country together in a unique way, across divisions  
of race, religion, region. And that is what’s going to be required in order for us to actually  
deliver on the issues that both Senator Clinton and I care so much about (para. 298-299). 
Again, this was a sound rhetorical strategy by Obama. Obama never had to challenge Clinton’s 
qualifications to be a leader; rather, based on her own rhetoric that had established herself as a 
strong, viable candidate, he was allowed to stress one of the most negative characteristics 
associated with Hillary Clinton: her divisiveness. Countless scholars in various fields, including 
communication, have remarked that Clinton’s divisiveness had been a defining characteristic of 
Clinton’s persona and rhetoric for years, to the extent that it often required rhetorical 
transformations to make her seem more likable and charismatic among the public (Corrigan, 
2000; Dow & Tonn, 1993; Durbriwny, 2005; Gardetto, 1997; Kelly, 2001; Parry-Giles, 2000; 
Parry-Giles & Blair, 2002; Trent & Short-Thompson, 2003). Clinton’s response to questions 
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about her electability fed these past assertions about her personality, and allowed Obama to use  
the typically feminine strategy of adopting an ‘above-it-all’ demeanor (Witt, et al., 1994).  
Indeed, as she progressed through the debates, Clinton’s rhetoric seemed intent on 
feeding Obama’s argument about her divisiveness by presenting herself as the toughest, strongest 
candidate able to win a general election. To that end, Clinton’s Republican enemies, and John 
McCain specifically, became hapless rhetorical allies for her during the debates when looking 
ahead to a general election campaign, and allowed Clinton to begin drawing distinction between 
herself and her Democratic opponents while she established her toughness. Toward the end of 
the second debate in South Carolina, Clinton argued: 
 I believe of any one of us, I am better positioned and better able to take on John McCain  
or any Republican when it comes to issues about protecting and defending our country  
and promoting our interest in the world. And if it is indeed the classic Republican  
campaign, I’ve been there. I’ve done that. They’ve been after me for 16 years, and much  
to their dismay I am still here. And I intend to be still here when that election comes  
around and we win in November 2008 (“The Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, para.  
614). 
Moments later in this same debate, Clinton went on, asserting that her toughness and alleged 
appeal to independents would aid her in a November election: “…if you are someone like I am, 
who has withstood the full force of corporate lobbyists, starting with the health insurance 
companies, and the drug companies, and the oil companies, and everybody I’ve taken on for all 
of these years, you know, I think I’m independent and tough enough to be able to deal with 
anybody. And that’s what I intend to do” (para. 614). Clinton’s assertion of her toughness and 
resilience were rhetorical weapons she was comfortable wielding, especially when she dealt with 
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skepticism about handling Republican rivals. During her first debate against Obama alone, 
Clinton was overtly optimistic about her chances against Republicans, by stating, “The 
Republicans will try to put either of us into the same box that, if we oppose this president’s Iraq 
policy, somehow we cannot fully represent the interests of the United States, be commander-in-
chief. I reject that out of hand, and I actually welcome that debate with whomever they 
nominate” (“Transcript of Thursday’s Democratic,” 2008, para. 463). This rhetoric, while 
seemingly wise for a woman running for such a masculine political office, was damaging on two 
gendered fronts. First, it reminded voters that while Clinton may have weathered several battles, 
she consistently had to engage in such battles against Republicans, which reminded voters of her 
divisive nature. Additionally, since Clinton failed in many of these battles (i.e. universal health 
care) or was proven to be wrong in such skirmishes (i.e. Iraq), this rhetoric diminished the 
appearance that she could, indeed, be a strong leader. Thus, Clinton’s rhetoric in arguing on 
behalf of her general election chances was counterintuitive and unproductive. 
 Clinton’s use of bravado, of ‘rhetorical strength,’ was also displayed during her final 
debate with Obama. Once McCain secured the pledged delegates necessary to secure his 
nomination for the Republicans, Clinton attempted to demonstrate that she knew how best to 
beat her Senate colleague, and argued as such when asked bluntly by George Stephanopoulos, 
whether Clinton thought Obama could beat John McCain. Clinton argued: 
 …what is important is that we understand exactly the challenges facing us in order to  
defeat Senator McCain. He will be a formidable candidate. There isn’t any doubt about  
that. He has a great American story to tell…But I also know, having gone through 16  
years of being on the receiving end of what the Republican Party dishes out, how  
important it is that we try to go after every single vote everywhere we possibly can to get  
  153 
those electoral votes that we’re going to need to have the next president elected  
(“Democratic Debate in Philadelphia,” 2008, para. 59-61). 
When Stephanopoulos had pressed Clinton to answer directly whether or not Obama was 
qualified, she continued to still stress her own chances as superior: 
 Yes. Yes. Yes. Now, I think that I can do a better job…I am better able and better  
prepared in large measure because of what I’ve been through and the work I’ve done and  
the results I’ve produced for people and the coalition that I have put together in this  
campaign…I believe I’m the better and stronger candidate against Senator McCain, to go  
toe to toe with him on national security and on how we turn this economy around (para.  
63-65). 
As if to more securely position herself as the stronger candidate, tough enough to take on 
McCain, Clinton added later in this same debate, “I’ve been in this arena for a long time. I have a 
lot of baggage, and everybody has rummaged through it for years…And so therefore, I have, you 
know, an opportunity to come to this campaign with a very strong conviction and feeling that I 
will be able to withstand whatever the Republican sends our way” (para. 161). Once again, in 
attempting to demonstrate her toughness as a female candidate, Clinton’s own words reminded 
voters of the large amount of political baggage, mostly negative and demonstrating Clinton’s 
lack of femininity, that she has carried as a nominee. And while such rhetoric did remind voters 
that she could handle such Republican attacks, as she had for almost two decades, Clinton’s 
rhetoric counteracted the belief that she was not partisan or divisive and reminded voters of the 
intense political infighting that had characterized national politics during Bill Clinton’s time as 
president. As such, her rhetoric advancing her strength and toughness in order to persuade voters 
that she was ‘man enough’ for a general election, bolstered Obama’s claims that Clinton was a 
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divisive leader, welcoming and even enjoying attacks from anyone, and further reminded voters 
of how truly unfeminine she was as a politician. 
Chapter Summary 
When addressing all four of the exigencies that dominated Hillary Clinton’s rhetorical 
situation as she campaigned for president, the theoretical double binds faced by political women 
have been shown to have had a tangible hold on Clinton’s campaign rhetoric. Clinton, in wanting 
to be considered as the best candidate for president and not the best female presidential aspirant, 
struggled to utilize exigencies (health care, Iraq, and her general election chances) in a way that 
would allow her to escape her gender in persuading audiences that she could lead. She ignored 
the historic nature of her campaign because she had to—voters would not have been persuaded 
simply because she was a woman; she had to be the best candidate, so she turned a blind eye 
whenever possible to her gender. And when her attempts to prove that she was the best candidate 
to deal with her central exigencies failed, because she was too divisive, or embodied masculine 
characteristics to her detriment, or was simply wrong in her approach, Clinton could not or 
would not put forth rhetoric sufficient to convince voters of her abilities to solve the problems 
she addressed. Chapter Three clearly indicated that Clinton faced myriad double binds as she 
sought to convince her audience of her leadership abilities, and indeed, her femininity, and failed 
to adapt to the changing elements of her rhetorical situation. In much the same way, Clinton was 
unable to escape the double binds posed by the exigencies within her rhetorical situation—those 
created by outside sources, and those set forth in her own discourse. Thus, as much as Clinton 
would have perhaps hoped that her gender would be the last thing that would have influenced the 
election, it seems clear that the cultural expectations regarding the behavior and characteristics of 
women once again plagued Clinton. They ultimately limited her creation of effective rhetoric to 
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escape such double binds, complicated the exigencies she chose to feature in her campaign 
rhetoric, and thus marred her ability to achieve her party’s nomination. 
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Chapter Five: Analysis of Clinton’s Constraints 
 Bitzer (1968) stated, “…every rhetorical situation contains a set of constraints made up 
by persons, events, objects, and relations which are parts of the situation because they have the 
power to constrain decision and action needed to modify the exigence” (p. 8). Constraints within 
a rhetorical situation can be difficult to ascertain and differentiate from the audience and 
exigencies because of an obvious interplay among all three components. For instance, persons 
who make up the audience can also constrain the message in their responses to rhetoric or in re-
focusing attention away from the exigencies discussed by rhetors to other situational factors. 
Similarly, while rhetors seek to position certain exigencies as the most crucial and needing to be 
addressed, constraints within a situation may also direct attention away from these exigencies 
and thus, compel rhetors to respond to such constraints rhetorically.  
Garrett and Xiao (1993) came to similar conclusions in their study wherein they revisited 
and, consequently clarified, the interaction among the tenets of Bitzer’s theoretical construct. 
These authors stated, “we would suggest that it is possible to keep all three elements in a 
dynamic tension, and to do so in a way that is truly rhetorical, by seeing the audience as the 
active center of the rhetorical situation,” as is arguably the case when politicians attempt to 
garner votes during a campaign to support their nomination or election (p. 39). Garrett and Xiao 
continued, arguing, “in the same way the rhetorical exigencies are expressions of the situational 
audience’s unsolved questions, concerns, anxieties, frustrations, and confusions, which need 
modification by discourse. The constraints, on the other hand, reflect the audience’s expectations 
for an appropriate discourse in a given circumstance” (p. 39). Thus, as the analysis of the 
constraints within Hillary Clinton’s rhetorical situation during the Democratic primary campaign 
demonstrates, many factors become salient between the previous analyses of audiences and 
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exigencies and the constraining factors that compelled Clinton to craft her rhetoric in a specific 
way. 
 Beyond a guiding definition of the constraints within a rhetorical situation, Bitzer (1968) 
also made note of the common sources of constraints. He stated, “standard sources of constraints 
include beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, motives, and the like; 
and when the orator enters the situation, [her] discourse not only harnesses constraints given by 
the situation but provides additional important constraints—for example [her] personal character, 
[her] logical proofs, and [her] style” (p. 8). Thus, Bitzer argued that while constraints can 
sometimes necessitate a rhetors’ discursive response due to the negative implications discerned 
from certain constraints, rhetors may also use constraints within the rhetorical situation to 
demonstrate the validity of their claims and the necessity of addressing their chosen exigencies. 
Constraints within rhetorical situations can, consequently, be factors external to the rhetor’s 
discourse or may be used within the speech act(s) to aid in persuading the audience. Indeed, 
Wallace (1971) argued, that how rhetors address factors such as the constraints surrounding their 
discourse indicate both the practical and the artistic elements of rhetoric itself. Wallace stated, 
“Rhetoric…is an art because its principles and teachings are directed to two general ends or 
functions: the making or producing of utterances and the understanding and appraising of 
them…Its principles reflect [people’s] behavior in their conversing, discussing, and speech-
making when they are in practical settings…” (p. 3). 
 As becomes abundantly clear in the following pages, Clinton’s candidacy was marred by 
several constraints given her gender and the persona she spent her career creating as a public 
figure. Some of the constraints (her experience in politics, for instance) could have, arguably, 
been helpful to her candidacy, while others (the negative perceptions about Clinton’s reputation, 
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the strategies utilized by Obama’s campaign, and Bill Clinton’s many negative attacks and gaffes 
on the campaign trail) created a situation incredibly detrimental to her success—one that, 
ultimately, she could not escape. Specifically, there were four key areas of constraints operating 
within Clinton’s rhetorical situation during her primary campaign for the presidency: Her 
experience, perceptions of her personal reputation, Obama’s strategies during the campaign, and 
Bill Clinton’s presence on the campaign trail.  
Experience as Constraint for Clinton’s Campaign Rhetoric 
The qualification of experience serves as a prerequisite for any candidate hoping to win 
the presidency. Clinton, though, faced unique obstacles in establishing herself, rhetorically, as 
qualified to be president. Since no woman has been president, nor even won her major party’s 
nomination for president, Clinton faced a unique barrier, as described in Chapter One and 
clarified, in terms of the historic nature of her candidacy, in Chapter Four. Additionally, as 
previously articulated, while Clinton was a political celebrity even before she announced her 
candidacy, this status did not automatically come with a perception of experience. Thus, as 
becomes clear over the next few pages, Clinton framed her campaign rhetoric in such a way as to 
deal with both of these constraints; she utilized her public personae to maximize perceptions of 
her experience while also carefully crafting her rhetoric to minimize the perception that she, as a 
woman, was unable to assume the presidency. 
 News media outlets both helped and hurt Clinton’s message as she attempted to persuade 
voters of her experience and abilities to be president, and as such, an analysis of these stories 
provides a more fully developed picture of Clinton’s rhetorical situation. The New York Times 
noted early in the race that Clinton viewed Obama as her major opponent, but also added her 
belief that “the threat of his candidacy would diminish as voters learned how inexperienced he 
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was in government and foreign affairs” (Healy, 2007, para. 9-10). This same article went on to 
also acknowledge a message that Clinton hoped would resonate with voters; “…that experience 
will be a major attribute for any successful candidate during difficult times” (para. 9-10). Indeed, 
her campaign immediately tried to establish Clinton as “the candidate best prepared to become 
the first Democrat in the White House since Bush succeeded [Bill] Clinton” (Balz, 2007b, para. 
2-3), perpetuating the idea that experience, in general, was a requirement to be president, and 
that Clinton’s experience, specifically, gave her an edge over her competitors. 
 According to news reports, the Clinton campaign was abundantly aware of the negative 
personal perceptions plaguing Clinton (factors that are discussed in the next section of this 
chapter in more detail); however, “her advisers say the most effective way of overcoming 
questions about her electability is to focus voters’ attention on what it takes to be president—
strength, intelligence, discipline, and toughness—all of which they say she already exhibits” 
(Balz, 2007b, para. 20). For this reason, Clinton seemed determined to position herself as the 
most experienced and capable Democratic candidate rather than the most likable. Additionally, 
polling numbers also suggested the merit behind Clinton’s strategy, as experience was still a 
dominant characteristic sought in presidential candidates (Lizza, 2007). Thus, Clinton was wise 
in choosing to emphasize this constraint as an asset to her electability. When one considers 
Clinton’s gender, it was even more of an important element to stress, considering, as indicated in 
Chapter One, male politicians tend to emphasize this characteristic in their campaign 
communication (Anderson & Sheeler, 2005; Blankenship & Robson, 1995; DeRosa & Bystrom, 
1999; Parry-Giles & Parry-Giles, 1996).  
 As becomes clear from her campaign speeches and debate performances, one of the key 
areas Clinton used to establish experience and ability was to draw not just on her time in the 
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United States Senate, but also her experiences in the private sector and, chiefly, her time as First 
Lady. Kiely (2007) summed up Clinton’s approach to responding to this particular constraint 
succinctly, asserting, “Clinton is about to begin her eighth year as a senator, but said she should 
also be judged on ‘the public service that I have rendered long before I was in public office,’ 
which included counseling her husband when he was in the White House and the Arkansas 
governor’s mansion and as a legal advocate for underprivileged children” (para. 7-8). This 
strategy of including feminine ideals and expectations had worked well for Clinton in the past, in 
helping to transform her public image during her husband’s second administration and also when 
running for the Senate (Corrigan, 2000; Gardetto, 1997; Kelly, 2001; Parry-Giles, 2000; Parry-
Giles & Blair, 2002; Trent & Short-Thompson, 2003). However, it also complicated her 
message. As is explained later in this section, her use of her time as First Lady in response to the 
constraint of experience carried with it damaging reminders of her husband’s tumultuous terms 
as president, and her own challenges in the public arena. Additionally, since no woman had ever 
run a campaign for president utilizing this specific area of expertise to establish her 
qualifications, it was a risk to pin even part of her credibility on such experiences. 
 Indeed, Clinton’s rhetoric espousing her experience and abilities did become 
complicated, somewhat convoluted, and at times, incredibly damaging, in terms of the news 
coverage tracking Clinton. Leibovich (2007) noted, “Mrs. Clinton’s variously named events 
reflect a candidate striving to convince voters that a host of seemingly contradictory qualities can 
coexist in a single candidate: that she is an utterly familiar figure who is an agent of change; that 
she has already lived in the White House but that her election would be historic and 
unprecedented; that she is someone who is tough but also likable” (para. 10). This became 
especially true after Clinton’s third place finish in Iowa, when, perceptually, Obama’s message 
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of change won out over Clinton’s claim of superior experience. Healy (2008a) wrote: “Clinton 
advisers declined to say Thursday night if she would now pursue a different strategy against Mr. 
Obama. But a shift seems likely now that Mrs. Clinton’s multilayered, sometimes contradictory 
message—offering an experienced hand, for example, but also running as a candidate who could 
bring change—fell flat in this first contest” (para. 9). In this same article, Healy went on to quote 
John Edwards, who came in second in Iowa ahead of Clinton, who also seemed to sum up 
voters’ disdain for Clinton’s experience, highlighting this aspect of her rhetoric as a key 
constraint: “As Mr. Edwards put it, ‘the status quo lost and change won’ in the caucuses” (para. 
23).  
 With an idea of the contextual elements of her rhetorical situation in mind, with regard to 
this particular constraint, it is necessary to now turn to Clinton’s own rhetoric to understand how 
she was able to craft a fitting response that negotiated the particular constraint of experience. As 
is made clear from the following pages, Clinton’s ability to use her experience as an argument 
that she was ready to lead was at times successful. However, because of gendered elements of 
her rhetorical situation, and the sources she chose to use to establish her experience, Clinton 
often fell short in responding to this particular constraint during the campaign. 
Experience as Constraint in Clinton’s Speeches 
In examining Clinton’s own rhetoric during the campaign, it is clear that experience won 
out over change as her governing mantra. One way that Clinton established her experience 
during her campaign speeches was by denoting her long, diverse career as evidence of her 
qualifications. Clinton (2007b) stated, “I am asking for your support based on my 35 years of 
work, my understanding of the changes that we need, my commitment to apply the persistence, 
the perseverance, and yes, the perspiration to get it done” (para. 11). She repeated this similar 
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phrase after the Iowa caucuses were completed: “I have done this work for 35 years. It is the 
work of my lifetime” (Clinton, 2008a, para. 9). Lines like these did well to remind voters of the 
many years she has served the public, but also reminded voters of her status as an insider in 
Washington politics—a qualification, unfortunately, that voters, en masse, seemed to reject in 
substantial ways as Obama’s campaign focused its’ rhetoric around the message of “change”. As 
the analysis in Chapter Three indicates, Clinton’s campaign also consistently used negative 
campaigning, subtle appeals to super delegates, and many of Bill Clinton’s closest advisors and 
campaign workers throughout the 2008 race, further entrenching the idea that Clinton was part of 
the Washington establishment. This meant, as is discussed in the third section of this chapter, a 
rejection not just of Republican control of politics, but a rejection of Clinton’s experience since it 
represented for many a substantive part of the problems with the political system in Washington. 
Thus, while she attempted to use her years of work in politics to adapt to this particular 
constraint, her argument was often turned against her as a reason to reject a Washington insider 
like Clinton for the Democratic nomination for president. 
Another way that Clinton established her experience during her key campaign speeches 
was by enumerating the many activities, laws, and commissions that she had championed. Over 
the course of her key campaign speeches, Clinton would often use phrases such as “my vision for 
our country, my plans for change, and my ability to lead” to convince voters that she had not 
only a clear path to victory, but also a clear plan for what she would do with the presidency once 
elected (Clinton, 2007b, para. 8). She told voters in Iowa that she was a consistent supporter of 
individuals, resisting paths that would have led to personal benefit alone: “…for me that means 
that I started when I got out of law school, not going to work for a big corporate law firm but 
going to work for the Children’s Defense Fund” (2007b, para. 22). She also reminded voters that 
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she “helped to create the Children’s Health Insurance Program” (2007b, para. 29). Using rhetoric 
such as this to establish her qualifications also served the dual-purpose of establishing Clinton’s 
femininity on the trail. Her work on behalf of others, seemingly without any thoughts about her 
own personal gain, denoted the cooperative, integrative leadership approach Rosenthal (1998) 
has championed for female politicians, and it demonstrated Clinton’s predilection for 
championing not just popular, male-oriented issues, but also the more often over-looked or less-
stressed “women’s” issues such as the protection of children. This, of course, did not mean that 
Clinton only championed “women’s issues.” As all presidential candidates must do, she also had 
to establish her experience and vision for dealing with typically masculine issues, and did so in 
her various key speeches. In Iowa, Clinton spoke about her plans to address tax cuts and her 
plans for the economy in general (Clinton, 2007b). In other speeches, Clinton also addressed her 
plans for and experience with energy policy, veterans’ rights, national security, and global 
terrorism (Clinton, 2008c). Because she needed to establish her experience as a candidate, as it 
was a central constraint on the trail, Clinton did well to emphasize her past experiences with and 
future plans for myriad “male” and “female” issues. These issues not only allowed her to garner 
experience and use this constraint to her advantage, it also allowed her to demonstrate a 
successful tactic for female politicians by taking a gender-balanced approach to talking about 
issues on the trail. 
Another key ingredient to Clinton’s strategy as she dealt with the experience constraint 
was how she used her time as First Lady, first of Arkansas and then of the United States. In her 
key campaign speeches, Clinton claimed, “Arkansas students now have an education that was 
denied to previous generations and I am proud that I was part of making those changes as well” 
(Clinton, 2007b, para. 25). Clinton, also relying on her experience as First Lady of Arkansas, 
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asserted her leadership abilities by claiming, in terms of education reform, “This is something I 
have worked on for decades. I brought a program to Arkansas, the Home Instruction for 
Preschool Youngsters Program, that gave parents the tools they needed to help their own 
children” (2007b, para. 41). She also claimed, in Iowa, “I traveled to Beijing as First Lady on 
behalf of all of you, to stand up for a very simple proposition—that women’s rights are human 
rights and human rights are women’s rights” (2007b, para. 27). By establishing her experiences 
in this way, rather than simply relying on her experience in the Senate, Clinton was making two 
implied yet provocative arguments. First, Clinton’s discourse implied that the activities of a First 
Lady are substantive, and thus, can be utilized to establish the requisite experience for a 
presidential run. Second, she was implying that her experiences as First Lady, while often 
overshadowed by controversy, should be celebrated as beneficial for our nation. 
Finally, two other inter-related elements of Clinton’s campaign speeches were also used 
to address experience and to counteract the gendered assumptions of voters that may mar a 
female candidates success. First, though she did this far more prominently in her debate 
performances, Clinton asserted her toughness, developed through past experiences, as evidence 
of her ability to lead. She argued in Iowa, “when I am elected, I will stand and fight for each and 
every one of you every single day” (2007b, para. 51). And after Super Tuesday, Clinton was 
even more direct and forceful: “Now we know the Republicans won’t give up the White House 
without a fight, well let me be clear, I won’t let anyone swift boat this country’s future” (2008c, 
para. 14). By asserting her toughness, she was arguing to voters that a woman can take on the 
masculine mantle of the presidency, while simultaneously and implicitly reminding voters that 
she has “been there and done that” in terms of being involved in tough political battles. As such, 
her toughness, from Clinton’s perspective, helped her to establish that she had the requisite 
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experience to assume the “manly” post of president and thus, bypass this constraint. Second, and 
in a very similar way, Clinton established the sufficiency of her experience by rhetorically 
establishing her readiness to lead as president “on day one.” She told crowds in Iowa, “Iowans 
have an awesome responsibility, especially this year. Because we have to make a decision that 
will not only help us figure out who will be the next democratic nominee, that’s important, but 
even more so, who is ready to be President and who is ready, willing, and able on Day One to do 
the job that we need done” (Clinton, 2007b, para. 5). Even after her third place finish in Iowa, 
Clinton still vowed, “I am so ready for the rest of this campaign and I am so ready to lead” 
(2008a, para. 10). In much the same was as she attempted to respond to the experience constraint 
through her rhetorical toughness, Clinton’s assertion that she, more so than her rivals, was ready 
to lead from the beginning of her presidency signaled to audience members that she indeed had 
the experience necessary to serve as president.  
Experience as Constraint in Clinton’s Debate Performances 
In much the same way as in her campaign speeches, Clinton used her debate 
performances to demonstrate her past activities as proof of her experience and ability to lead. In 
the South Carolina Democratic primary debate against just Obama and Edwards in January, 
Clinton noted, “We have to stimulate the economy. I began calling for some kind of economic 
action plan back at the beginning of December” (“The Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, para. 
5). She asserted plainly later in this debate, in charging that Obama did not have specific plans in 
place to correct America’s problems, that she, in fact, did: “There is no evidence from your Web 
site, from your speeches, as to how you would pay for it. Now why is that important? It’s 
important because I think elections are about the future. But how do you determine what will 
happen in the future? Well, you have to look at the record, you have to look to what we say in 
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campaigns, and what we have done during our careers” (para. 103-104) suggesting that there was 
little in the Obama file to provide a clue. Later in this same debate, when Clinton was asked a 
question about her economic plans and a call for a moratorium on home foreclosures, she 
asserted, “I’ve been calling for action since last March” (para. 203). The message implicit in 
each of these remarks indicated to voters that Clinton, as opposed (allegedly) to her rivals, was 
ready to lead, and her past experiences had proven this. As such, by listing her successes with 
past policy initiatives, Clinton once again argued that her experience should not be a constraint 
for her candidacy; rather, it should be viewed by voters as an asset. 
Clinton used a similar strategy during her first debate against only Obama in Los Angeles 
prior to Super Tuesday, and used the opportunity to demonstrate her experience when compared 
specifically with Obama’s. Clinton stated, when discussing immigration reform, “well, actually, I 
co-sponsored comprehensive immigration reform in 2004 before Barack came to the Senate…So 
I’ve been on record on behalf of this for quite some time” (“Transcript of Thursday’s,” 2008, 
para. 264-265). When the subject of revisiting America’s NAFTA agreements came up during 
the Cleveland debate in late February, Clinton was also quick to both attack Obama and also laud 
her own record: “Again, I have received a lot of incoming criticism from Senator Obama. And 
the Cleveland Plain Dealer examined Senator Obama’s attacks on me regarding NAFTA and 
said they were erroneous… I have a record of standing up for [our manufacturing industries], of 
chairing the Manufacturing Caucus in the Senate, and I will take a tough position on these trade 
agreements” (“The Democratic Debate in Cleveland,” 2008, para. 85). Similarly, Clinton once 
again pointed out her long record of experience in the final debate of the primary in Philadelphia, 
when she argued, “I think year after year for now 35 years, I have a proven record of results” 
(“The Democratic Debate in Philadelphia,” 2008, para. 83).  
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Similarly, Clinton used her campaign debate performances to establish that she had 
specific plans and policies ready to enact were she elected president. In South Carolina, when 
facing Obama and Edwards, Clinton asserted, “I have a package of $110 billion; $70 billion that 
would go towards dealing with the mortgage crisis, which, unfortunately, I don’t think President 
Bush has really taken seriously enough” (“The Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, para. 5). 
Later in this debate, Clinton said even more explicitly, “And if we have a president who is 
willing from day one to make it a mission to create shared prosperity again, that’s going to be 
good for every American. And that’s what I’m going to offer as president. That’s what I’ve been 
talking about, that’s what I’ve been working for and that’s what I intend to do. And I think we 
can get results for every American” (para. 492). 
One of the clearest examples of this strategy came in Clinton’s first debate against only 
Obama, wherein she was asked about her health care plan. After enumerating many of the 
failures with the current system of health insurance and care in the United States, Clinton 
continued to articulate her plan with incredible specificity: 
We could do so much better. And here are some of the ideas that I have put on the table.  
Number one, the Bush administration has given enormous tax giveaways to HMOs and  
drug companies under the Medicare prescription Part D program, under the HMO  
program in Medicare. I would rein those in. They are not being earned. They do not  
produce the results that are supposedly being touted by the Bush administration. I would  
also move for electronic medical records, something that I have worked on for nearly five  
years on a bipartisan basis. Started with Newt Gingrich and Bill Frist. We passed my  
legislation through the Senate a year ago. Didn’t get it through the Republican House.  
Now we’re going to try again in the Democratic Congress. If we had electronic medical  
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records, according to RAND corporation—hardly a bastion of liberal  
thinking… (LAUGHTER)…they have said we would save $77 billion a year. That  
money can be put into prevention. It could be put into chronic care management. It can be  
put into making sure that our health care system has enough access so that if you are in a 
rural community somewhere in California or somewhere in Tennessee or somewhere in 
Georgia, you’ll have access to health care. If you are in an inner-city area and you see 
your hospital, like the Drew Medical Center, closed on you, then you are going to have a 
place once again where you can get health care in the immediate area. So we can begin to 
be more effective and more sensible about how we cover everybody and use the money 
from the top-end tax [cuts] and from modernizing the system (“Transcript of 
Thursday’s,” 2008, para. 182-188). 
Clinton repeated this strategy in the Cleveland debate wherein she and Obama debated  
their respective health care plans for a significant portion of the time. Toward the end of this 
lengthy discussion, Clinton stated: 
 And under my plan, it is affordable because, number one, we have enough money in our  
plan. A comparison of the plans like the ones we’re proposing found that actually I cover  
nearly everybody at a much lower cost than Senator Obama’s plan because we would not 
only provide these health care tax credits, but I would limit the amount of money that 
anyone ever has to pay for a premium to a low percentage of your income. It will be 
affordable…I have the most aggressive measures to reduce costs and improve quality. 
And time and time again, people who have compared our two approaches have concluded 
that (“The Democratic Debate in Cleveland,” 2008, para. 50-52). 
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Clinton stressed her possession of specific plans to establish requisite experience in the final 
debate, as well, when she asserted once again, “And I hope that this evening, voters in 
Pennsylvania and others across the country will listen carefully to what we have to say, will look 
at our records, will look at the plans we have. And I offer those on my website, 
hillaryclinton.com, for more detail” (“Democratic Debate in Philadelphia,” 2008, para. 11-12). 
One of these plans she mentioned specifically later in this debate was how she would deal with 
the economy. Clinton asserted: 
…I have a very specific plan of $100 billion in tax cuts that would go to people to help  
people afford health care, security retirement plans…make it possible for people to get 
long-term health insurance and care for their parents and grandparents who they are 
trying to support, making college affordable and so much else…we might not be able to 
do all of that at once. But if you go to my website, HillaryClinton.com, it is laid out there 
how I will pay for everything, because everything I have proposed, I have put in how I 
would pay for it (para. 224-225). 
Later on during this debate, Clinton added more details, and as she did, she again asserted how 
she was consistently on the forefront in offering plans and funding sources to deal with economic 
concerns. Clinton stated, “I was the first to come out with a strategic energy fund, where we 
needed to be investing in clean renewable energy” (para. 255). She also stated, “I want to see us 
actually tackle the housing crisis, something I’ve been talking about for over a year” (para. 257). 
Finally, during this last debate in Philadelphia, Clinton exhibited the same rhetorical strategy 
when she discussed energy independence. Clinton argued, “I would quit putting oil into the 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve and I would release some to help drive the price down 
globally…We’ve got to have a long-term energy strategy…And I’ve laid out a comprehensive 
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plan to move us toward energy independence that I hope I will have the opportunity to 
implement as president” (para. 350-354).  
Clinton also used her debate performances to establish her comfort in dealing with 
masculine issues as a component of her experience. When asked, during the first debate, about 
immigration reform, Clinton immediately tied the issue to national security and terrorism. 
Clinton argued, “Well, I’m in favor of comprehensive immigration reform, which includes 
tightening our border security, sanctioning employers [who] employ undocumented immigrants, 
helping our communities deal with the costs that come from illegal immigration, getting the 12 
million or so immigrants out of the shadows. That’s very important to me. After 9/11, we’ve got 
to know who’s in this country” (“South Carolina Democratic,” 2007, para. 346-347). She 
continued with this specific line of argumentation later in the debate when asked whether or not 
Democrats could keep the country safe from terrorism than Republicans. Clinton asserted, “Well, 
Brian [Williams], I think that, as a senator from New York, it is something that I have worked on 
very hard ever since 9/11—to try to convince the administration to do those things that would 
make us safer. And I think there’s a big disconnect between the rhetoric and the reality” (para. 
434). Again, in the same debate, Clinton responded to a question on terrorism with equal force: 
“Well, again, having been a senator during 9/11, I understand very well the extraordinary horror 
of that kind of an attack and the impact that it has, far beyond those that are directly affected. I 
think a president must move as swiftly as is prudent to retaliate…So let’s focus on those who 
have attacked us and do everything we can to destroy them” (para. 472-476). Clinton adopted a 
similar strategy in her first debate against just Obama and Edwards just days before the South 
Carolina primary: “I have the greatest admiration for the American military. I serve on the 
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Senate Armed Services Committee. I’ve been to Iraq three times. I’ve met with the leaders of the 
various factions” (“The Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, para. 416).  
Clinton continued this trend in the final Democratic primary debate; when she discussed 
the Iraq war once again, she argued, “And I am convinced that it is in America’s best interest, it 
is in the best interest of our military, and I even believe it is in the best interest of Iraq, that upon 
taking office, I will ask the secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and my security 
advisers to immediately put together for me a plan so that I can begin to withdraw within 60 
days” (“Democratic Debate in Philadelphia,” 2008, para. 183). She continued, later in this same 
debate, to establish her ease in dealing with masculine issues, as she argued, “Our military will 
continue to be stretched thin, and our soldiers will be on their second, third, even their fourth 
deployment. And we will not be able to reassert our leadership and our moral authority in the 
world. And I think those are the kinds of broad issues that a president has to take into account” 
(para. 192-193).  
In addition to demonstrating her ability to deal with masculine issues, Clinton also 
demonstrated her tenacity in dealing with men she might encounter as president as evidence of 
her experience. In her first debate against only Obama that took place shortly before Super 
Tuesday, Clinton noted: 
It is imperative, though, that we actually plan and execute this right. And you may  
remember last spring, I got into quite a back-and-forth with the Pentagon, because I was 
concerned they were not planning for withdrawal, because that was contrary to their 
strategy, or their stated position. And I began to press them to let us know, and they were 
very resistant, and gave only cursory information to us. So I’ve said that I will ask the 
Joint Chiefs and the secretary of defense and my security advisers the very first day I’m 
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president to begin to draw up such a plan so that we can withdraw (“Transcript of 
Thursday’s,” 2008, para. 399-401). 
During the debate in Cleveland, Clinton also mentioned international foes she might have to 
tangle with in a similar way: “I have long advocated a much tougher approach to Musharraf and 
to Pakistan, and I have pushed the White House to do that” (“The Democratic Debate in 
Cleveland,” 2008, para. 135). 
 Similarly, in terms of stressing the sufficiency of her experience as a candidate for 
president, Clinton was determined to demonstrate her toughness and strength rhetorically. She 
claimed in Cleveland, “You know, 15 years ago I tangled with the health insurance industry and 
the drug companies, and I know it takes a fighter. It takes somebody who will go toe-to-toe with 
the special interests” (“The Democratic Debate in Cleveland,” 2008, para. 203). Clinton also 
used the final debate in Philadelphia as an opportunity to demonstrate her toughness, asserting, 
“we need a fighter back in the White House” (“Democratic Debate in Philadelphia,” 2008, para. 
372). Additionally, as she discussed her abilities to deal more successfully than Obama with a 
November matchup against John McCain, a requirement of any party’s nominee’s experience as 
a presidential contender, Clinton asserted, “I believe I’m the better and stronger candidate 
against Senator McCain, to go toe to toe with him on national security and on how to turn the 
economy around” ( para. 65). During the last debate of the primary season, Clinton also added a 
discussion of terrorism and dealing with countries in the Middle East, asserting: 
Of course I would make it clear to the Iranians than an attack on Israel would incur  
massive retaliation from the United States, but I would do the same with other countries 
in the region. You know, we are at a very dangerous point with Iran. The Bush policy has 
failed. Iran has not been deterred. They continue to try to not only obtain the fissile 
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material for nuclear weapons but they are intent upon and using their efforts to intimidate 
the region and to have their way when it comes to the support of terrorism in Lebanon 
and elsewhere…we cannot permit Iran to become a nuclear power (para. 207-212). 
Clinton’s concluding remarks during the Philadelphia debate also clearly asserted the persona of 
toughness that she sought to establish. Clinton argued, “So I will tell everyone who listens that 
I’m ready to be commander in chief. I’ve got 35 generals and admirals, including two former 
chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wesley Clark and others, who believe that I am 
the person to lead us out of Iraq, to take on Al Qaeda, to rebuild our military” (para. 377). 
Interestingly, as she progressed into her final statements of the night, she continued this theme of 
toughness and the ability to fight but blended it to include a somewhat feminine undertone that 
signified nurturance and compassion. Clinton finished her closing statement, and argued, “And I 
hope that I have demonstrated not just over the last weeks or even the last hour and [a] half but 
over a lifetime that you can count on me. You know where I stand. You know that I will fight for 
you and that together we’re going to take back our country” (para. 379).  
To further mitigate the constraint of experience, just as it was during her campaign 
speeches, ‘being ready to lead on day one’ was also a common theme in her debate 
performances, as exemplified in the first primary debate in South Carolina wherein Clinton 
argued, “…the most important decision is who would be the best president on day one, to deal 
with all the problems that we know are waiting for our next president? And the subsidiary 
question is, who can best withstand the Republicans and all that we know is coming from them 
in order to win in November 2008? I believe strongly that I can make the best case for that” 
(“The Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, para. 593-594). Just days before Super Tuesday, 
Clinton continued with this particular strategy in her first debate against just Obama, again 
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asserting that she, rather than Obama, would best be able to handle the problems facing 
Americans on day one: 
…when the celebrations are over, the next president will walk into the Oval Office, and  
waiting there will be a stack of problems, problems inherited from a failed 
administration: a war to end in Iraq and a war to resolve in Afghanistan; an economy that 
is not working for the vast majority of Americans…tens of millions of people either 
without health insurance at all or with insurance that doesn’t amount to much, because it 
won’t pay what your doctor or your hospital need…an energy crisis we fail to act on at 
our peril; global warming, which the United States must lead in trying to contend with an 
reverse; and then all the problems that we know about and the ones we can’t yet predict. 
It is imperative that we have a president, starting on day one, who can begin to solve our 
problems, tackle these challenges, and seize the opportunities that I think await…I think 
it’s imperative we have a problem-solver, that we roll up our sleeves. I’m offering that 
kind of approach, because I think that Americans are ready once again to know that there 
isn’t anything we can’t do if we put our minds to it (“Transcript of Thursday’s,” 2008, 
para. 23-30). 
By presenting her experience in this way so as to mitigate this specific constraint, or to 
even use the constraint of experience to her advantage, Clinton, while seemingly beating her 
opponent perceptually, was in actuality hurting her own chances for victory on two fronts. First, 
she was demonstrating her abilities to address issues that are conventionally gender-coded as 
masculine, which may have alienated voters. This was, on the surface, a wise strategy, given that 
any woman running for the most masculine of political offices would need to portray herself as 
able to deal with “masculine” issues such as the economy. Unfortunately, as evident from these 
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excerpts, Clinton was unwise to stress these specific masculine issues. Bystrom, et al. (2004) and 
Clift and Brazaitis (2000) noted that when women win elections, it is because they have balanced 
their approach to both masculine and feminine traits and issues, while stressing feminine issues 
and traits as a way to establish credibility and at the same time, not defying conventional gender 
expectations. Thus, because Clinton chose, especially in her debate performances, to balance her 
approach in discussing both masculine and feminine issues and possibly erred on the side of 
emphasizing masculine issues, she could easily have alienated a portion of her audience while 
trying to establish her experience. Second, Clinton’s strategy of establishing her experience 
while also undercutting Obama’s was, in effect, adding force to Obama’s rhetorical mantra of 
“change” as is discussed in the third section of this chapter. For Clinton to win the experience 
battle, she had to demonstrate that she was, in effect, a member of the Washington establishment 
that Obama was arguing should be changed. Thus, as this initial discussion demonstrates, Clinton 
was, once again, locked in a double bind she could not escape by using traditional campaign 
strategies. 
However, Clinton did use other rhetorical strategies during the debates to establish and 
emphasize her experience beyond the overtly masculine tactics examined above. For instance, 
Clinton used her time in the White House as First Lady as an almost constant source of 
establishing expertise during her key primary debates. From the very first debate, which included 
all eight of the initial Democratic candidates, when Clinton was asked a question about gun 
control in the wake of the Virginia Tech massacre, Clinton used her time as First Lady to 
demonstrate her experience with the subject. She stated, “I remember very well when I 
accompanied Bill to Columbine after that massacre and met with the family members of those 
who had been killed and talked with the students, and feeling that we had to do more to try to 
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keep guns out of the hands of the criminal and the mentally unstable. And during the Clinton 
administration, that was a goal…” (“South Carolina Democratic,” 2007, para. 238-239). Her 
time working on health care during Bill Clinton’s presidency was also used as a source of 
establishing experience. Later in this same debate, she answered a question about health care 
reform in this way: “Well, let me start by saying that all of the ideas that you’re going to hear 
about in this campaign are very important to get out to the public so that people can actually 
think about them, examine how they would affect their lives because I do have the experience of 
having put forth a plan, with many of the features that John and Barack just mentioned” (para. 
284).  
Another clear example demonstrating this strategy came in Clinton’s first debate against 
only Obama prior to the Texas and Ohio primaries and caucuses in early March. In this lengthy 
excerpt from the debate, Clinton touched on many subjects and noted several examples, drawing 
her audience’s attention to one clear fact: her time as First Lady gave her experiences that were 
valuable as a presidential contender, again, in order to successfully address the rhetorical 
constraint of experience: 
…certainly during the eight years that I was privileged to be in the White House, I had a  
great deal of responsibility that was given to me to not only work on domestic issues, like  
health care—and when we weren’t successful on universal health care, I just turned  
around and said, well, we’re going to get the Children’s Health Insurance Program. And  
I’m so proud we do, because now six million children around the country every month 
get health care. And I took on the drug companies to make sure that they would test drugs 
to see if they were safe and effective for our kids…And certainly the work I was able to 
do around the world, going to more than 82 countries, negotiating with governments like 
  177 
Macedonia to open up their border again, to let Kosovar refugees in. Speaking on behalf 
of women’s rights as human rights in Beijing, to send a message across the world that 
this is critical of who we are as Americans (“Transcript of Thursday’s,” 2008, para. 318-
321). 
Similarly, directly before the Ohio and Texas contests in March, Clinton even more 
clearly extolled her work as First Lady as proof that she had the experience to lead the nation in 
the Cleveland debate: 
 [Co-Moderator] Brian Williams: Well, Senator Clinton, in the last debate you seemed to  
take a pass on the question of whether or not Senator Obama was qualified to be  
commander in chief. Is your contention in this latest speech that America would  
somehow be taking a chance on Senator Obama as commander in chief? 
 Sen. Clinton: Well, I have put forth my extensive experience in foreign policy, you know,  
helping to support the peace process in Northern Ireland, negotiating to open borders so  
that refugees fleeing ethnic cleansing would be safe, going to Beijing and standing up for 
women’s rights as human rights and so much else (“The Democratic Debate in 
Cleveland,” 2008, para. 133-134). 
Clinton, still answering the same question, finished her answer by adding: 
 So I think you’ve got to look at, you know, what I have done over a number of years,  
traveling on behalf of the country to more than 80 countries, meeting and working out a 
lot of different issues that are important to our national security and our foreign policy 
and our values, serving on the Senate Armed Services Committee for now five years… I 
will have a much better base to make on a range of issues that really America must 
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confront going forward, and will be able to hold my own and make the case for a change 
in policy that will be better for our country (para. 137). 
Toward the end of this same debate, Clinton clarified her point more concisely: “…what I 
believe is that my experience and my unique qualifications on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue 
equip me to handle the problems of today and tomorrow and to be prepared to make those tough 
decisions in dealing with Putin and others because we have so much work to do…” (para. 274). 
And while Clinton here did make note of her Senate experience as also contributing to her ability 
to lead, she still balanced this against her experience in the White House as both equally 
contributing to her readiness.  
 Clinton repeated this strategy in her final debate against Obama, when she claimed: “But 
I know too that, you know, being able to rely on my experience of having gone to Bosnia, gone 
to more than 80 countries, having represented the United States in so many different settings 
gives me a tremendous advantage going into this campaign, particularly against Senator 
McCain” (“Democratic Debate in Philadelphia,” 2008, para. 125). The use of her time as First 
Lady helped Clinton in a few ways in terms of the particular constraint of experience. First, it 
allowed her to embody traditional notions of femininity as she argued that she was qualified. 
Second, her discussion of her time as First Lady of the United States specifically reminded voters 
of her time in the White House, establishing an inherent connection to the office of the president. 
Finally, it allowed her to highlight her unique qualifications for the office, as she could stress the 
executive initiatives and the diplomatic efforts she had undertaken that could set her apart from 
her opponents who had only served in, aside from Governor Bill Richardson, legislative roles.  
Still, Clinton’s use of her time as First Lady to address this particular rhetorical constraint 
did not come without consequences. Obama regularly argued against this way of establishing 
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experience and accused Clinton of building up her experience beyond what it should be. A 
segment from the Cleveland debate demonstrates this issue succinctly: 
 Sen. Obama: (From videotape.) -- herself as co-president during the Clinton years. Every  
 good thing that happened she says she was a part of. And so the notion that you can  
 selectively pick what you take credit for and then run away from what isn't politically  
 convenient, that doesn't make sense. 
 Mr. Williams: Now, Senator Obama, you can react to it and whatever you wanted to react  
 to from earlier, but I've been wanting to ask you about this assertion that Senator Clinton  
 has somehow cast herself as co-president. 
 Sen. Obama: Well, I think what is absolutely true is, is that when Senator Clinton  
 continually talks about her experience, she is including the eight years that she served as  
 first lady, and you know, often says, you know, ‘Here's what I did.’ ‘Here's what we did.’  
 ‘Here's what we accomplished’ -- which is fine. And I have not -- I have not in any way  
 said that that experience is not relevant, and I don't begrudge her claiming that as  
 experience. What I've said, and what I would continue to maintain, is you can't take credit  
 for all the good things that happened but then, when it comes to issues like NAFTA, you  
 say, well, I -- behind the scenes, I was disagreeing. That doesn't work. So you have to, I  
 think, take both responsibility as well as credit (“The Democratic Debate in Cleveland,”  
 2008, para. 212-216). 
Obama’s strategy here was on target. As scholars who have studied the 2008 campaign indicated, 
Hillary Clinton was incredibly constrained by her invocation of her experience as First Lady 
(Schnoebelen, et al., 2009; Torrens, 2009). The use of this experience tied her to an ultimately 
feminine role, and at the same time, as demonstrated in the above excerpt from Obama, her 
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experiences as First Lady reminded voters of the “co-presidency” the Clintons had both 
emphasized while Bill Clinton was president—a label that caused many citizens to cringe at what 
seemed a way for a power-hungry woman to utilize the power of the presidency in an un-elected 
capacity, and to raise questions about the potential for another “co-presidency.” Thus, while 
Clinton should have emphasized her experience as First Lady as a contrast to her chief rival for 
the nomination (as they shared, in large part, roughly similar résumés as legislators and 
attorneys), it inadvertently tied her back to the negative reputation she had earned while her 
husband was president (as is examined in greater depth in the fourth section of this chapter), and 
did little to combat the constraint that she was, indeed, experienced enough to be president 
herself. 
Given the sheer number of times it was mentioned during just the key speeches and 
debate performances, and the amount of her rhetoric apportioned to this particular issue, it is 
clear that establishing her past experiences as proof of her ability to lead as president was viewed 
by Clinton as a major constraint during her bid for the presidency. And, as noted throughout the 
preceding analysis, Clinton was both successful and unsuccessful in providing rhetoric that was a 
fitting response to this constraint. 
On one hand, detailing the specific plans she would undertake, and the various areas, 
both masculine and feminine, was rhetorically wise for Clinton. As previously indicated in 
Chapter One, scholarship on leadership, and the presidency specifically, has indicated that 
effective leadership, especially presidential leadership, is inherently masculine in orientation 
(Bystrom, 2003b; Duerst-Lahti, 2006; Han, 2003; Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993). Bem’s (1974; 
1993) research reminds us that masculinity has traditionally been associated with the ability to 
get things done and pursue an instrumental orientation. Thus, in order to demonstrate that a 
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woman could, indeed, effectively serve as president, Clinton was smart to repeatedly list her 
accomplishments and to present detailed plans for her presidency for voters to counteract 
stereotypically negative beliefs regarding women. 
On the other hand, as previously indicated, Clinton relied far too heavily on emphasizing 
her experience and comfort with male issues and traits, which runs counter the dominant political 
communication beliefs that women should balance their approaches or err on the side of 
emphasizing female traits and issues so as to not appear utterly unconventional as a candidate. 
Clearly, though Clinton did consistently rely on her time as a First Lady—an explicitly feminine 
role—used much more of her discourse to establish her competence with masculine issues and 
her possession of masculine traits. And as the next section of this chapter demonstrates, Clinton’s 
establishment of her expertise exacerbated another rhetorical constraint that plagued her 
rhetorical situation: her lack of likability and negative reputation as a public figure. 
Perceptions of Clinton’s Reputation as Rhetorical Constraint 
 All parties involved in the 2008 Democratic presidential primary were aware of the 
obvious: Clinton was the best-known candidate among Democrats seeking the nomination. This 
awareness, early on, helped Clinton by catapulting her to the top of many early polls, and 
establishing her as the clear favorite among Democratic voters (Balz, 2007b). However, this 
knowledge of Clinton among her opponents and among voters was a double-edged sword. Since 
Clinton was the best known, Nagourney (2006) noted “Almost without exception, [Clinton’s 
Democratic opponents in the campaign] have approached this race with the same strategy: to try 
to emerge as the alternative to Mrs. Clinton and to take advantages of substantial reservations in 
Democratic circles about her potential to win the White House” (para. 8). Her opponents harped 
on Clinton’s reputation, firmly established in the American psyche after many years in the public 
  182 
eye, complicating Clinton’s rhetorical response during the campaign. Specifically, Clinton’s 
reputation as a rhetorical constraint can be boiled down to two primary factors working against 
her during the primary campaign: the perception of her privacy or lack of self-disclosure—which 
could be interpreted as a lack of transparency—and the perception that Clinton was, simply, not 
likable enough to vote for.  
 An image of Clinton’s private, almost insulated world, and the subsequent negative 
perception of such privacy, was a common theme perpetuated by news sources from the 
beginning of the campaign. In the prelude to her campaign announcement, Clinton was reported 
to have had several private meetings with influential Democrats, much to the chagrin of several 
voters she would later be courting. Healy and Nagourney (2007) reported in the New York Times 
that Clinton often appeared to be “surrounded by an insular circle of longtime advisers and 
friends who are detached from many of the grass-roots Democrats who have grown in influence 
since the last time a Clinton ran for president” (para. 7).  
 Obama also made several jibes during the campaign toward Clinton, as widely reported 
in news sources, that also perpetuated this appearance of privacy. Leibovich (2007) reported, “As 
he drills into specifics, Mr. Obama’s critique of Mrs. Clinton becomes plainer. He said 
deliberations of his health care legislation would not take place ‘in back rooms,’ a reference to 
Mrs. Clinton’s failed initiative in the 1990s, for which she was roundly slammed as being too 
secretive” (para. 22). 
 The belief that Clinton was a deeply private person, perpetuated in news media sources, 
complicated her appearance of likability. An excerpt from the New York Times demonstrates the 
last tenet of this specific constraint that haunted Clinton’s rhetorical performance during the 
primary: 
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 Even in low moments, Mrs. Clinton has been a picture of steely public composure. She  
has rarely, if ever, seemed to let herself go. Not when her health care initiative failed. Not  
the first time the world found out about her husband’s marital misconduct. Not the  
second time either. In contrast, Mrs. Clinton’s challengers for the Democratic presidential  
nomination have been emotionally accessible. Senator Barack Obama wrote about his  
absent father in “Dreams From My Father” and about quarreling with his wife in “The  
Audacity of Hope.” John Edwards, the former senator from North Carolina, is the star of  
a long-running, heart-rending family drama: he lost his son in a car accident and has a  
wife with incurable cancer and he discusses all of it with seeming ease. In contrast, Mrs.  
Clinton has meted out her inner life one teaspoon at a time: a suggestive line in an  
interview here, a hearty laugh there (Kantor, 2008a, para. 2-5). 
 Even Clinton’s own supporters acknowledged that her likability was going to be an issue 
potentially impeding her nomination, as demonstrated by Balz (2007b):  
 But many Democrats say she will have to work to overcome skepticism about her  
candidacy inside her party. ‘Can [voters] finally see the reality of Hillary Clinton, not the  
myth of Hillary Clinton?’ said Mickey Kantor, who was commerce secretary in the  
Clinton administration and supports the senator’s candidacy. ‘The money will be  
there…The experienced people will be there. All those things she will have. But the  
image [is something] she will have to turn around in some parts of the country’ (para.  
18). 
Kornblut and Cohen (2007) echoed this perception, noting that Clinton “appears more vulnerable 
on questions of character…she is [viewed as] not sufficiently candid” (para. 9).  
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At times, the picture of Clinton’s likability was actually presented in a positive light by 
the press, but with clear, unmistakable reminders of the fact that Clinton had to depict herself in 
certain ways so as to avoid an unlikable persona. Hornaday (2007) writing about Clinton’s 
announcement video, commented, “The aesthetic sophistication suited Clinton, who, as a former 
First Lady and a U.S. senator, would look hopelessly out of place in most other contexts…and 
the look and the script warmed up a woman portrayed as either an amoral ice queen or control-
freak dragon lady by her political opponents” (para. 5). Indeed, Clinton’s likability (or lack 
thereof) was a key feature of many news stories during the campaign, acknowledging that 
Clinton had to repair this image if she were to capture her party’s nomination. During her early 
campaign efforts in Iowa, Healy (2007d) noted, “At some events this week, the clear message 
was: I am a caring person; I care about you. At other events, it was attack, attack, attack (against 
Barack Obama in particular). Naughty, nice, naughty, nice” (para. 7). 
 Clinton was probably most successful in combating the image of being unlikable in New 
Hampshire when, on the eve of the primary there, she visibly broke down in front of the 
audience and ‘cried.’ As previously indicated in the analysis of Clinton’s audience in Chapter 
Three, this situation allowed Clinton to humanize her public persona, though not without 
controversy (as many had speculated as to whether or not the misty eyes were faked by Clinton 
to gain favor among her audience members). Regardless of the actual details of the event, the 
situation did help Clinton combat her lack of likability among some, and she was quick to 
capitalize on the event to try and turn it to her favor. She told the New York Times, “‘It was just 
so touching when this woman asked, ‘Well, what about you?’…I just don’t think about that, I 
think about what I can do for other people. I have spent a lifetime trying to help others; I’m very 
other-directed. That’s maybe why people don’t get me in the political world’” (Healy, 2008b, 
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para. 9). As Clinton’s quotation indicated, she was cognizant of the fact that a majority of voters 
did not, indeed, “get” her. As a powerful political woman seeking even more power as she 
sought to become president, she often seemed too harsh, shrill, and unfeminine as a woman. 
Consequently, Clinton seemed well aware of the fact that she needed to demonstrate her 
femininity (or at least her likability) to combat the negative perceptions garnered from the 
reputation she had earned from her years involved in national politics, bolstering the argument 
that her reputation was, in fact, a core constraint she faced on the trail. 
 Other news sources were relentless in questioning Clinton’s likability, demonstrating the 
pessimism about Clinton’s chances that was likely in the minds of many voters who viewed her 
unfavorably. A comment from one of Maureen Dowd’s articles for the New York Times clarified 
this pessimism, and points out how clearly Clinton’s likability was a constraint during the 
primary campaign: “She won her Senate seat after being embarrassed by a man. She pulled out 
New Hampshire and saved her presidential campaign after being embarrassed by another man. 
She was seen as so controlling when she ran for the Senate that she had to be seen as losing 
control, as she did during the Monica scandal, before she seemed soft enough to attract many 
New York voters” (Dowd, 2008, para. 5). Dowd continued in the same article to present one of 
the most hyperbolic yet seemingly accurate assessments of the debate over Clinton’s likability 
during the campaign:  
 Bill [Clinton] churlishly dismissed the Obama phenomenon as ‘the biggest fairy tale I’ve  
ever seen,’ but for the last few days, it was Hillary who seemed in danger of being  
Cinderella. She became emotional because she feared that she had reached her political  
midnight, when she would suddenly revert to the school girl with geeky glasses and  
frizzy hair, smart but not the favorite. All those years in the shadow of one Natural, only  
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to face the prospect of being eclipsed by another Natural? How illuminating to have a  
moderator of the New Hampshire debate ask her to explain why she was not as popular as  
the handsome young prince from Chicago. How demeaning to have Obama rather  
ungraciously chime in: ‘you’re likable enough.’ And how exasperating to be pushed into  
an angry rebuttal when John Edwards played wingman, attacking her on Obama’s behalf  
(para. 11-12). 
Note that Dowd fails to consider that Clinton’s display was due to genuine emotion about public 
service; arguing, rather, that it was based on the perception that Clinton was emotionally 
responding to the possibility of losing her political dream. Regardless of the truth of the matter, 
the moment was significant. And it wasn’t significant solely because it came from a presidential 
candidate—it was significant because it was this presidential candidate. Kantor (2008a) 
explained: “Also remarkable about the reaction [to Clinton’s ‘tears’ in New Hampshire] was how 
much weight the commenters attached to Mrs. Clinton’s comments. After a year’s worth of 
speeches and debates, several new biographies and reams of journalism, the truth about what sort 
of person Hillary Clinton is—how genuine, how altruistic—seemed to come down to a few 
minutes of tape for some voters. It seemed to prove, once again, what might be called the Queen 
Elizabeth rule: the less emotion a leader shows, the more importance will be attached to those 
rare flashes of it” (para. 19). Understanding this rule, Clinton remarked after the fact, “‘If you get 
too emotional, that undercuts you…A man can cry; we know that. Lots of our leaders have cried. 
But a woman, it’s a different kind of dynamic’” (Dowd, 2008, para. 13). In response to Clinton’s 
‘tearing up’ in New Hampshire, and as if in justification of Clinton’s comments afterward, John 
Edwards had attacked Clinton, arguing, “‘I think what we need in a commander in chief is 
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strength and resolve, and presidential campaigns are tough business, but being president of the 
United States is also tough business’” (Kornblut, 2008, para. 11-12). 
 Another story on the trail that severely hampered Clinton’s rhetorical abilities to 
transform her negative image during the campaign, occurred in mid-March when Clinton was 
speaking about her foreign policy experience at George Washington University. During this 
speech she asserted that when she had traveled with her daughter to Bosnia in 1996, she had 
dodged sniper fire upon exiting the airplane, most likely in an effort to “bolster her argument that 
she [had] the foreign policy experience needed to be commander in chief” (Duke, et al., 2008, 
para. 8). In the week following Clinton’s remarks about her trip to Bosnia, it was discovered and 
widely reported by several news organizations that Clinton’s claims had been totally false, and 
that video documentation of her arrival in Bosnia contradicted her account of the experience. 
After the reports about Clinton’s actual arrival surfaced, Clinton responded by arguing, “‘I say a 
lot of things—millions of words a day—so if I misspoke, that was just a misstatement’” (Duke, 
et al., 2008, para. 5). However, as she had mentioned similar stories about sniper fire in previous 
speeches, and as the story that she had lied about her trip to Bosnia had been run worldwide, the 
damage to her credibility had been done. Clinton’s Bosnia gaffe, in other words, became yet 
another sore spot for the candidate as she sought to reform her negative reputation; it mitigated 
her attempts to convey warmth and an honest persona, a conventionally feminine characteristic, 
and it perpetuated the need for Clinton to address this rhetorical constraint through her discourse. 
And as the analysis of her campaign rhetoric demonstrates later, this specific incident would 
come back to haunt her in terms of reforming her reputation. 
 If not for Obama being her lead opponent in the primary race, with his effective and 
inspirational oratorical skill and his perceptible charisma, Clinton may not have had nearly as 
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tough a time proving her likability. But Obama was her central opponent, and his palpable 
likability was a stark contrast to the doubts about Clinton’s. Obama, in contrast to Clinton, was 
perceived as real—as authentic (Williams, 2008). More than this, Obama was inspirational. 
“Campaign worker A. J. Weiss said he reached some Clinton voters ‘who politely declined to 
talk,’ but ‘a lot of people that did want to talk (about Obama) were truly inspired, I think, by the 
senator’” (Moore, 2008, para. 14). The day after Super Tuesday, a volunteer for Obama’s 
campaign, Tyler Bush, also told the USA Today, “‘in the last week there’s been a definite surge. 
People you talk to on the street, they’re jumping on the bandwagon…’ He decided to vote for 
Obama after learning of his work as a community organizer helping laid-off steelworkers in 
Gary, Ind., near Bush’s home. ‘I’ve been looking for a leader for a long time, and he’s that guy,’ 
Bush said (Moore, 2008, para. 15-16). Another Obama supporter in South Carolina stated, 
“‘there was something about Senator Obama that I found really fresh and exciting…I like how 
positive he has been’” (Leibovich, 2008, para. 32). Typical characteristics used by voters to 
describe Clinton, on the other hand, were not quite as inspirational. She was, as reported in new 
sources, described as destructively negative and polarizing (Leibovich, 2008; “Super Tuesday 
voters,” 2008).  
 Further complicating Clinton’s rhetoric, when news reporters and political pundits alike 
had struggled to characterize the key ingredient behind Obama’s appeal to voters in terms of 
likability, it was described as a movement—a movement that was lacking as a force behind 
Clinton’s campaign. As the Democratic primary drew to a close, Hirshman (2008a) described the 
difference between Obama and Clinton succinctly: 
 …it’s something less analyzable. When faced with a ‘movement,’ resistance is costly.  
And for weeks now, online and cable news channels, almost anyone who expresses  
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criticism of Obama or support for Clinton has elicited a firestorm of disapproval.  
Obama’s scores of defenders—‘Obamabots,’ they’re called—immediately recite the anti- 
Clinton litany: Billary, Monica Lewinsky, Hillary’s Iraq vote, identity politics. Well- 
regarded activists such as Planned Parenthood’s Feldt or successful writers such as Tina  
Fey who support Clinton are excoriated as worthless pieces of nonsense. After [Gloria]  
Steinem wrote an op-ed on Clinton’s behalf in the New York Times, the New Republic  
published an article titled ‘Gloria Steinem’s Awful Op Ed.’ Not misguided. But ‘awful’  
(para. 19-20).  
As the previous excerpt demonstrated clearly, and as the analysis in Chapter Three indicates, 
Hillary Clinton was facing a tremendous uphill battle in terms of appealing to voters because of 
the constraint posed by her reputation. Thus, given the complications she faced as she attempted 
to appeal to voters and deal with this specific constraint (and the distinct lack of warmth and 
likability that have characterized her reputation), Clinton had to strategically frame her rhetoric 
to make herself appear more genuine and feminine as a candidate. And as the following analysis 
demonstrates, while Clinton was aware of this constraint, she was largely unsuccessful in 
addressing it effectively, or using it to her advantage, in her campaign discourse. 
Reputation as Constraint in Clinton’s Speeches 
 Clinton seemed cognizant of her negative reputation, and specifically, the perception that 
she was unlikable, from the very beginning of her campaign. As the analysis in Chapters Three 
and Four demonstrates, Clinton began her campaign in a very conversational way, accentuating 
both her femininity and her willingness to personally converse with voters as well as her 
awareness of her status as the front-runner for the nomination. However, while Clinton could 
approach her campaign in an initially conversational manner because of her dominant status on 
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the trail early on, it is more likely that she was compelled to craft her rhetoric in this way to 
specifically counter the constraint caused by her poor reputation as a person, and her own 
perceived lack of femininity. In the video announcement that launched her campaign, she stated, 
“So let’s talk. Let’s chat. Let’s start a dialogue about your ideas and mine” because, as 
presidential candidate Hillary Clinton (as opposed to Senator Hillary Clinton or former First 
Lady Hillary Clinton), she had to (Clinton, 2008a, para. 11). Beginning her campaign in this 
manner allowed Clinton to embody some of the positive stereotypes about how women 
communicate, allowing her to reach out to those who were skeptical about her warmth. 
Additionally, the proposition that she wanted to begin a ‘conversation’ with America was in 
keeping with Helgesen’s (1995) contention that women should “emphasize relationships with 
people” (p. 28). It also demonstrated that Clinton approached the presidential campaign in a 
different, non-traditional way compared to her male opponents, demonstrating the positive 
“apolitical above-it-all demeanor” that successful female politicians have been said to embody in 
the past (Witt, et al., 1994, p. 215). Also, beginning her campaign in this way allowed Clinton to 
embody many of the positive characteristics of female leaders, like the ability to work effectively 
with others and a hands-on approach to leadership (Epstein, et al., 1998; Rosenthal, 1998b; 
Tolleson-Rinehart, 2001). Thus, from the beginning of her campaign, Clinton was attempting to 
counteract the constraint posed by her lack of likability through her use of rhetoric. 
 Clinton, in other speeches on the trail, also attempted to demonstrate her warmth, and 
asserted that she was also able to help millions of people in her various endeavors, though the 
tone was clearly set to establish warmth and kindness rather than solely her leadership 
experience, as discussed in the previous section. In Iowa, Clinton (2007b) stated, “I found 
children who were blind, children who were deaf, children in wheelchairs, children with other 
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kinds of disabilities. There was no place for them in beautiful schools like this. So I worked with 
many others to change the law, to make it possible for children with disabilities to get a public 
education and I was proud to be part of making change that helped millions and millions of 
Americans” (para. 23). Later in this speech, Clinton also asserted, “And I want, as president, to 
inspire more philanthropy, to get more Americans involved in helping their neighbors” (para. 
28). 
 Clinton’s speeches also reminded her audience of times in the past when she was popular, 
or perceived in a warmer way, such as when she wrote her book It Takes a Village (Clinton, 
2007b). Several previous studies demonstrated that Clinton was able to successfully repair her 
public image by engaging in certain rhetorical activities such as writing her book It Takes a 
Village, and speaking on behalf of women’s rights in Beijing (Anderson, 2002; Parry-Giles & 
Blair, 2002; Vavrus, 2002). When Clinton engaged in these types of activities in the past, she 
was largely able to overcome, rhetorically, the negative public impressions that citizens held; 
thus, reminding voters of these aspects of her time as First Lady could have helped to mitigate 
her lack of warmth and likability. What was lacking in her campaign for president, though, was a 
new example to drive the point home that she was likeable. 
 Another way Clinton attempted to bypass the constraint posed by her negative reputation, 
as previously analyzed in Chapter Three, was through her use of specific examples in her 
discourse. In Iowa, Clinton devoted a significant portion of her speech to one such example, 
demonstrating not only her attempts to reach certain demographics, but also her awareness of 
this constraint. Clinton (2007b) stated: 
 I was in Winterset two weeks ago and there was a man there and a woman in a  
wheelchair and the man was standing behind her with his hands on the back of the  
  192 
wheelchair. Occasionally he would reach over and give her a drink, occasionally wipe her  
mouth. And I called on him when question time came. He told me that he and his wife  
had been married for 50 years, that she’s had Parkinson’s for 29 years and it got  
increasingly more difficult to care for her, he tried to get long-term care insurance,  
nobody would help him with his wife. All he’s looking for is a little bit of help. He wants  
to take care of her, they’ve been together a really long time. But it’s going to be hard if he  
doesn’t get help at all. When I’m president we’re going to provide help to loving family  
members like him and so many others who are doing the right thing (para. 36-37). 
 Additionally, as previously articulated in Chapter Four, one of Clinton’s chief exigencies 
was asserting the Bush Administration’s tendency to view most Americans as ‘invisible’; this 
rhetorical device was also used to establish Clinton’s warmth during the campaign. After Super 
Tuesday, Clinton (2008c) argued: 
 I see an America where we stand up to the oil companies and the oil producing  
countries, where we launch a clean energy revolution and finally confront the climate  
crisis. I see an America where we don’t just provide health care for some people, or most  
people, but for every single man, woman, and child in this country—no one left out. I see  
an America where when a young man or woman signs up to serve our country, we sign  
up to serve them too…That’s the America I see—that’s the America we will build  
together (para. 15-18). 
 Finally, Clinton’s speeches also included assertions that she had acted, and will continue 
to act, in a spirit of bipartisanship, designed to decrease the perception that she was not warm or 
that she was politically divisive. Clinton, speaking in Iowa, claimed, “In the Senate, I have 
worked across the aisle to make change…I immediately went to work, expanding economic 
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opportunities in our rural areas for our farmers in our small towns. Working across the aisle with 
Republicans to get health care for our National Guard and Reserve members who didn’t have 
it…Working to make sure that despite the differences we have in philosophy or ideology, that we 
cannot let partisanship stand in the way of improving the lives of the people in our country” 
(2007b, para. 31-32).  
 If one only looked at Clinton’s key speeches during the campaign, the perception that she 
was successful in her attempts to counteract the constraint posed by her negative reputation may 
appear to be a logical conclusion to draw. However, Clinton’s speeches should not be analyzed 
in a vacuum for any constraint, let alone this specific one. After all, her campaign speeches are 
where Clinton had complete dominion over her message and tone, unencumbered by the rival 
messages of her opponents or naysayers. Her campaign speeches indicate that Clinton was aware 
of her reputation, and as such, she chose specific places in each of these speeches to rectify this 
image and bypass this constraint in her rhetorical situation. However, as becomes clear in the 
next section, Clinton’s debate performances demonstrate a rhetor who did, indeed, have 
significant problems in proving her warmth and likability on a number of occasions. 
Reputation as Constraint in Clinton’s Debate Performances 
Clinton, in much the same way as she did in her campaign speeches, also used her debate 
performances (at least her early ones) to demonstrate her caring nature, and her willingness to 
work with opponents so as to bypass or refute this particular constraint. In the South Carolina 
primary debate wherein Clinton debated only Obama and Edwards, Clinton devoted a large 
portion of one of her responses to this end: 
 Well, I respect John’s commitment to ending poverty. That’s why, 35 years ago, when I  
graduated from law school, I didn’t go to work for a law firm. I went to work for Marion  
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Wright Edelman at the Children’s Defense Fund, because ending poverty—particularly  
ending poverty for children, has been the central core cause of everything that I’ve been  
doing for 35 years. I care deeply about what for me is a mission and it does infuse  
everything that I do and why I’m in public office and why before I was in public service,  
chairing the Legal Services Corporation so that people got free legal aid when they would  
otherwise be put out of the courthouse, standing up time and time again for health care  
and education for abused and neglected kids and kids in the foster care system (“The  
Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, para. 488-489).  
Later in this debate, Clinton used the date of the occasion (Martin Luther King, Jr. Day) to 
extend this maternal persona and acknowledge her own opportunities, implying that she would 
act to establish and preserve such opportunities for others: 
 Well, there is no doubt that change comes from the extraordinary efforts of the American  
people. I’ve seen it in my life. I’m sitting here as a result of that change…The American  
people should not have to work so hard to get leaders who will actually help them and  
recognize we are strongest when we lead by our values. Dr. King transformed the lives of  
so many of us, and I intend to do whatever I can to make his legacy real in the lives of  
Americans (para. 619-623). 
The above excerpts once again depicted a candidate who was aware of the constraint posed by 
her negative reputation, and was acting rhetorically to assuage fears about her lack of warmth 
and divisiveness. 
 On January 31, Clinton, in her first debate against only Obama before Super Tuesday 
(February 5), also addressed issues relevant to this constraint; in this case, her perceived 
penchant for privacy and a lack of openness or warmth. When Wolf Blitzer commented, 
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“Senator Clinton, we remember in ’93, when you were formulating your health care plan, it was 
done in secret,” Clinton attempted to refute the premise of Blitzer’s implied argument, when she 
stated, “Well, it was an effort to try to begin this conversation, which we’re now continuing. It 
has been a difficult conversation. There have been a lot of efforts. And I’m proud that one of the 
efforts I was involved in 10 years ago resulted in the Children’s Health Insurance Program. We 
now have a million children in California…who every month get health insurance because of 
that bipartisan effort” (“Transcript of Thursday’s,” 2008, para. 132-136). In approaching this 
specific constraint in this way, Clinton not only took the opportunity to establish her credibility 
and experience, she did so in a way to make it appear as if there was an altruistic motive behind 
her secrecy, again to prove that she was a caring person who had done her best to help others. 
 Another way in which Clinton attempted to bypass the constraint posed by her negative 
reputation was in presenting herself in a maternal way, acting as a champion who sought to 
protect the “invisible.” Clinton, in the very first Democratic primary debate, lambasted Bush and 
acted maternally in critiquing Bush’s plan to help the economy. Clinton argued, “Everything we 
know about President’s Bush’s plans would leave 50 million to 70 million Americans out, 
because a lot of our seniors on fixed incomes don’t pay income taxes. But that doesn’t mean 
they’re immune from the energy costs and health care costs and everything else that’s going up 
around them…President Bush’s plan would do nothing to help them” (“The Democratic Debate 
in South,” 2008, para. 10-11). Clinton continued this strategy in her first debate against only 
Obama later in the campaign before Super Tuesday, when she asserted, “And I really spent a 
great deal of my early adulthood, you know, bringing people together to help solve the problems 
of those who were without a voice and were certainly powerless” (“Transcript of Thursday’s,” 
2008, para. 315). Later in this same debate, when asked about her Iraq strategy, Clinton again 
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attempted to take an overtly masculine issue and feminize her response, accentuating a caring, 
maternal demeanor:  
…it’s clear that if I had been president, we would never have diverted our attention from  
Afghanistan. When I went to Afghanistan the first time and was met by a young soldier 
from New York, in the 10th Mountain Division who told me that I was being welcomed to 
the forgotten war against terror, that just, you know, just struck me so forcefully. We 
have so many problems that we are going to have to untangle. And it will take 
everyone—it will take a tremendous amount of effort (para. 490-491).  
Clinton continued her maternal, nurturing approach during the debate in Cleveland; she asserted, 
“I want to get that money back and invest it in the middle class—health care, college 
affordability, the kinds of needs that people talk to me about throughout Ohio, because what I 
hear…is the same litany that people are working harder than ever, but they’re not getting ahead. 
They feel like they’re invisible to their government” (“The Democratic Debate in Cleveland,” 
2008, para. 204). Finally, Clinton also continued this theme of nurturance and maternal care in 
her last debate against Obama. At the beginning of her closing statement, Clinton asserted, “And 
I have a plan to take away $55 billion of the giveaways and the subsidies that the president and 
Congress have lavished on the drug companies and the oil companies and the insurance 
companies and Wall Street. And I have a plan to give that money back—give it back in tax cuts 
to the middle class—people who deserve it, who have been struggling under this president, who 
feel invisible, who feel like, you know, they’re not seen anymore” (“Democratic Debate in 
Philadelphia,” 2008, para. 373).  
A final, less oft-used way that Clinton attempted to correct the divisiveness people 
perceived that she embodied was by asserting her ability to work collectively with others. During 
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her last debate against Obama, Clinton discussed the Washington, D.C. ban on handguns. She 
asserted, “You know, more than one person, on average, a day is murdered in Philadelphia. And 
Mayor Nutter is very committed, as the mayor of this great city, to try to do what he can to stem 
the violence. And what I said is what I have been saying, that I will be a good partner, for cities 
like Philadelphia, as president” (“Democratic Debate in Philadelphia,” 2008, para. 296). This 
particular approach was helpful to Clinton, as it provided a contrast to the predominant opinions 
that she was partisan and, at times, even vindictive in her approach to policy change (i.e. health 
care reform). However, appeals like these were too few in number to contradict this aspect of the 
constraint posed by her reputation. 
 Indeed, though it is clear that Clinton attempted to craft portions of her discourse in order 
to combat the negative reputation she had as a politician (and a female politician, specifically), 
Clinton was unable to completely mitigate charges against her openness and warmth. First, her 
‘errors’ in talking about Bosnia, in many ways, irrevocably hampered her abilities to effectively 
deal with this constraint. This particular issue was critical, primarily because it was present, 
though the gaffe occurred several weeks earlier, in the last debate of the primary season. The 
transcript points out several revealing aspects of the long-ranging implications of Clinton’s 
“error”: 
 Mr. Stephanopoulos: Senator Clinton, we also did a poll today, and there are also questions  
 about you raised in this poll. About six in 10 voters that we talked to say they don't believe  
 you're honest and trustworthy. And we also asked a lot of Pennsylvania voters for  
 questions they had. A lot of them raised this honesty issue and your comments about being  
 under sniper fire in Bosnia. 
 Here's Tom Rooney from Pittsburgh. 
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 Q Senator, I was in your court until a couple of weeks ago. How do you reconcile the  
 campaign of credibility that you have when you've made those comments about what  
 happened getting off the plane in Bosnia, which totally misrepresented what really  
 happened on that day? You really lost my vote. And what can you tell me to get that vote  
 back? 
 Senator Clinton: Well, Tom, I can tell you that I may be a lot of things, but I'm not dumb.  
 And I wrote about going to Bosnia in my book in 2004. I laid it all out there. And you're  
 right. On a couple of occasions in the last weeks I just said some things that weren't in  
 keeping with what I knew to be the case and what I had written about in my book. And,  
 you know, I'm embarrassed by it. I have apologized for it. I've said it was a mistake. And it  
 is, I hope, something that you can look over, because clearly I am proud that I went to  
 Bosnia. It was a war zone… So I will either try to get more sleep, Tom, or, you know, have  
 somebody who, you know, is there as a reminder to me. You know, you can go back for  
 the past 15 months. We both have said things that, you know, turned out not to be accurate.  
 You know, that happens when you're talking as much as we have talked. But you know,  
 I'm very sorry that I said it. And I have said that, you know, it just didn't jibe with what I  
 had written about and knew to be the truth (“Democratic Debate in Philadelphia,” 2008,  
 para. 120-127). 
This section of the debate transcript is telling in many ways; it points out the fact that Clinton’s 
previous misstatement regarding Bosnia proved costly in terms of votes and mitigating her 
negative reputation. This segment of the debate transcript also indicates another constraint posed 
by the press, in that news reporters, weeks after Clinton apologized for the error, were still 
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compelled to bring up the issue. Finally, it showed a lack of comfort on Clinton’s part in 
addressing the issue.  
Still, the next few paragraphs from the transcript of this debate was even more telling of 
Clinton’s problems caused by the Bosnia gaffe—the fact that Obama would take the high road 
on the issue, even when baited by the news media: 
 Mr. Stephanopoulos: Senator Obama, your campaign has sent out a cascade of e-mails, just  
 about every day, questioning Senator Clinton's credibility. And you yourself have said she  
 hasn't been fully truthful about what she would do as president. Do you believe that  
 Senator Clinton has been fully truthful about her past? 
 Senator Obama: Well, look, I think that Senator Clinton has a strong record to run on. She  
 wouldn't be here if she didn't. And you know, I haven't commented on the issue of Bosnia.  
 You know, I -- 
 Mr. Stephanopoulos: Your campaign has.  
 Senator Obama: Of course, but –  
 Senator Clinton: (Laughs.)  
 Senator Obama: Because we're asked about it. But look, the fact of the matter is, is that  
 both of us are working as hard as we can to make sure that we're delivering a message to  
 the American people about what we would do as president. Sometimes that message is  
 going to be imperfectly delivered, because we are recorded every minute of every day. And  
 I think Senator Clinton deserves, you know, the right to make some errors once in a while.  
 I'm—obviously, I make some as well. I think what's important is to make sure that we don't  
 get so obsessed with gaffes that we lose sight of the fact that this is a defining moment in  
 our history (“Democratic Debate in Philadelphia,” 2008, para. 128-137). 
  200 
Obama’s response here was telling of Clinton’s rhetorical constraint regarding her negative 
reputation. As the above excerpt exemplifies, Obama was often much more apt to navigate 
precarious situations during the debate in which he could have been perceived as attacking or 
mudslinging. He was able, because of his cool demeanor during the debates, to craft his rhetoric 
in such a way to escape such perceptions while he still made sure that the issue was featured in 
the debate to Clinton’s detriment. Thus, Obama seemed to embody the previously discussed ‘a-
political, above-it-all demeanor’ valuable to women in politics, while Clinton was still flailing, 
rhetorically, as she scrambled to form a sufficient response to the constraint posed by her lack of 
warmth and likability. 
On the other hand, Clinton’s quest to establish herself as warm and caring was, oddly 
enough, sometimes helped by some news reporters in the key primary debates. Kornblut (2009b) 
argued that the press coverage during the 2008 campaign cycle was incredibly sexist. And 
previous scholarship has also indicated that the press unfairly biases their reporting of politics 
against women (Braden, 1996; Duerst-Lahti, 2006; Witt, at al., 1994) But rather than simply 
short-changing Clinton in terms of the amount or content of coverage, some of the news 
reporters who acted as moderators for the debates seemed to attack or short-change Clinton. This 
may have helped soften her image, making her appear more sympathetic. In the first debate 
between only Clinton and Obama before Super Tuesday, Clinton was asked a series of questions 
about her Iraq vote and her plans to end the war. At one point, Wolf Blitzer interrupted Clinton 
in a telling exchange: 
 Clinton: …We had to fight to get body armor. You know, George Bush sent people to  
war without body armor. 
 Blitzer: So what I—what I… 
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 Clinton: We need a president who will be sensitive to the implications of the use of force  
and understand that force should be a last resort, not a first resort. 
 Blitzer: So, what I hear you saying—and correct me if I’m wrong—is that you were naïve  
in trusting President Bush? 
 Clinton: No, that’s not what you heard me say, 
 (AUDIENCE BOOING) 
 Clinton: Good try, Wolf. Good try. You know… 
 Blitzer: Was she naïve, Senator Obama?... 
 Clinton: You know, I think that, you know, that is a good try, Wolf. 
 (LAUGHTER) (“Transcript of Thursday’s,” 2008, para. 494-504). 
Still, when Clinton would comment on these moments of possible bias by the moderators, her 
commentary was not always well received. The example previously analyzed in Chapter Three, 
wherein Clinton commented on the inequality the moderators had showed her because she was 
consistently asked the first question on many of the debate topics, demonstrated that while some 
audience members responded favorably to her criticism of the reporters, others did not. Clinton’s 
responses to the moderators in terms of this specific constraint could have worked to Clinton’s 
advantage, to both draw laughter amongst the crowd as well as to highlight the inequality of her 
treatment, but as the notations within the quotations in both of these transcript excerpts indicate, 
her audience responded both with laughter and booing. 
 Predominantly, analysis of the key debate performances indicates the press did not 
always help Clinton during the debates as she sought to deal with this specific constraint. In fact, 
some reporter/moderators overtly impeded her ability to be warm, or even clear, in answering 
questions. The late Tim Russert of NBC news was, arguably, Clinton’s major source of ire 
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during any of the debates. During the Cleveland debate, shortly before the March 4th Ohio and 
Texas primaries and caucuses, one exchange between Russert and Clinton demonstrated the 
challenge posed by Russert for Clinton in terms of this constraint: 
 Sen. Clinton: I have said that I will renegotiate NAFTA, so obviously, you’d have to say  
to Canada and Mexico that that’s exactly what we’re going to do. But you know, in  
fairness— 
 Mr. Russert: Just because—maybe Clinton— 
 Sen. Clinton: Yes, I am serious. 
 Mr. Russert: You will get out. You will notify Mexico and Canada, NAFTA is gone in  
six months. 
 Sen. Clinton: No, I will say we will opt out of NAFTA unless we renegotiate it, and we  
renegotiate on terms that are favorable to all Americans… You know, Senator Obama  
told the farmers of Illinois a couple of years ago that he wanted more trade agreements.  
I—right now— 
 Mr. Russert: We’re going to get—we’re going to get to Senator Obama, but I want to stay  
on your terms— 
 Sen. Clinton: Well, but that—but that is important— 
 Mr. Russert: —because this was something that you wrote about as a real success for  
your husband. You said it was good on balance for New York and America in 2004, and  
now you’re in Ohio and your words are much different, Senator. The record is very clear. 
 Sen. Clinton: Well, I—I—you don’t have all the record because you can go back and  
look at what I’ve said consistently… (“The Democratic Debate in Cleveland,” 2008,  
para. 95-105). 
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After Clinton stressed the differences between her plans for NAFTA and Obama’s for several 
paragraphs, Russert asked for clarification yet again: “But let me button this up. Absent the 
change that you’re suggesting, you are willing to opt out of NAFTA in six months?” To which 
Clinton immediately replied, “I’m confident that as president, when I say we will opt out unless 
we renegotiate, we will be able to renegotiate” (“The Democratic Debate in Cleveland,” 2008, 
para. 110-111). In essence, Russert’s behavior indicates someone who clearly did not trust the 
answers he was receiving, implying for the viewer that perhaps there was some reason for doubt 
(like a lack of sincerity, integrity, etc.). It also, in a basic form, demonstrated the sexism that 
often permeates political races involving women, in that women are often interrupted much more 
than their male rivals. 
 Russert continued his strategy of interrupting Clinton several other times during the 
debates, only rarely doing the same to Obama. And, as if taking a cue from his colleague, Brian 
Williams began doing the same thing later in this debate, as the following excerpt demonstrates: 
 Mr. Williams: And Senator, I need to reserve –  
 Sen. Clinton: Well, but I have -- I just have to add –  
 Mr. Williams: I'm sorry, Senator, I've got to –  
 Sen. Clinton: Now wait a minute, I have to add –  
 Mr. Williams: I've got to get us to a break because television doesn't stop.  
 Sen. Clinton: -- because the question -- the question was about invading -- invading -- Iraq. 
Mr. Williams: Can you hold that thought until we come back from a break? We have 
limited commercial interruptions tonight, and we have to get to one of them now. 
It should be noted that when the debate returned from break, Brian Williams never returned to 
Clinton for an answer, and instead, asked Obama a new question instead. 
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 Russert continued to question Clinton on numerous topics, including her unwillingness to 
release her tax returns and in testing her knowledge about the identity of the newly elected  
President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, and in a manner that was largely uncommon of his 
fellow moderators during the primary debates. When the questioning turned to the economy, 
Russert asked a lengthy question, implicitly arguing against Clinton’s previous campaign 
promises: 
 Senator Clinton, on the issue of jobs, I watched you the other day with your economic  
 blueprint in Wisconsin saying, this is my plan; hold me accountable. And I've had a chance  
 to read it very carefully. It does say that you pledge to create 5 million new jobs over 10  
 years. And I was reminded of your campaign in 2000 in Buffalo, my hometown, just three  
 hours down Route 90, where you pledged 200,000 new jobs for upstate New York. There's  
 been a net loss of 30,000 jobs. And when you were asked about your pledge, your  
 commitment, you told The Buffalo News, ‘I might have been a little exuberant.’ Tonight  
 will you say that the pledge of 5 million jobs might be a little exuberant? (“The Democratic  
 Debate in Cleveland,” 2008, para. 121-122). 
Clinton recovered from the seemingly hostile question effectively, using the opportunity to 
blame George Bush and his policies as an excuse for her miscalculation, but the tone of the 
question seemed to smack of bias, especially when comparing Russert’s questions to Obama that 
were not nearly as overt in skepticism and malignancy. Regardless, the negative tone with which 
Russert spoke to Clinton, again, reaffirmed the skepticism that many voters already had in terms 
of Clinton’s reputation. After all, if Clinton was a power-hungry woman who would stop at 
nothing to realize her political ambitions, then Russert was right to approach her with this level 
of hostility. And because of Russert’s approach, Clinton was left with little to do but weather the 
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storm and recover as much as possible through her own use of rhetoric. In other words, instead 
of Clinton being able to provide counter examples to disprove this constraint and establish her 
warmth, she had to spend more time recovering from these examples of poor moderator behavior 
during the debates. As such, Clinton was never really able to recover form this particular 
constraint, and the perception that she was largely lacking warmth, integrity, and femininity 
continued.  
 Clinton’s rhetoric and treatment by the moderators during the debate was a trial by fire 
that she, or any other candidate running for high elective office, had to go through.  After all, 
political candidates, especially women, have to demonstrate that they are “tough enough” to 
assume the office they seek. Since Clinton was a woman running for the most masculine of 
elected offices in our country, it showed a sign of weakness when she argued against the unequal 
treatment she was shown in the debates (as if, as a woman, she would have required special help 
to establish equal footing among her male rivals), and her complaints diminished her standing 
among some of her audience members (as seen when audience members would “boo” when she 
dared to comment about such issues). At the same time, her abject lack of response to such 
sexism, and her unwillingness to overtly challenge the ideology that she was not caring, warm, 
nurturing, or feminine also cost her in terms of the perceptions of audience members. It is clear, 
from the number of references in her speech and debate transcripts that Clinton sought to address 
this particular constraint, but did so in a way that was at times contradictory, and thus, never 
seemed authentic. Compounding this constraint were the rhetorical skills of Obama, who rarely 
engaged in this aspect of the debate about Clinton’s reputation, even when baited into doing so 
by the debate moderators. Indeed, while Obama would rarely harp on this specific constraint 
faced by Clinton, evidenced by his minimal comments on the subject in the previous discussion 
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of Clinton’s reputation, his rhetorical abilities, and the strategies used by himself and members of 
his campaign proved, in and of themselves, to comprise another one of Clinton’s major rhetorical 
constraints during her campaign. 
Obama’s Campaign Strategies as Constraints for Clinton’s Rhetoric 
 Even before Clinton announced her candidacy, Barack Obama’s campaign strategies 
posed a set of definable constraints for Clinton’s rhetoric. On one hand, this was to be expected, 
as Obama was Clinton’s chief rival for, and eventually the winner of, the Democratic Party’s 
nomination for president. On the other hand, the nuanced ways in which Obama’s campaign 
served as a rhetorical spoiler for Clinton’s chances deserves specific scrutiny. Specifically, 
Obama’s strategies provided Clinton with several logistical constraints during the campaign, 
complicated her promise of change versus Obama’s (causing her to alter her rhetoric mid-
stream), and resulted in a campaign that went far longer than any Democrat believed possible or 
wanted to occur. 
 Logistically, Obama’s strategies complicated Clinton’s rhetoric before she even made the 
announcement that she was running. Nagourney (2006) reported, late in 2006, “Senator Barack 
Obama’s announcement that he might run for president is altering the early dynamics of the 2008 
Democratic nominating contest. The move has created complications for Senator Hillary 
Rodham Clinton as she steps up her own preparations and is posing a threat to lesser-known 
Democrats trying to position themselves as alternatives to Mrs. Clinton…” (para. 1). Indeed, 
Clinton had sought to delay her official entry into the race until later in 2007, “and focus instead 
on notching accomplishments as a prominent member of the new Democratic majority in the 
Senate” (Healy & Nagourney, 2007, para. 15-16). Alas, because Obama, who was not well-
known outside for Illinois for anything other than a stirring 2004 Democratic keynote address, 
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had announced his possible foray into the presidential race, Clinton had to adjust her plans 
accordingly. 
 Another logistical issue demanding a rhetorical response from Clinton was caused by the 
public perception regarding Obama’s wins and Clinton’s losses during the campaign. On the 
ground in Iowa, the first primary battleground, and in the aftermath of Obama’s win here, the 
perception dominating news sources was that Clinton’s campaign was floundering while 
Obama’s was gaining steam. Several stories reported that Clinton was shaking up her campaign 
staff—firing top officials and replacing them with individuals who may have more luck 
combating Obama’s tactics (“Clinton overhauls, but,” 2007; Kornblut, 2007). In essence, 
Obama’s success in Iowa dominated news stories and compelled Clinton to constantly regroup. 
In terms of advertising, Nagourney and Healy (2007) reported, “Mrs. Clinton spent much of the 
early part of [2007] working huge rallies in the state’s major news media markets in the belief 
that the coverage would reverberate into the more sparsely populated areas. But that is not the 
way things work in Iowa” (para. 22). Indeed, Clinton’s strategies in caucus states in general were 
rightly judged by news reporters as far behind those of Obama’s, and reminded readers of 
Clinton’s lack of personal connection with voters. Iowa governor Tom Vilsack was reported in 
The Washington Post as saying, “‘a caucus is so labor-intensive…It’s so relationship-oriented’” 
(Kornblut & Balz, 2007, para. 15). And in Iowa specifically, Clinton’s experience as a 
campaigner and former First Lady served her little. Kornblut (2007) reminded us, “From the 
outset, Clinton faced an uphill fight in Iowa, a state in which her husband was never forced to 
develop an infrastructure in his two runs for the White House. But in this campaign, her rivals 
moved quickly to assemble teams of veteran operatives. Still, her initial strategy did not push 
special emphasis on the caucuses, treating them as part of a national campaign” (para. 13-14). 
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Thus, since caucuses tend to focus attention on the persuasive abilities of candidates on a 
personal, one-on-one level—a level which Obama seemed much more apt to handle effectively 
while Clinton floundered because of her negative reputation—Obama’s strategy of focusing 
attention on these contests proved to be a constant constraint for the Clinton campaign. 
 Indeed, the campaign and caucuses in Iowa proved the veracity of this element of the 
Obama constraint for Clinton in detail. In late 2007 Obama’s efforts in Iowa were resonating 
well among voters and Clinton’s were not. As such, one of Clinton’s deputy directors, Mike 
Henry, circulated a memo at that time suggesting that Clinton skip the caucuses in Iowa 
altogether; an idea that offended many Iowans, and caused Clinton’s campaign to publicly 
recommit to seeing Iowa through (“Clinton overhauls, but,” 2007; Kornblut, 2007). Clinton, 
thus, became mired in a no-win situation; her campaign knew they would likely not be 
competitive in the state, but they felt compelled to remain given the negative implications for 
Clinton’s future successes if Obama went into New Hampshire with a win in Iowa (Healy, 
2007d; 2008a; Steinberg & Elder, 2008).  
 Clinton’s performance in Iowa, and the complications raised by her campaign’s decision 
to concentrate on primary states out of a belief that she would wrap up the nomination by Super 
Tuesday on February 5th and Obama’s almost total success with caucuses, was, in large part, a 
key ingredient of Clinton’s political demise. Lawrence (2008b) asked and answered this most 
obvious question in an article for the USA Today: “Why doesn’t Clinton win caucuses? Clinton 
and her allies point to the nature of a caucus. Blue-collar shift workers, they say, don’t have the 
time or flexibility to show up at a certain time and stay for a couple of hours. If you’re out of 
town, you’re out of luck. Ditto if you can’t get a babysitter. Political analysts say passion and 
organization are key to caucuses wins, and Obama has them in greater measure” (para. 2-4). 
  209 
Analyses among news reporters, such as these examples represent, indicate not only the 
logistical struggles with the caucuses that plagued Clinton, but also the likability issues she 
faced, as analyzed in the previous section. Clinton was not widely perceived as likable, and 
clearly, likability was a key factor in winning caucuses.  
 Another logistical complication for Clinton created by Obama’s campaign is a bit less 
definable, though palpable for much of the later primary season: the news medias’ preference for 
Obama over Clinton. Steinberg and Elder (2008) argue, “…the polls only tell part of the story of 
why reporters and news organizations like Newsweek, the Washington Post and MSNBC, among 
others, led their viewers and readers to believe Mr. Obama was on the verge of an easy victory in 
New Hampshire. ‘I think the press for a variety of reasons has strong favorites in each of these 
two races…they strongly favor Senator Obama’” (para. 5-6). This perception is given more 
weight considering the previously articulated analysis of Clinton’s treatment by Tim Russert and 
Brian Williams. Obama was, at least perceptually favored over Clinton, and this specific 
constraint may have affected the decisions of voters. Duerst-Lahti (2006) wisely noted, “…what 
the press assumed, and the way it frames its coverage…has consequences for what readers think 
about, and to a lesser extent, how they think about it” (p. 12-13). Combine this sentiment with 
Braden’s (1996) assertion that women “struggle to receive…legitimacy in the eyes of the media 
and, subsequently, the public,” and the implications for Clinton’s campaign become clear. As 
Obama was seemingly more ‘popular’ among reporters, so to could he have been deemed more 
popular among voters.  
 Obama’s strategies also complicated Clinton’s overall rhetorical message as the senator 
from Illinois grasped tightly to more inclusive pronouns to describe his initiatives and policies, a 
stark contrast to Clinton’s language on the trail. Leibovich (2007) reported, “Mrs. 
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Clinton…speaks further from her audience than Mr. Obama, but also spends more time gripping, 
grinning, and posing afterward. Mrs. Clinton has a tendency to use the ‘when I’m president’ 
construction, as opposed to ‘if I’m elected.’ She prefers the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘me,’ whereas Mr. 
Obama is more prone to use ‘we’ and ‘us’…” (para. 16). In essence, when we apply the previous 
scholarship regarding gender roles and the conventional language forms used by men and 
women, it was as if Obama rather than Clinton was speaking as a woman, complicating Clinton’s 
desired perception that she was warm, feminine, and cooperative in her approach to politics (the 
constraint previously analyzed in section two of this chapter).  
 Similarly, Obama’s campaign rhetoric and strategies also plagued Clinton as the race 
went on past the initial contests. Both camps, as they picked up delegates, attempted to spin the 
outcomes of primaries in their favor. And as evident from news sources, at this stage of the 
election (the week after Super Tuesday), Obama was winning the perception race. “Clinton and 
Obama are ‘inching along’ on delegates, says Jean Jessburg, a former Iowa party official who 
directed this year’s Nevada caucuses, ‘ but the perception is that [Obama] is sweeping the 
country’” (Lawrence, 2008c, para. 5). Adding fuel to the perceptual fire, this same article went 
on to note that Clinton had been outspent by Obama. Other news stories told a similar tale; Balz 
and Craig (2008) reported, “Obama’s winning streak, his large margins and the prospect of more 
victories next week put Clinton in a tenuous position, despite the close delegate competition” 
(para. 9). Lawrence (2008a) reported the race in a similar way in February, stating, “Illinois 
Senator Barack Obama swept the contests on record fundraising, heavy advertising and a parade 
of celebrity endorsements, wiping out double-digit polling leads long held by his famous rival, 
former first lady and New York Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton” (para. 2).  
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 Taking advantage of stories like these in various national news sources after Super 
Tuesday, Obama’s campaign strategist was reported in the USA Today stating, “Obama is ‘well-
organized’ for other February contests, including Maryland and Virginia next week” (Lawrence, 
2008a, para. 16). This same article went on to comment on the Clinton campaign response 
strategy at the time, noting “Clinton advisers took an even longer view, citing opportunities in 
Texas and Ohio (March 4), in Pennsylvania (April 22), and even at the national convention” 
(para. 16). Thus, perceptually, the message throughout the earlier contests was clear, despite the 
narrow gap between the two candidates—Obama was far ahead, and Clinton was scrambling to 
stay afloat. 
 Finally, one word, common to Obama’s rhetoric, spelled out myriad problems for 
Clinton’s rhetorical response during the primary: change. As the analysis in Chapter Four 
indicates, Clinton directed a large part of her rhetorical efforts toward convincing voters that 
George Bush’s failed leadership was a central problem that she could rectify as an antidote—a 
change from the current direction our country was headed. But Barack Obama and his campaign 
advisors were obviously keen to Clinton’s strategy and adopted the campaign theme of “Change” 
for their own purposes as a tool to defeat Clinton.  
 News reports indicating Obama’s proficiency with using this central theme of change 
proliferated from the beginning of the campaign, stressing Obama’s adeptness with defeating 
Clinton at, what was at the time, her own game. A New York Times report from late 2006 
clarified this idea before either of the candidates had even launched their campaigns: 
 In Mr. Obama, Democrats have a prospective candidate who both underlines and  
compensates for the potential weaknesses that worry many Democrats about Mrs.  
Clinton. He is fervent opponent of the war in Iraq, and Democrats see him as an  
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exceedingly warm campaigner with a compelling personality and a striking ability to  
command a crowd. He has no known major political baggage…And Mr. Obama can even  
match Mrs. Clinton’s arresting political storyline if he tries to become the nation’s first  
black president as she seeks to become its first female president (Nagourney, 2006, para.  
6-7). 
Nagourney continued in the same article to quote Obama as he foreshadowed a central rhetorical 
theme of his campaign and a vital constraint of Clinton’s rhetoric on the trail: 
 …one of his central messages is that he is something Mrs. Clinton is not: a late baby  
boomer…and a fresh face that rises above old partisan grudges. Mr. Obama has already  
provided some hints of how he would position himself against Mrs. Clinton, suggesting  
that he would link her to her husband’s presidency and their role in the intense  
partisanship that marked much of the 1990s and that carried over into the Bush  
presidency…Asked whether he detected a void in the Democratic presidential field, Mr.  
Obama replied that he sensed a mood of ‘Do we want to get beyond the slash-and-burn,  
highly ideological politics that bogged us down over the last several decades?’  
(Nagourney, 2006, para. 13-15). 
Indeed, Obama continued this line of attack against Clinton throughout the presidential 
primary, and used the negative perception of Clinton’s reputation previously analyzed to 
articulate the resonant, central ideal behind his candidacy: Change. For instance, during the first 
debate against just Clinton before the pivotal Ohio and Texas contests, Obama summed up this 
argument clearly: “I don’t think the choice is between black and white or it’s about gender or 
religion. I don’t think it’s about young or old. I think what is at stake right now is whether we are 
looking backwards or we are looking forwards. I think it is the past versus the future” 
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(“Transcript of Thursday’s,” 2008, para. 16). Here, Obama attempted (successfully) to establish 
his own paradigm for voters with which to view the campaign and the candidates themselves—a 
strategy that required a direct rhetorical response from Clinton if she wished to challenge 
Obama’s assertions and win the votes of those who viewed her as a Washington elite and thus, 
an inauthentic agent of change.    
Obama’s campaign strategies added one final, significant constraint as Obama’s 
candidacy drew more and more support and Clinton’s waned; the need to end the race as early as 
possible and establish a solid candidate who could compete in November against Republican 
presidential nominee, John McCain. This aspect of the Obama constraint resonated widely in 
mass media news sources as a key issue requiring Clinton’s response. The campaign dragged on 
months longer than anticipated, and the Clinton campaign suffered more than Obama’s (in terms 
of key staffers being hired and fired, super delegates pledging more and more support to Obama 
and shifting allegiances from Clinton to Obama, and Clinton’s monetary support diminishing as 
the race went on) (Balz, et al., 2008; Kornblut & Shear, 2008; Weisman, 2008). Each time 
Clinton would score a major victory, Obama would win his own, or win enough of the popular 
support within various contests to keep the margin of victory close (“For Clinton, a lively,” 
2008; “Super Tuesday voters,” 2008). Thus, the perceptual support Obama enjoyed made the 
delegate race seem much less close than it actually was. After Super Tuesday, “Democratic 
strategist Geoffrey Garin…called Obama ‘a speeding freight train’…” while he noted that 
Clinton “badly needed victories ‘to recharge her campaign financially, [and] to recharge her 
campaign emotionally’” (Lawrence, 2008a, para. 6). At the same time, David Damore, a political 
scientist at the University of Nevada-Las Vegas argued, “‘The longer this goes on, the better it is 
for Obama…Every time he wins, people take him more seriously’” (Lawrence, 2008a, para. 18-
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19). In essence, these stories perpetuated the belief that Obama had the momentum and Clinton 
did not, despite her ability to win primaries and convince super delegates to continue to support 
her nomination well past Super Tuesday.  
As the analysis of major news stories about the campaign indicates, Obama’s strategies 
served as a significant constraint within Clinton’s rhetorical situation. Though both candidates 
initially used somewhat similar rhetorical mantras, Obama’s performances were perceived as far 
more credible or authentic, probably due to the manner in which Clinton crafted her rhetoric to 
address the previously articulated constraints regarding her presentation of experience sufficient 
to lead and the negative perception of her reputation. As such, one would have expected Hillary 
Clinton to feature a discussion and refutation of the issues posed by Obama’s strategies in her 
key speeches and debate performances. However, as the analysis indicates, Clinton’s rhetoric 
was more often than not indirect and thus, ineffectual in bypassing this specific constraint. 
Obama’s Strategies as Constraint in Clinton’s Speeches 
In her key campaign speeches, Clinton was largely hesitant to acknowledge the 
constraints that Obama’s campaign strategies caused during her quest for the presidency, only 
talking about such strains indirectly or by lumping Obama in, discursively, with her other 
opponents. After her third place finish in Iowa, Clinton seemed to be in damage control mode, if 
not outright denial, asserting, “we’re going to take this enthusiasm and go right to New 
Hampshire tonight” (Clinton, 2008a, para. 1). She continued this rhetorical damage control, 
asserting, “I am as ready as I can be after having had this incredible experience here in Iowa” 
(para. 4). More directly attempting to diminish Obama’s and Edward’s victories over her in the 
caucuses, she added, “We have always planned to run a national campaign all the way through 
the early contests” (para. 6). Clinton then proceeded to explain, perhaps, why she did not do as 
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well as she would have liked, again pointing out key logistical issues: “There were a lot of 
people who couldn’t caucus tonight despite the very large turnout. There are a lot of Iowans who 
are in the military…There are a lot of people who work at night…” (para. 15-16). The obvious 
assertion missing is that, had all of these caucus goers been able to vote, or caucus, they would 
have voted, naturally, for Clinton. In considering some of the scholarship from Chapter One, this 
rhetorical response to losing in caucuses was unwise for Clinton. It smacked of blaming others 
for mistakes rather than taking responsibility, and seemed to remind voters of the spin common 
to ‘typical’ politicians—aspects of Clinton’s rhetoric which seem much more masculine rather 
than feminine in nature (Beck, 2001; Epstein, et al., 1998).  
Clinton’s response to Obama’s assertion that he more than she represented change was 
varied. As reported in various newspapers, she attempted to adopt the same rhetorical strategy as 
she attempted to embody change in Iowa. Milbank (2007) recounted many of her attempts at 
sloganeering in Iowa, such as ‘Ready for Change, Ready to Lead,’ and ‘Working for Change, 
Working for You,’ but also noted that such slogans were among many different attempts to lure 
voters, including ‘Big Challenges, Real Solutions,’ ‘Time to Pick a President,’ ‘The Hillary I 
Know,’ ‘Every County Counts,’ and ‘I’ve Switched to Hillary’ (para. 4-5). Because of the mass 
of slogans, Milbank concluded, “these days, it sounds as if a mad, computerized sloganator has 
taken over [Clinton’s] campaign headquarters” (para. 4-5). Milbank also added, as many others 
recognized during the same point in the campaign, that “Obama has been cautious about slogan 
proliferation,” instead choosing to focus his rhetorical efforts on the singular theme of ‘change,’ 
with only a few alterations (para. 7). This was wise, especially considering the polling numbers 
that indicated the appeal of change. Leibovich (2007) reported that, at the time, a poll targeting 
the female voting bloc indicated they were motivated by Clinton’s candidacy, “but more driven 
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by a desire to bring about change—which would appear to mesh with the Obama message” 
(para. 21). Thus, because Obama targeted his rhetoric more specifically around change, and 
Clinton used this moniker in conjunction with many others, it seemed to perceptually ring more 
true for Obama. 
 Clinton’s strategy when Obama had targeted the theme of change was obvious—she had 
to develop her own rhetorical response to Obama’s mantra of change. When her attempts fell 
flat, she then changed her strategy to instead decry Obama’s claims of change with negative 
campaigning. Leibovich (2007) argued: 
 [Clinton] rarely names her chief political competitors for the Democratic presidential  
nomination, but their presence looms. ‘Some people think you can hope for change,’ she 
said at one recent event, in a jab at Senator Barack Obama of Illinois. ‘Some people think 
you can just demand it,’ she added, in a swipe at former Senator John Edwards of North 
Carolina. ‘I think you do it by working really, really hard,’ she said, before going on to 
catalog her résumé (para. 2-3).  
And while Clinton’s strategy of co-opting the ‘change’ mantra did seem to resonate early on in 
national polls, the story was much different on the ground in the early contests. As Kornblut and 
Cohen (2007) reported, “Nationally, Clinton is viewed as a candidate of change, with support 
from 41 percent of Democrats seeking a new direction in a recent Post-ABC poll. But in Iowa, 
Obama dominates the ‘change’ vote, winning 43 percent of that group, compared with 25 percent 
for Edwards and 17 percent for Clinton” (para. 7).  
And in reality, given Clinton’s lack of focused rhetoric early on in the campaign, it is no 
wonder why Clinton’s attempts to perpetuate herself as a change agent failed. Healy (2007d) 
argued, “Other times it was Hillary-as-change-agent; still other times it was, I’m a known 
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quantity, I’d be a steady hand on the ship of state” (para. 8). While Obama would talk one-on-
one with voters, shaking hands and invigorating crowds at his events in Iowa, “Mrs. Clinton’s 
events [were] meticulously planned and orderly, and even regal at times” (Leibovich, 2007, para. 
15). Clinton’s strength was never going to be, as articulated in the previous section of this 
chapter, her likability, nor her ability to argue that she was, indeed, an unknown X-factor, able to 
lead the country in a new direction never traversed. Indeed, her rhetorical strength was going to 
be in, ideally, relying on her experience and expertise against a lesser-experienced Obama. But 
Clinton persisted in trying to have her cake and eat it too, rhetorically—drawing on both 
narratives of established leadership and change agent, and thus, her strategy, caused by this 
specific constraint, fell flat. Page and Lawrence (2008) summed up this particular setback for 
Clinton’s rhetoric in Iowa succinctly: “Iowans chose Obama’s message of ‘turning the page’ to a 
new kind of politics over Clinton’s assurances that she had the strongest experience” (para. 16). 
 When Clinton’s attempt to co-opt the idea of change did fall flat on voters in Iowa, the 
Clinton campaign responded to this specific rhetorical complaint, according to news reports, by 
“stepping up their criticism of Obama and…[drawing] distinctions between [Clinton’s] level of 
experience and electability and his” (Kornblut, 2007, para. 12). These same advisers would go 
on, later in the campaign, to argue, “‘We’re in the solutions business and [Obama’s] in the 
promises business’” (Balz & Craig, 2008, para. 16).  
 Clinton’s attempt to derail Obama’s mantra of change seemed deeply flawed rhetorically, 
and his campaign seemed to understand this. Obama, after Super Tuesday, was quoted in The 
Washington Post as saying, “‘Today, the change we seek swept through…At this moment, the 
cynics can no longer say our hope is false’” (Balz & Craig, 2008, para. 5). Among the cynical 
critics, was, of course, Hillary Clinton, and Obama’s characterization was apt. By adopting the 
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rhetorical strategy she did, Clinton was attempting to counter ‘change’ by raising doubts in the 
mind of voters—for all intents and purposes, by killing the hope that we can change our country. 
When campaigning to win hearts and minds, this does not seem to ring as a promising strategy. 
In a statement that perhaps summed up the public outcry against such a rhetorical strategy 
embodied by Clinton’s struggle against Obama’s ‘change’ ideology, Filmmaker Michael Moore 
was featured in the USA Today endorsing Obama’s bid, and lambasting the negativity of 
Clinton’s campaign. He stated, “‘what’s going on is bigger than [Obama] at this point…and 
that’s a good thing for this country’” (Memmott & Page, 2008, para. 11-12). In essence, 
Clinton’s attempt to defeat the surge desiring change was simply seen as evidence that she was 
part of a general malaise discussed by historian Matthew Dallek. Dallek argued, “‘You would 
think that post-9/11, there would be this almost World War II idea of the federal government as 
functional and wise, protecting us with its focus on the greatest threats. But people still have that 
general anti-Washington feeling, and the sense that Washington still doesn’t work’” (in Lizza, 
2007, para. 8).  
Clinton, of course, still attempted to use the ‘change’ mantra to a degree, among many 
different strategies, but the Obama campaign was unwilling to drop this ideology that had carried 
it to so many victories during the primary. Nagourney (2008) demonstrated this tenacity among 
both campaigns clearly: “Hillary Rodham Clinton took the stage for one of her last rallies here 
Monday night in front of a battery of signs declaring, ‘Ready for Change.’ Mr. Obama stood at a 
lectern that read, ‘Change We Can Believe In’” (para. 9). The wording of these signs was 
significant, rhetorically, and sums up the inherent struggles between the two candidates’ use of 
the mantra of change. Obama’s use of change was perceived as authentic, while Clinton’s was 
not. Considering the previous sections of this chapter, the reasons why become clear. Clinton had 
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a special, extraordinary obligation, as a woman running for president, to establish her experience 
and qualifications. And when she did, even though she somewhat relied on her past feminine role 
as First Lady to do so, she established herself as a part of the Washington in-crowd. As such, 
Obama’s claim of change was much more believable than Clinton’s. Additionally, as 
demonstrated in section two of this chapter, Clinton was perceived as the much less likable of the 
two candidates—specifically, she was seen as too private, lacking openness, and lacking warmth. 
Obama on the other hand was so likable, so charismatic, that he inspired a ‘movement.’ As such, 
though electing a woman as president certainly would indicate that the country was ‘ready for 
change,’ electing Obama was perceived by some voters (as indicated previously in Chapter 
Three) as a more authentic route to accomplish ‘change we can believe in.’  
Another way in which Clinton indirectly responded to the constraints posed by Obama’s 
strategies—specifically, the length of the campaign caused by Obama’s success—was by 
asserting that the race was always believed to be one that must be hard-fought. Clinton, after the 
Iowa caucuses, asserted, “We have a long way to go but I am confident and optimistic, both 
about the campaign but maybe more importantly about our country. This country deserves 
everything we can give to it” (Clinton, 2008a, para. 14). She continued in the same speech, 
stating, “Thank you all so very much…for understanding that this great democracy of ours 
deserves to have all of our best efforts and I promise you, this campaign that I am running will 
certainly have mine and I ask for yours as well” (para. 20). After winning the New Hampshire 
primary, Clinton continued this same theme, stating, “We know that for the promise of America 
to be real, we are called upon to deliver on that promise. And if you join in this call to greatness, 
we will, together, answer. So tomorrow we’re going to get up, roll up our sleeves and keep 
going” (Clinton, 2008b, para. 9). Clinton’s responses here indicate the toughness and 
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determination she tried to establish in accentuating her experience and credibility. This rhetoric 
also defies the stereotypical weakness that some voters may associate with a female candidate, 
and thus, may have helped Clinton rally voters for as long as she did on the campaign trail. Still, 
by only indirectly addressing the constraints posed by Obama’s strategies, she missed out on an 
opportunity to counteract the Obama ‘movement’ that was, at this time during the campaign, 
beginning to develop momentum.  
A final way in which Clinton indirectly acknowledged the constraints posed by Obama’s 
strategies in her campaign speeches was in posing rhetorical counter-attacks against Obama’s 
penchant for speech-making versus Clinton’s abilities to make changes possible through action. 
She interacted with her audience in Iowa before the caucuses, asking, “Who is ready and able to 
make the changes we need starting on day one in the White House?” (Clinton, 2007b, para. 19). 
After the crowd responded with a resounding ‘You are,’ Clinton continued: “Well, some people 
believe you make change by demanding it. Some people believe you make change by hoping for 
it. I believe you make change by working hard for it. That’s what I’ve done all my life and that is 
what I will do for you” (para. 21). After Clinton failed to win the Iowa caucuses, though Clinton 
still attempted to perpetuate this claim, attempting to recapture Obama’s momentum, by 
contending: “What is most important now is that as we go on with this contest that we must keep 
focused on the two big issues, that we answer correctly the question that each of us has posed: 
How will we win in November 2008 by nominating a candidate who will be able to go the 
distance and who will be the best president on day one? I am ready for that contest” (Clinton, 
2008a, para. 5). Again, Clinton’s rhetoric here reflected a candidate who was in denial. Though 
she was surely able to capitalize on her win in New Hampshire, she seemed after this win to rest 
on her laurels (rhetorically) by never again addressing the specific constraints posed by Obama’s 
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campaign. This could be interpreted as a wise way to deal with the “Obamabots,” in that Clinton 
could have been enacting the masculine idea of ‘never letting your opponents see you sweat.’ 
However, in addressing the entirety of the rhetorical situation during the campaign, it becomes 
clear that this is not the best interpretation of events. In much the same was as the analysis in 
Chapters Three and Four indicated was almost a definable trend for Clinton, she seemed to be 
simply unaware or at least unwilling to acknowledge the realities of her rhetorical situation when 
she had complete control over the substance of her message. As such, Clinton’s key campaign 
speeches did not aid her in arresting the social movement-like momentum that Obama’s 
campaign came to represent. 
Obama’s Strategies as Constraint in Clinton’s Debate Performances 
In contrast to the indirect approach with which Clinton approached this constraint in her 
key speeches, Clinton used her debate performances to more directly express her displeasure 
with some of Obama’s tactics, making careful choices to highlight those tactics that she no doubt 
believed would most hurt his candidacy. At the very beginning of the Cleveland debate, the first 
in which the two debated only each other, Clinton condemned Obama’s use of negative 
campaigning and the alleged mindset behind it. She asserted, “And in the last several days, some 
of those differences in tactics and the choices that Senator Obama’s campaign has made 
regarding flyers and mailers and other information that has been put out about my health care 
plan and my position on NAFTA have been disturbing to me” (“The Democratic Debate in 
Cleveland,” 2008, para. 5). She continued directly after this opening barrage, “it’s been 
unfortunate that Senator Obama has consistently said that I would force people to have health 
care whether they could afford it or not…my plan will cover everyone and it will be affordable. 
And on many occasions, independent experts have concluded that…So we should have a good 
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debate that uses accurate information, not false, misleading and discredited information…” (para. 
7-8). And while Clinton was certainly, as any politicians would be, justified in responding to 
such allegations and tactics, responding to Obama’s tactics in this way arguably mitigated her 
attempts to establish warmth and likability. And as the analysis in Chapter Three indicates, 
Clinton was rarely perceived positively when going negative with her campaign discourse. As 
such, responding to the constraints posed by Obama’s strategies in this way, while it attempted to 
demonstrate that Obama was also engaged in negative campaigning, likely did more harm than 
good in terms of voter perception. 
Later in the Cleveland debate, Clinton was once again forced to address Obama’s attacks 
on her Iraq vote. But when she was asked to respond, Clinton did her best to alter the premise of 
the argument—instead of defending her vote, she attacked Obama’s oratorical finesse and senate 
votes in much the same way she had during her speeches in Iowa: 
And every time the question about qualifications and credentials for commander in chief  
are raised, Senator Obama rightly points to the speech he gave in 2002 [wherein Obama 
argued against going to war]. He’s to be commended for having given that speech. Many 
people gave speeches against the war then, and the fair comparison is he didn’t have 
responsibility, he didn’t have to vote; by 2004 he was saying that he basically agreed with 
the way George Bush was conducting the war/ And when he came to the Senate, he and I 
have voted exactly the same (“The Democratic Debate in Cleveland,” 2008, para. 134).  
This was an apt strategy for Clinton, and one that she needed to do more often, since, as the 
analysis in Chapter Four indicates, Iraq was a key exigence during her campaign. However, 
because she failed to offer more rhetoric like this—discourse that not only turned the tables on 
the Iraq discussion but that also reminded voters that while Obama was the candidate of pretty 
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speeches she was the candidate of experience and action—the constraints posed by Obama’s 
strategies persisted until the end of the campaign in June.  
Indeed, Obama made several strategic moves that complicated the clarity and force of 
Clinton’s rhetoric during the key primary debates. For example, during the Cleveland debate, 
Obama countered Clinton’s claims of experience and once again used her Iraq vote against her 
when he stated, “I think everybody, the day after that vote was taken, understood this was a vote 
potentially to go to war…The reason that this is important, again, is that Senator Clinton, I think, 
fairly, has claimed that she’s got the experience on day one. And part of the argument that I’m 
making is that, it is important to be right on day one” (“Transcript of Thursday’s,” 2008, para. 
511-514). Obama also, during the Cleveland debate, made it a point to highlight the negative 
campaigning conducted by the Clinton campaign, causing a large part of this specific debate to 
be devoted to the constraints surrounding the campaign and less about the salient issues that both 
candidates championed. The Cleveland debate also offered Obama the opportunity to, once 
again, co-opt one of Clinton’s key rhetorical strategies of accentuating her experience. Obama 
argued, “Well, Senator Clinton I think equates experience with longevity in Washington. I don’t 
think the American people do and I don’t think that is you look at the judgments that we’ve made 
over the last several years that that’s the accurate measure… on the critical issues that actually 
matter I believe that my judgment has been sound and it has been judgment that I think has been 
superior to Senator Clinton’s as well as Senator McCain’s” (“The Democratic Debate in 
Cleveland,” 2008, para. 130-132). All of these ideas brought up in the debates by Obama served 
to counteract many of the tactics Clinton was using to establish her experience and warmth, 
demonstrating the scope of this particular constraint for Clinton’s rhetoric. 
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The analysis of news stories regarding this set of constraints indicates the force behind 
Obama’s strategies. However, neither Clinton nor Obama dedicated a large amount of time 
attending to these constraints. For Obama, this was tactical, as his lack of much discussion about 
these issues implied to the voting public that he was satisfied to allow such strategies and 
arguments stand on their own merit. For Clinton, this was damning as it was clear that Obama’s 
strategies compelled the perceptual momentum, no matter how many contests she won, to 
perpetually be in Obama’s favor. She needed to respond directly to the constraints posed by 
Obama’s strategies, but failed to do so sufficiently—either because of a lack of effective 
response or, more likely, because she was too busy rhetorically constructing her persona as an 
experienced leader or repairing her negative reputation to convince voters she was likeable and 
feminine. As the final section of this chapter indicates, Clinton may have had yet another 
constraint that distracted from her successful attention to Obama’s strategies on the trail—her 
husband and campaign surrogate, former President Bill Clinton. 
Bill Clinton as Constraint for Hillary Clinton’s Campaign 
 Like many of Hillary Clinton’s strategies, including Bill Clinton on the campaign trail 
had both positive and negative consequences. From the outset, Bill Clinton would seemingly 
have only added positively to the early energy that Hillary Clinton’s campaign possessed. He 
was, after all, a popular president, despite the chaotic later years of his administration, and he 
was able to draw as large a crowd on the trail as his wife, ensuring that thousands would be able 
to hear Hillary’s message. Additionally, the charismatic former president could have been useful 
in attracting grassroots support for Hillary, and could potentially have “[energized] the activists 
needed to win a caucus” (Kornblut & Balz, 2007, para. 13). Indeed, from the very beginning of 
his wife’s campaign, Bill Clinton often worked behind the scenes, courting citizen as well as 
  225 
super delegate votes, and providing his advice and expertise privately (Darman, 2007). However, 
Bill Clinton’s presidency was steeped in conflict and controversy, to say the least, and thus, his 
inclusion on the campaign trail was a risk. Baker (2008) asserted, “Clinton’s was a presidency 
often marked by turbulence, full of operatic twists and colorful characters. At times he was 
viewed as a transformative leader, at other times as a marginalized figure. His stumbles paved 
the way for Republicans to capture Congress for the first time in 40 years, yet he learned how to 
‘triangulate’ to get back on top” (para. 11).  
 As other scholars who have studied Hillary Clinton’s campaign have noted, including 
Bill in her campaign in any sort of feature role was not without negative consequences. First, 
such a move reminded voters of the key difference between Hillary Clinton and all other serious 
presidential aspirants who came before her: she was a woman campaigning to be what no other 
woman had ever been. Torrens (2009) argued that Bill Clinton’s presence on the trail conjured 
costly perceptions: “it [was] Clinton’s role as a wife that, for historical, cultural, and ideological 
reasons, prevented her success in the campaign…Hillary Clinton’s campaign stood no chance of 
success because of the discursively gendered nature of the presidency and because of her prior 
choices regarding her position as wife” (p. 29). Schnoebelen, et al. (2009) agreed, and asserted 
that Hillary Clinton’s tie to Bill Clinton was so palpable in the public, political sphere that it was 
impossible for Hillary to run on her own merits because of Bill Clinton’s presence on the trail 
and the negativity that their past and his actions engendered among voters. Kenner Muir and 
Taylor (2009) concurred that Bill Clinton’s influence on his wife’s presidential campaign was 
inescapable and as such highly constraining; they asserted, “As individuals, each Clinton has an 
ability to adapt and respond to various political situations and be highly successful in garnering 
public support. However, for a married team, the political influences and challenges take on a 
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vastly different dimension given the intersections of marriage, gender, and politics” (p. 69-70). 
As such, given the myriad issues that could and did develop based on the inclusion of her 
husband in Clinton’s campaign strategies, Bill Clinton and his actions represented a unique 
constraint in Hillary Clinton’s rhetorical situation on the campaign trail. 
 Still, it arguably made sense to include Bill Clinton on the campaign trail because of 
Hillary’s strategy of including her days as First Lady among her years of experience. This, 
however, allowed Obama and other candidates to deny Hillary Clinton’s rhetoric as a change 
agent, something the former president even admitted on the trail. Kornblut and Balz (2007) 
argued, “[Hillary] Clinton has begun emphasizing the message of change, as well—a challenge, 
given her increasing reliance on her husband’s record in the White House in the 1990s. The 
former president did not shy away from looking backward during their joint appearance Tuesday, 
acknowledging that people might look at him and his wife and think, ‘they’re old, and they’re 
sort of yesterday’s news’” (para. 6). Thus, perceptions like this—fostered by Bill Clinton 
himself—damaged Hillary’s attempts to respond to the constraints posed by Obama’s change 
message, and explicitly prompted voters to look backward, rather than forward to a brighter 
political forecast. 
 Also, adding Bill Clinton helped to perceptually add endurance to Hillary’s candidacy, 
especially after the aforementioned possibility of Clinton pulling her team out of Iowa to focus 
on later primaries. On this topic, Healy (2007d) argued, “Mrs. Clinton and her husband are born 
competitors; throwing elections is not in their D.N.A. When Mrs. Clinton announced her 
candidacy last January, she said she was ‘in it to win it.’ There is no reason to think that she and 
her team have changed their minds…” (para. 17). However, as acknowledged previously, Bill 
Clinton could have seemingly added little in terms of strategy in Iowa as he never competed here 
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personally, and this fact served as a source of frustration for Clinton’s campaign, as 
acknowledged in the New York Times by Nagourney and Healy (2007): “[In] Iowa, where Mrs. 
Clinton and her husband do not have the advantages of having run a primary campaign, as they 
have in New Hampshire, is a place that has appeared to frustrate the Clinton political operation 
from the day she arrived here. Bill Clinton never competed in Iowa caucuses; the state was 
effectively conceded to Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa in 1992, and Mr. Clinton was unopposed in 
1996” (para. 7).  
 There were reports from the trail that indicated that Bill Clinton did not always enjoy 
being the supportive spouse while his wife took center stage (Nagourney & Healy, 2007). “At a 
time of growing tension in Mrs. Clinton’s campaign [shortly before the Iowa caucuses], her aides 
described former President Bill Clinton as increasingly frustrated that his wife’s campaign has 
not fought back even more forcefully against efforts by Mr. Obama and former senator John 
Edwards to raise questions about Mrs. Clinton’s character. They said that Mr. Clinton has 
warned for weeks that they were taking a toll on his wife’s candidacy” (Nagourney & Healy, 
2007, para. 16). Indeed, when aides of Clinton were quoted in news sources, especially on a 
problem with the campaign, both Hillary and Bill Clinton’s views were often expressed, 
implying publicly that the former president was a more dominant figure in planning the 
campaign than may have been the case. An excerpt from one New York Times article reflects this 
impression concisely: “Mrs. Clinton is trying to steel herself against pessimism, but both she and 
Mr. Clinton are feeling disappointment, advisers say” (Healy, 2008b, para. 17). Reports like 
these severely hampered Hillary Clinton’s candidacy. On one hand, she was relegated, despite 
her own status as a U. S. Senator and successful campaigner, back to the role of partner on the 
trail, denying the individuality expected of men, and thus, successful presidential candidates 
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(Bower, 2003; Gilligan, 1993; Tolleson & Rinehart, 2001). It is difficult, after all, to establish 
yourself as an individualistic leader if you are constantly referred to as existing in a dyad. This 
becomes even more problematic when you are a woman attempting to embody the masculine 
individuation embodied by effective leaders generally and presidents specifically. 
 While Bill Clinton was responsible for some missteps early in the campaign, later in the 
campaign he would make outright gaffes that embarrassed his wife. After Hillary Clinton’s loss 
in Iowa, Bill Clinton’s presence became more prominent on the trail, working on the ground in 
Nevada and South Carolina particularly, attracting more and more media attention to his antics 
(Kornblut, 2009b). Bill Clinton attacked Obama before New Hampshire, calling his candidacy 
“the biggest fairy tale I’ve ever seen” (Dowd, 2008, para. 11). Similarly, Kornblut (2009b) noted 
that Bill Clinton was “widely chastised in the black community for discounting what Obama had 
accomplished…when [he] implied that Obama would win South Carolina for the same reason 
Jesse Jackson had, because of a large black electorate” (p. 71). Bill Clinton also was a constant 
reminder of the scandal that plagued his administration and thus, why some voters were hesitant 
to support Hillary. Kantor (2008b) reported, “[some voters remarked that they] admired Bill 
Clinton but would not vote for his wife because she stayed with her husband after the Monica 
Lewinsky scandal” (para. 18). Herein was another clear example of one double bind that plagues 
political women. If Hillary had left her husband after the Lewinsky scandal, she could have been 
perceived as a strong, independent woman, or as a woman who neglected the sacred bonds of 
matrimony. Either way, Clinton was trapped in a no-win situation. Bill Clinton, on the other 
hand, though he did suffer a decline in popularity during and immediately after the scandal, 
experienced no such double bind plaguing his political future and enjoyed, until the 2008 
campaign, a resurgence of popularity after his terms as president ended.  
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Other voters expressed similar negative views, but instead of focusing their ire on 
scandal, they mentioned other negatives from Bill Clinton’s administration that served as 
constraints to Hillary Clinton’s campaign. An editorial in the St. Petersburg Times summed up 
this perception among voters clearly: “…Now Clinton’s challenge is to inspire voters while 
defining her own vision for change…and having Bill Clinton and his old allies at her side makes 
that more difficult. For all the goodwill the former president has among many Democrats, his 
frustration and desperate attacks against Obama in New Hampshire recall the uglier, meaner side 
of the Clintons that this country does not need to revisit” (in “Did ‘near-tear’,” 2008, para. 5).  
Indeed, Bill Clinton’s presence on the campaign trail created a constraint that no other 
previous candidate, Democrat or otherwise, had ever had to face: the prospect of Hillary Clinton 
creating her own identity as a presidential contender while also having to deal with the legacy 
created by a spouse who had previously been the president. To demonstrate this concept, Baker 
(2008) wrote in The Washington Post, “…It seems more than a little bit about [Bill Clinton], too. 
As Hillary Rodham Clinton and Barrack Obama clash on multiple political fronts heading into 
Super Tuesday, William Jefferson Clinton’s record as president has emerged as a key 
battleground. How Democrats define his legacy could determine which presidential candidate 
they choose: Hillary Clinton, to extend it, or Obama, to make a clean break from it” (para. 3). 
The Clinton campaign staff knew that this was a risky endeavor; Bill Clinton would obviously 
want to defend his record and his successes, but in doing so would overshadow Hillary as a 
candidate and draw attention away from her own unique initiatives and plans. Baker (2008) 
continued, asserting that the campaign staff understood “that campaigns are about the future, not 
the past, and that Hillary Clinton needs to maintain her own identity. At the same time, they 
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anticipate that Republicans will take on the former president with full force should she win the 
nomination” (para. 22). 
Just as a number of scholars mentioned at the beginning of this section have already 
concluded was somewhat due to Bill’s presence on the trail, when Hillary Clinton’s campaign 
began to falter, political pundits began to openly connect her failures with his actions. Dowd 
(2008) provided evidence of Bill Clinton’s detriment to his wife’s campaign hopes:  
Bill Clinton, campaigning in Henniker on Monday, also played the poor-little-woman  
card in a less-than-flattering way. ‘I can’t make her younger, taller or change her gender,’  
he said. He was so low-energy at events that it sometimes seemed he was distancing  
himself from her. Now that she is done with New Hampshire, she may distance herself  
from him, realizing that seeing Bill so often reminds voters that they don’t want to go  
back to that whole megillah again (para. 20). 
Indeed, Bill Clinton’s presence on the trail was conceptualized by many, as retold through news 
sources, as “Clinton fatigue.” Leibovich (2008) wrote, “…the anger felt by the Clintons and that 
directed at them goes to what many see as deep fractures and unresolved tensions in the 
Democratic Party. ‘There is a lot of Clinton fatigue in the party and in the country today, and 
many people are reacting to that,’ said Tom Daschle, a former Democratic leader in the Senate, 
who is supporting Mr. Obama” (para. 12-13).  
 From this examination of major news stories and scholarship, Bill Clinton as a force on 
the campaign trail was arguably a potent constraint for Hillary Clinton’s rhetoric; however, there 
is little to no mention of Bill in any of Hillary’s key campaign speeches. Beyond thanking Bill, 
along with her mother, Chelsea Clinton, and any number of other personal friends, Bill Clinton’s 
name is used nowhere in any of her speeches analyzed in this study. Indeed, Clinton never 
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brought up her husband when she had complete control over her rhetoric. Why this was the case 
is anyone’s guess. Her campaign speeches, planned out and refined for eloquence and clarity in 
advance, were certainly sites wherein she could have discussed the constraints posed by her 
husband’s behavior on her own terms and clarified the issue for voters. On the other hand, if she 
had handled it poorly, Clinton’s campaign speeches addressing her ‘Bubba issues’ on the trail 
certainly could have backfired or perpetuated the perception that she was shackled, inescapably, 
to her husband. Indeed, the following analysis of Clinton’s debate performances wherein she 
addressed this constraint indicates a lack of comfort with this issue that could have explained the 
lack of response in her own speeches on the trail. 
Bill Clinton as Constraint in Hillary Clinton’s Debate Performances 
Clinton made implicit statements about her husband during a few of her key debate 
performances, but rarely named her husband specifically when she did so. In her first debate 
against only Obama in Cleveland, Clinton stated, responding to a question about tax cuts, “But 
Wolf, it’s really just important to underscore here that we will go back to the tax rates we had 
before George Bush became president. And my memory is, people did really well during that 
time period… (APPLAUSE)…And they will keep doing really well” (“Transcript of 
Thursday’s,” 2008, para. 203-205). Clinton adopted a similar strategy when she discussed the 
economy in her last debate against Obama in late April; Clinton claimed, “I wouldn’t raise 
[capital gains tax rates] above the 20 percent if I raised it at all. I would not raise it above what it 
was during the Clinton administration” (“Democratic Debate in Philadelphia,” 2008, para. 260). 
Later in this debate, she discussed Social Security and made a similar comment: “I am totally 
committed to making sure Social Security is solvent. If we had stayed on the path we were on at 
the end of my husband’s administration, we sure would be in a lot better position because we had 
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a plan to extend the life of the Social Security Trust Fund…” (para. 279). In all of these excerpts, 
Clinton’s strategy was clear: she was hearkening back to the days of her husband’s 
administration as a repudiation of the George W. Bush era in the White House. As the analysis in 
Chapter Four demonstrated, Clinton regularly featured Bush as a foil during the campaign, and 
as these specific excerpts make clear, her argument was, albeit indirectly, that she would return 
the country to the more palatable state of the Clinton era. Thus, while not using her husband 
directly in her discourse, Clinton was framing her policies to mirror those of her husband’s, and, 
at the same time, further entrenched her connection to her husband as a constraint during the 
campaign. 
 And while Clinton herself rarely addressed any of the problems that resulted when she 
included her husband in her campaign, she was unable to avoid this specific constraint in her 
debate performances because of both the moderators and her opponents. During the first South 
Carolina debate, wherein Clinton, Obama, and Edwards took part, Obama forced Hillary to 
address Bill Clinton’s role on the campaign trail. Obama argued, “The irony is that you provided 
much more fulsome praise of Ronald Reagan in a book by Tom Brokaw that’s being published 
right now, as did—as did Bill Clinton in the past” (“The Democratic Debate in South,” 2008, 
para. 135). Shortly after this line, Obama and Clinton had a telling exchange reflecting Hillary’s 
frustration with her ‘Bubba issues’ during the campaign: 
 Clinton:…You talked about Ronald Reagan being a transformative political leader. I did  
not mention his name. 
 Obama: Your husband did. 
 Clinton: Well, I’m here. He’s not. And… 
 Obama: Ok. Well, I can’t tell who I’m running against sometimes. 
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 (APPLAUSE) 
 Clinton: Well, you know, I think we both have very passionate and committed spouses  
who stand up for us. And I’m proud of that (para. 149-154). 
 Later in this same debate, we saw a glimpse of another common theme regarding Bill 
Clinton’s presence on the trail—specifically, the news media’s predilection for making Bill 
Clinton a subject regardless of the topic discussed. During this debate, reporter Susan Malveaux 
and Hillary Clinton shared an exchange that exemplified this trend cogently: 
 Malveaux: To Senator Clinton. In New Hampshire, you said you found your own voice,  
but increasingly there are people who believe that it’s your husband’s voice that has  
become too loud. Congressman Clyburn earlier said today, ‘I think he can afford to tone  
it down.’ Is there a risk that he is overshadowing your message and your voice? 
 Clinton: Well. I think that he is very much advocating on my behalf, and I appreciate  
that. He is a tremendous asset. And he feels very strongly about this country and what’s  
at stake and what our future should be. I believe that this campaign is not about our  
spouses. It is about us. It is about each of us individually. Michelle and Elizabeth are  
strong and staunch advocates for their husbands, and I respect that (“The Democratic  
Debate in South,” 2008, para. 589-592). 
As this exchange indicates, Clinton understood that her husband’s comments and actions on the 
trail had hindered her efforts. But her options, because she had included him in her campaign, 
and had developed aspects of her campaign platform heavily influenced by his presidency, were 
limited. This specific exchange, and Bill Clinton’s actions on the trail in general, clarifies 
Hillary’s double bind as a presidential candidate who was also a wife: she had to defend her 
husband because of their relationship as spouses, even though some may have preferred that she 
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had chastised him for his interference and misstatements. On the other hand, while some may 
have been satisfied by such an aggressive posture toward her husband on Clinton’s part, others 
who believe (as Tammy Wynette once advocated) a wife should ‘stand by her man’ would have 
seen this behavior as unfeminine and probably un-presidential. As such, and because Hillary’s 
image as unfeminine was already a considerable issue during the campaign, her rhetorical 
responses to this specific constraint had to be tailored in such a way to control the damage while 
remaining properly feminine. 
In her first debate against only Obama in Los Angeles just before Super Tuesday, Bill 
Clinton’s time as president was brought up by moderator Wolf Blitzer, but this time in a question 
for Obama: “Senator Obama…a lot of Democrats remember the eight years of the Clinton 
administration, a period of relative peace and prosperity, and they remember it fondly. Are they 
right? Should they be remembering those eight years with pleasure?” (“Transcript of 
Thursday’s,” 2008, para. 356-357). Obama’s response was interesting and very strategic. Obama 
clearly did not want to anger Democratic voters who did look on Bill Clinton’s administration 
fondly, but he also needed to progress his own interests in defeating Hillary Clinton. Thus, 
Obama responded, “Well, I think there’s no doubt that there were good things that happened 
during those eight years of the Clinton administration. I think that’s undeniable. Look we’re all 
Democrats…So I don’t want to diminish some of the accomplishments that occurred during 
those eight years, And I absolutely agree with Senator Clinton , that ultimately each of us have to 
be judged on our own merits” (para. 358-361). Obama’s response compelled Hillary Clinton, 
when she had the chance to respond, to somewhat counter one of the chief ways she was 
establishing her own experience and abilities—she had to distance herself from her husband’s 
administration. She conceded, “We start from the same place. Nobody has an advantage no 
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matter who you are or where you came from. You have to raise the money. You have to make 
the case for yourself. And I want to be judged on my own merits. I don’t want to be advantaged 
or disadvantages. I’m very proud of my husband’s administration” (para. 384-385).  Clinton then 
tried to recover, adding humorously, “And you know, it did take a Clinton to clean up after the 
first Bush and I think it might take another one to clean up after the second Bush” (para. 388). 
Clinton tried, in this instance, to make the best of a bad situation. However, by distancing herself 
from Bill Clinton and his administration, as Obama likely hoped she would have done, she also 
distanced herself from a prime source of her experience and qualifications for the presidency. As 
section one of this chapter demonstrates, Clinton utilized her years as First Lady to give herself a 
unique set of desirable qualifications that no other candidate possessed. She spoke of these 
qualities and activities often in both her speeches and debate performances. However, by the end 
of the campaign, she was forced to abdicate them.  
Later in this same debate, Hillary’s Clinton’s frustration with this issue once again 
bubbled to the surface after her husband was brought up by moderator Jeanne Cummings. The 
exchange is illuminating: 
Cummings: Well, since we’ve dealt with the kids, let’s deal with the spouses for a  
second. Senator Clinton… 
Clinton: He has a spouse, too. 
(LAUGHTER) 
Obama: Thankfully Michelle is not on stage. I’m sure she could tell some stories, as well. 
Cummings: Senator Clinton, your husband has set off several firestorms in the last few  
weeks in early primary states with the way he has criticized Senator Obama. Greg Craig,  
who was one of your husband’s top lawyers [claimed if the] campaign can’t control the  
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former president now, what will it be like when you’re in the White House? 
(LAUGHTER) 
Clinton: Well, one thing I think is fair to say, both Barack and I have very passionate  
spouses… 
Obama: We do, no doubt. 
Clinton: …who promote and defend us at every turn. You know, but the fact is that I’m  
running for president, and this is my campaign. 
(APPLAUSE) 
Clinton: And I have made it very clear that I want the campaign to stay focused on the  
issues that I’m concerned about, the kind of future that I want for our country, the work  
that I have done for all these years. And that is what the campaign is about. And of  
course, I’m thrilled to have my husband and my daughter, who is here tonight, you know,  
representing me and traveling the country… 
(APPLAUSE) 
Clinton: …speaking with people, but at the end of the day, it’s my name that is on the  
ballot, and it will be my responsibility as president and commander in chief, after 
consulting broadly with a lot of people who have something to contribute to difficult 
decisions, I will have to make the call. And I am fully prepared to do that (“Transcript of 
Thursday’s,” 2008, para. 538-554). 
During the Los Angeles debate, Clinton did well to redirect the issues away from her husband 
and the problems he had caused during her campaign and to her experience and the advantages 
of having a Clinton in the White House. But at such a crucial time during the campaign—less 
than a week before Super Tuesday—it seemed as if Bill Clinton was a key aspect of the 
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campaign that people cared about. Thus, though Clinton had sparks of well-crafted discourse to 
address this constraint, the very fact that it was a key issue during a pivotal part of the campaign 
in and of itself was a constraint. Moreover, it was a constraint that Clinton, though at times 
joking with the moderators while she addressed this issue, clearly was uncomfortable with this 
topic of debate.  
The trend of incorporating Bill Clinton into the debate subject matter continued 
throughout much of the campaign. During the Cleveland debate, Bill Clinton was brought up, 
this time by Obama, but in a more substantive way: to discredit Hillary Clinton’s policy 
initiatives. When debating universal health care, Obama argued, “Every expert has said that 
anybody who wants health care under my plan will be able to obtain it. President Clinton’s own 
secretary of Labor has said that my plan does more to reduce costs and as a consequence makes 
sure that the people who need health care right now all across Ohio, all across Texas, Rhode 
Island, Vermont, all across America, will be able to obtain it” (“The Democratic Debate in 
Cleveland,” 2008, para. 33). Thus, despite Hillary Clinton’s assurances that her campaign wasn’t 
about Bill, it clearly was. In considering the previous pages articulating the number of news 
sources about Bill Clinton, the number of times his activities were condemned by Hillary 
Clinton’s opponents, and the number of times the former president came up during the debates, 
Bill Clinton and his role in his wife’s campaign was one of the more consistent and troubling 
constraints plaguing Hillary Clinton’s rhetorical situation.  
In her assessment of Clinton’s campaign and its future implications for women seeking 
the presidency, Kornblut (2009b) argued the biggest problem for women running for the 
presidency is their husbands. She contended, “That was certainly the case for Hillary Clinton, 
who from the outset must have known that having a former two-term president for a husband 
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was bound to bring extra scrutiny” (para. 11-12). Scrutiny certainly did result from Bill Clinton’s 
time on his wife’s campaign, but more devastating were the rhetorical consequences. Bill Clinton 
embarrassed his wife, distracted voters, caused Hillary to distance herself from one of her prime 
sources of experience or caused the public to associate her as a wife rather than as an 
independent woman candidate, and perhaps more demeaning, forced her to, once again, clean up 
after a series of messes that he had caused. The reality was that she was, indeed, shackled to her 
past—a past that included not only a personal life that was difficult for most to understand but 
ventures into politics on a level that few of her predecessors had attempted. And, unfortunately, 
several of these ventures were not successful such as health care. Bill Clinton’s presence on the 
trail dominated national news and once again placed Hillary in her husband’s shadow. Bill 
reminded voters that Hillary was a woman running for the presidency, and of the turbulence 
experienced during the Clinton era (i.e. Kenneth Starr, Monica Lewinsky, Travelgate, 
Whitewatergate, etc.). Most strikingly his presence reminded voters of the past—a past that not 
all Democrats cherished—and distracted from the potential his wife’s candidacy could have 
offered. All of these factors negated the message of freshness and genuine concern for the 
American people that the Obama campaign was able to generate. Thus, when in contrast, Bill 
Clinton as a constraint for Hillary’s rhetoric severely damaged her viability as a candidate for 
president. 
Chapter Summary 
 As is evident from the number of news reports and the rhetorical strategies allotted to the 
difficulties and challenges Clinton faced in her quest for the Democratic nomination in 2008, her 
rhetoric was highly constrained in tangible ways. In identifying connections among her 
responses to these constraints, it is clear that Clinton adopted several similar strategies.  
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 First, Clinton often ignored the constraints she faced in her key speech opportunities. On 
one hand, this was understandable; few candidates, especially female candidates, would spend a 
significant amount of their time to directly convince their audience that they were likable or 
feminine enough to not challenge gender conventions while, at the same time, masculine enough 
for politics. Few candidates would also directly acknowledge how far behind they were 
perceptually because of the strategies enacted by their chief rival as such a move would instantly 
signal weakness. Clinton was similarly unable to acknowledge the problems created by her 
husband’s involvement in the campaign because such a move would have complicated her 
presentation of femininity, or possibly cut her off from a chief source of political muscle while 
trying to raise money and secure voters who remembered Bill fondly. As such, Clinton relegated 
the constraints she faced to the background of her discourse though, all the while, because of the 
news stories surrounding her candidacy, these issues seemed salient for voters and pundits alike. 
 Second, because Clinton rarely attacked the validity or force of these constraints during 
her campaign speeches, despite the prevalence of these issues during the race, they became 
frequent topics during the debate performances, making it difficult for Clinton to respond to 
these issues cogently. The adversarial arena of political debates can, hypothetically, be a solid 
venue for establishing experience and a readiness to lead, but it is not a wise place to establish 
likability, warmth, and a lack of divisiveness as a candidate (as was Clinton’s experience in 
2008). Additionally, the debates were not the best place in which to challenge Obama’s strategies 
or rhetorical force given the potential—realized, in Clinton’s case—for the rhetoric to devolve 
into negative campaign attacks (a move that, as Chapter Three indicates, isolated Clinton from 
her audience). The debates also proved a costly location for addressing Bill Clinton’s 
involvement in her campaign, since it forced Clinton into the double bind of both distancing 
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herself from her husband (a key source of establishing her experience) while she was not fully 
able to mitigate his bad behavior because such a move could have been perceived as unfeminine. 
Thus, Clinton’s debate performances, because of her utter lack of control over her opponents or 
the moderators involved, added weight to the constraints she faced in her rhetorical situation and, 
as such, did not allow Clinton to form a fitting response that would allow her to bypass their 
effect on her candidacy. 
Third, the one constraint Clinton seemed determined to turn in her favor during the 
campaign, the establishment of her experience as sufficient evidence of her leadership abilities, 
was handled effectively in her speeches but was largely diminished in her debate performances. 
As the myriad references in the first section of this chapter indicate, Clinton spent a large amount 
of her rhetorical efforts on establishing herself as able to lead. This was wise, to an extent, as 
much of the scholarship dedicated to women in politics has indicated the need for women to 
prove themselves as effective leaders, often more so than their male adversaries. However, 
Clinton seemed blind to the other constraints she faced in focusing on this specific issue, and 
thus, failed to balance her rhetoric to satisfy all of the constraints she faced. And indeed, when 
aspects of her experience began to deteriorate, especially during the debates later in the 
campaign (i.e. the experience she derived as First Lady), her rhetoric fell flat in allowing her to 
bypass, or handle at all, the constraints she faced. 
 In sum, the constraints Clinton faced in her rhetorical situation as presidential candidate 
overshadowed her abilities to draw positive attention to her campaign, and thus, hindered her 
abilities to successfully address the exigencies and persuade her audience. While Clinton was 
obviously successful to an extent—in capturing millions of votes and convincing many super 
delegates that she would have been the best candidate for the nomination—her rhetoric failed to 
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focus on the central problems she faced on the trail. Whether this was due to a lack of awareness 
or simply ignoring the constraints that persisted during the campaign, it is clear that Clinton 
failed to provide a fitting response given the nature of her rhetorical situation. 
 Now that each of the three elements of Clinton’s rhetorical situation during her bid for 
the Democratic presidential nomination in 2008 have been described and critiqued, the 
conclusions and implications of this study will be presented in Chapter Six. The next chapter will 
also, based on the findings of this study, present the limitations of this investigation as well as 
avenues for future research for scholars interested in Hillary Clinton specifically, and the 
intersection of gender and politics generally. 
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Chapter Six: Critical Conclusions 
In her assessment of rhetoric in general, Campbell (1972) noted, “conflict is a frequent 
and perhaps desirable outcome of persuasive discourse. Good rhetoric must stir up public 
discussion and controversy; it must speak to basic human conflicts if it is to fulfill its function as 
rhetoric” (p. 10). Taking this cue from one of the most lauded female rhetoricians in our field, I 
am compelled to agree, and add that if one goal of Clinton’s rhetoric during her campaign for 
president was to bring controversy and conflict to light in American culture, her campaign 
succeeded. Specifically, Clinton’s candidacy served as a distinct litmus test for understanding the 
highly constrained situation women must face when seeking high elective office. At the 
beginning of this study, I argued that Clinton’s gender played a central role in the construction of 
her campaign rhetoric, and indeed, the analysis has demonstrated that even when Clinton most 
wanted to be treated only as a viable candidate for president, her gender constrained her rhetoric. 
As such, this study of Clinton’s campaign rhetoric, utilizing the lens of Bitzer’s rhetorical 
situation, helps scholars to understand the tangible double binds facing women in politics, and 
the gendered expectations that form the foundation of these double binds. In short, this study 
reminds all of that while our society has made many strides toward gender equality in the public, 
political sphere, we have a long way to go before such equality can truly be realized.  
The review of literature in the first chapter of this study was used to paint an initial 
picture of the rhetorical situation for any woman seeking political or leadership success. This 
literature also provided several questions about what one could expect when applying these 
findings to Clinton’s campaign. First, in addressing how Clinton could both acknowledge while 
also bypass the double binds experienced by political women because of their gender, it is clear 
that Clinton was just as trapped by her gender as any other woman would be, denoting the 
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powerful grasp that gender conventions have on our culture. Second, when posed with the 
question of how Clinton would acknowledge and combat the gendered trait expectations held by 
voters, it is now clear that Clinton used her rhetoric in both her speeches and debate 
performances to stress her possession of both male and female traits, though she stressed male 
traits much more than female traits in an effort to position herself as viable against a large field 
of male candidates. Third, in answering the question of how Clinton would address traditionally 
masculine and feminine issues, the analysis demonstrates that while Clinton did attempt to stress 
both masculine and feminine issues (especially in terms of her chosen exigencies in her 
campaign rhetoric), the rhetorical situation compelled Clinton to address more male than female 
issues, causing Clinton’s candidacy considerable harm because of her previous activities with 
both Iraq and health care reform. Fourth, in addressing the central question of how Clinton could 
convince voters that she, as a woman, could assume the masculine position of president, the 
analysis demonstrates that Clinton largely ignored her gender on the trail, instead choosing to 
position herself as just another candidate for president, with many far-reaching implications. 
Fifth, in answering the question regarding the role media played on the campaign trail, it is clear 
now that media sources hindered her candidacy by consistently creating a rhetorical situation 
tying Clinton to negative aspects of the campaign trail (her ties to her husband Bill Clinton and 
his negative campaign attacks, her Bosnia gaffe and how this diminished her honesty and 
sincerity—two key traits women are supposed to embody, her failures with health care and how 
divisive she had been on this issue—another key problem for women who hope to achieve 
political success, etc.) and also embodying many of the sexist elements demonstrated by past 
studies of media coverage of women politicians (focusing on physical appearance and attire to 
Clinton’s detriment, asking Clinton questions not asked of her male rivals, etc.). Finally, when 
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addressing the manner in which Clinton’s rhetoric served to position herself as a leader, while 
she did employ several positive aspects of both male and female leadership, she also embodied 
many of the negative aspects of leadership ascribed to men.  
The previous paragraph presents several quick answers to the questions posed in Chapter 
One. As such, in order to clarify the conclusions drawn and in order to foster salient implications 
regarding this study, the following pages take a closer look at each question and provide fuller 
justification for the answers provided. After the questions are explored and answered, the 
implications as well as the suggestions for future research and limitations of this study are 
presented.  
Clinton’s Inescapable Double Binds 
 The concept of the double bind has been applied to women in politics for nearly three 
decades now, and it serves as an apt metaphor for Clinton’s rhetorical situation during the 
Democratic primary in 2008. Clinton’s gender required on one hand that she embody masculine 
traits as she sought the most masculine of elective offices in the United States (and perhaps the 
world), yet her gender, on the other hand, also required that she temper her appeals to masculine 
traits, issues, and leadership styles in order to not defy societal conventions regarding appropriate 
femininity. Clinton’s dominant strategy in addressing the double binds experienced by political 
women was, largely, to ignore that they applied to her. Clinton rarely acknowledged the 
historical nature of her candidacy, instead choosing to run as any male candidate for president 
would—stressing her past experiences and qualifications to lead as evidence that she should win 
the nomination. This proved costly to Clinton, in the end, because such a rhetorical strategy 
ignored the reality of her rhetorical situation. 
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 In terms of her audience, Clinton could have used the double binds facing her as a 
woman to bolster her ethos among women voters, a voting bloc she assumed would come to her 
assistance but, in the end, was deeply divided between supporting Clinton and supporting 
Obama. As the analysis in Chapter Three indicates, Clinton’s voting base quickly eroded as her 
opponents cast themselves as clear alternatives to the former First Lady and perceptual 
Washington insider. The theme of the 2008 election was clearly change, and in trying to position 
herself as a capable candidate in general, rather than a capable female candidate specifically, 
Clinton lost the opportunity to position herself as a key ingredient to changing American politics. 
Anita Dunn, a senior Obama campaign staff member, clarified this strategic flaw succinctly: 
“‘They spent 2007 basically trying to credential [Clinton] as qualified when she already 
was…For Hillary, the opportunity in that race was to be a change agent who had the experience 
but could also bring change. And instead they wanted to run her as Margaret Thatcher’” (in 
Kornblut, 2009b, p. 40-41). 
But could Clinton have run her campaign differently? In the comforting light of 
hindsight, an obvious answer could be “yes:” Clinton could have more cogently argued that as a 
woman she represented change, much as Obama did as an African-American. I argue though, 
given the analysis presented in this study, and the conclusions drawn by several other studies 
regarding Clinton’s candidacy, it would have been incredibly difficult, if not impossible, for 
Clinton not to stress her leadership abilities more than her gender (see Carlin & Winfrey, 2009; 
Kenner Muir & Taylor, 2009; Kunin, 2008; Schnoebelen, et al., 2009). Given what we know 
about the predominance of gender stereotypes held by American voters, Clinton had to convince 
her audience that she could win as the best qualified candidate rather than the candidate who 
could bring societal change that voters may not have been ready for. In essence, Obama could do 
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what Clinton could not; as an African-American male, Obama could more easily embody 
societal change because he was not shackled by gender conventions in political contexts. 
 Indeed, Obama seemed able to utilize feminine strategies in his run for the White House 
much more so than Clinton. Kornblut (2009b) summed up this idea clearly: 
 For Obama…As the 2008 campaign progressed, his feminine side seemed to grow. Far  
from proving himself on the shooting range or in military gear, he appeared on daytime 
talk shows and used words like inclusive and sensitivity and empathy. He encouraged his 
campaign to foster ‘consensus,’ a tone reflected by his grassroots Internet operation. He 
deferred to his wife, whom he described as the ‘tougher’ one. Obama was at ease 
discussing breast cancer and relating to his two young girls, whom he brought up on stage 
with surprising regularity. He liked to listen, and to rest a hand on the shoulder of an 
autograph seeker on the rope line—warmly, not in the backslapping style of previous 
male candidates (p. 43-44). 
Ironically, this summary of Obama’s campaign style was reminiscent of the tactics Bill Clinton 
used when he ran for president (he was warm, congenial, and “felt our pain,” etc.). Still, 
Kornblut’s analysis helps to summarize one of the key ideas reflected in this study: Obama was 
able to enjoy gender latitude in running for president because he was a man; Hillary Clinton, 
conversely, enjoyed no such latitude, either because of societal conventions or self-imposed rules 
based on the perception of gender expectations. This awareness caused former Clinton 
administration spokesperson, Dee Dee Myers to quip, “‘I joked during the campaign that if Bill 
Clinton was the first black president, Obama could be the first female president…[Obama] had 
so much more latitude to act like a girl than Hillary. Because he didn’t have to prove himself. He 
didn’t have all that baggage’” (in Kornblut, 2009b, p. 46). What Myers does not add but clearly 
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implied is that Hillary Clinton, as a woman running for president, did have to live up to, or at 
least address, the gendered expectations of voters. Herein lied the double bind for Clinton in 
terms of her audience. 
 Clinton’s double binds also plagued her campaign in terms of the exigencies within her 
rhetorical situation. First, in her choice of rhetorical exigencies to feature as most relevant, Iraq 
and health care, Clinton was backed into a gendered corner from which she could not escape. At 
the start of the campaign, the Iraq war was the dominant issue, and she seized on the opportunity 
to demonstrate her leadership abilities on a masculine issue. However, because of her previous 
vote to authorize the war, Clinton’s attempt to demonstrate masculine leadership was flipped by 
Obama’s strategies in order to demonstrate that Clinton’s leadership decisions were flawed from 
the beginning. She could not escape the perceptual failure of her initial vote to authorize the war, 
yet she had to keep addressing the war (and other Bush administration failures) because it was 
dominant in the minds of voters and she had to prove her aptitude with masculine issues. 
Similarly, Clinton chose universal health care as a key exigence in order to demonstrate not only 
a level of policy expertise (as she was very familiar with the issue), but also to demonstrate the 
feminine qualities of wishing to care for others and being nurturing. However, because her 
experience with health care reform was drawn largely from her time as First Lady and her work 
with Bill Clinton, it again placed her on precarious gendered footing. Her previous initiatives 
failed in 1994, harming the perception that she could lead successfully, but also, in a more 
damaging way, this reminded voters of the past failures of her husband’s administration and 
when, quite frankly, Hillary Clinton was not very popular. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter One, 
several studies that analyzed perceptions of Hillary Clinton during her husband’s first term have 
indicated that during health care reform in Bill Clinton’s first administration, Hillary was viewed 
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as incredibly unfeminine and unlikable (Campbell, 1998; Corrigan, 2000; Dubriwny, 2005; 
Gardetto, 1992; Kelly, 2001). As such, when Hillary Clinton chose to make these two exigencies 
paramount during her campaign, she inadvertently created a rhetorical no-win situation from 
which she could not escape the double binds plaguing her candidacy. 
 Finally, in terms of the constraints Clinton faced in her rhetorical situation on the trail, 
the double binds were similarly real and damaging. Clinton’s reputation as unlikable and lacking 
warmth and openness crippled her ability to succeed. This was not simply because she was 
running against Obama who was seen as incredibly warm, genuine, and authentic (though that 
certainly was a critical factor); rather, it was because Clinton’s perceived personality, as 
demonstrated through media sources and her own rhetoric, defied traditional notions of 
femininity, ‘True Womanhood,’ or ‘Republican Motherhood.’ But Clinton, as a woman running 
for president, had to demonstrate these abilities. Clinton’s rhetoric embodied the idea that she 
had to run as a man, possessing male characteristics, in order to be successful. In demonstrating 
her toughness, strength, and the ability to lead as any man could, Clinton was, at the same time, 
bolstering the claims that she was unfeminine, making her appear too different, too controversial, 
or possibly too revolutionary as a candidate. And while she was able to connect with millions of 
voters who perceived her as warm and authentic, or who simply did not care about these 
qualities, the majority of voters saw Clinton’s reputation as a reason to reject her candidacy, and 
thus, this double bind was also costly.  
 Bill Clinton’s presence on the trail was another key constraint demonstrating the double 
bind Clinton experienced in her run for president. Bill Clinton is an able campaigner, and has 
been shown to be an incredible force in motivating and connecting with voters. On the other 
hand, Bill Clinton reminded voters of all of Clinton’s baggage—baggage that no other candidate 
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had on the trail—and chiefly, of Clinton’s time as First Lady, an ultimately female role. If the 
presidency can be construed as the most masculine of offices, then the role of First Lady can 
arguably be seen as the most feminine of roles, regardless of who occupies the East Wing 
(although Hillary moved her office to the West). Perhaps then, though Hillary Clinton’s rhetoric 
was obviously designed to conjure the impression that she was as capable as any man running for 
office, the presence of Bill Clinton reminded voters of Clinton’s overt femaleness at a time when 
she was trying to defy it rhetorically. This connection has been made before in scholarship 
addressing Hillary’s campaign for president, and thus, further validates the idea that Hillary 
Clinton could not, try as she might, escape the double bind of being a wife and mother who was 
also seeking a dominant place in the public, political sphere (see Kenner Muir & Taylor, 2009; 
Schnoebelen, et al., 2009). Combine this idea with Bill Clinton’s myriad missteps on the trail 
(that were often exacerbated and re-told over and over again by news media outlets, further 
establishing the problematic nature of Hillary Clinton’s rhetorical situation as she sought the 
nomination), his penchant for negative attacks against Obama and the voter uproar that resulted 
from Bill Clinton’s attempts to ‘defend his wife,’ and it becomes clear that Bill Clinton not only 
perceptually hindered his wife’s candidacy, but also helped to constrict her actions in a double 
bind just as sure as any other factor or individual on the trail.  
Clinton’s Presentation of Male and Female Traits 
 Hillary Clinton’s presentation of male traits was far more evident in her campaign 
rhetoric than her presentation of female traits. The analysis suggests that this was strategic, 
though not always wise on her part. If one looks at the list of characteristics for male politicians 
in the review of literature as a set of qualifications for the job of president, it becomes obvious 
why Clinton crafted her rhetoric in the way she did. As a woman running for president, Clinton 
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had to demonstrate for voters that she possessed the qualities that most voters associate with the 
office for which she was running. Indeed, reports released after the campaign ended validated 
this strategic course. Anne Kornblut (2009b), in her analysis of the 2008 presidential campaign, 
reported: 
 In December 2006, right before Clinton made her announcement, [Mark] Penn [Clinton’s  
campaign manager] invoked history in an internal memo that would set the tone for 
[Clinton’s] campaign for the next year. The United States, he argued, held a firmly 
patriarchal view of the presidency. The campaign should not, he warned, succumb to the 
temptation to position Clinton as a maternal leader—should not, in other words, run her 
as too much of a woman (p. 19). 
On one hand, given the vast amount of scholarship espousing the constraints on women 
politicians due to gendered conventions and expectations in our culture, this was somewhat wise 
advice. After all, men are generally seen as possessing the requisite skills and traits we associate 
with effective leaders, and the presidency specifically is seen as a masculine office. Thus, for 
Clinton to achieve elective success, she should have stressed masculine traits and behaviors. 
However, as this study demonstrates, Penn’s views did not adequately account for the unique 
constraints of the specific race in 2008. Instead, they allowed Obama to enjoy much more 
latitude in terms of gender traits and behaviors in which he could engage and they failed to 
address one of the most central questions regarding Hillary Clinton’s candidacy in the minds of 
voters: Can a woman be president? 
Additionally, given the marathon that was the Democratic Primary in 2008, Clinton had 
to demonstrate that she was tough enough to withstand the nomination process and, if she would 
have made it to November, the general election as well. Her reliance on the male traits of 
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toughness and strength dominated her campaign speeches and debate performances as she went 
toe-to-toe against her opponents and convinced voters that a woman could do the job. However, 
Clinton’s predilection for male traits complicated the perception that she was too masculine and 
lacking warmth and likability. This lack of perceptual likeability was key for Clinton; without 
appearing likeable among voters, Clinton was seen as less honest and open, further constraining 
her rhetoric on the trail (Spiker, 2009). Furthermore, in trying to embody a less emotional 
persona, and thus, distancing herself from voters, Clinton presented a stark contrast between 
herself and Barack Obama. He, unlike Clinton, seemingly understood that male presidential 
candidates could more easily embody feminine traits (much like Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton 
had done before him) in order to present a more warm, empathetic, and thus, sincere persona to 
voters. 
 It deserves mentioning that Clinton did not completely avoid female traits in her rhetoric. 
More often than not, as indicated in Chapter Four, when Clinton would embody feminine traits, 
it was to create the impression that she was a motherly protector, attempting to care for and 
nurture others who lacked such protection (i.e. veterans, children, the elderly, those without 
health care, etc.). But it is equally vital to note that when she adopted such a rhetorical stance, 
she did so in a way to separate herself from those who were in need of protection. She was 
embodying maternal rhetoric in a way that allowed her to run as other male politicians have—as 
a vehement protector of the innocent or the invisible, while showing no weakness on her part. 
Had no other constraining factors been present on the trail, this tactic might have worked to her 
benefit. Such a maternal or protecting role of femininity has worked for female politicians in the 
past (i.e. Margaret Thatcher, Ann Richards, etc.). However, given her consistent stressing of 
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male traits over female traits, and the myriad other constraints on the trail, such a use of feminine 
traits failed to bolster Clinton’s support among Democratic voters. 
 In sum, in assessing Clinton’s use of male and female traits on the campaign trail, this 
study of Clinton’s rhetorical situation serves as a reminder that female candidates are far more 
constrained in their choice of image traits to accentuate than male politicians are. By choosing to 
run as more of a male than female candidate, Clinton provided Obama (and others early on) the 
opportunity to embody more feminine traits.  
Clinton’s Use of Masculine and Feminine Issues 
 Though, as is often the case in presidential elections, myriad issues were discussed during 
the Democratic Primary in 2008, it is clear that the three most salient issues were health care 
reform, Iraq, and later in the campaign, the economy. Health care has, in past studies in politics, 
been considered more of a feminine than a masculine issues, given the associations with the issue 
for the more feminine qualities of care and nurturance, though this is arguably just as masculine 
an issue when applied to the legislative arena and concern for budget and legal ramifications are 
applied to reform. Regardless, Clinton used the issue of health care reform to establish both her 
nurturing, more feminine qualities in her campaign rhetoric as well as her experience with the 
issue to demonstrate the sufficiency of her leadership. When she had complete control of her 
rhetoric during her campaign speeches, Clinton used health care reform as a vehicle to correct 
the failed (masculine) leadership of the Bush administration—a remedy to correct the view that 
countless Americans who lacked health care were invisible. Clinton, thus, used this issue to 
demonstrate her femininity, at least to a basic extent. 
 Conversely, the war in Iraq and the economy, both clearly masculine issues, were used by 
Clinton to establish her aptitude for dealing with the masculine demands of the presidency. She 
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never shied away from either of these issues, showcasing them repeatedly in her campaign 
speeches and debate performances, demonstrating for primary voters that she had the ability to 
deal with masculine issues relevant to the nation. Thus, while Clinton’s use of masculine issues 
on the trail did not hinder her campaign rhetoric generally, her specific rhetorical situations, with 
the myriad constraints posed by her votes and actions on these issues, did complicate her 
rhetoric. Her vote to authorize the war in Iraq injured her credibility in posing solutions to 
extricate our forces from the Middle East. Additionally, choosing to focus on health care reform 
and Iraq, even though the economy was beginning a downward slide late in the campaign, 
demonstrated that her rhetoric was seemingly too consistent, lacking the adaptation necessary to 
respond to the dynamic nature of the lengthy primary campaign.  
 Because the above issues, none of which could be construed as plainly feminine, were the 
dominant issues of which Clinton spoke during her campaign, Clinton’s gender constrained her 
rhetoric to her detriment. In assuming women would naturally support her candidacy, Clinton 
apparently felt no inclination to feature women’s issues in her campaign speeches or debate 
performances. She reminded voters of her past initiatives working on behalf of children, 
women’s rights, and education, but failed to focus on any of these issues in any significant way 
in terms of what she would do to improve these areas once elected president. Arguably, because 
of her focus on masculine or ungendered issues during her campaign, Clinton once again failed 
to act in the traditionally successful ways that female politicians have acted in the past, all the 
while neglecting a potentially helpful voting bloc for her candidacy. 
Clinton’s Handling of Voter’s Gendered Expectations and Assumptions 
 In terms of her approach to voters’ gendered expectations and assumptions, it is clear that 
Clinton was consistent in trying to assuage any potential fears among voters that a woman could 
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not handle the job of president. Clinton, throughout her campaign rhetoric, was consistent in 
demonstrating her ability to deal effectively with masculine issues, in presenting masculine traits 
to voters, such as strength and toughness and a reliance on her past successes in politics, and in 
campaigning confidently amongst her male opponents. On the other hand, Clinton arguably erred 
on the side of presenting herself in too masculine a light, neglecting the public perceptions that 
she was too private, lacking warmth, and unlikable. In approaching her campaign rhetoric in this 
way, Clinton was either unaware or simply failed to acknowledge the reality of her rhetorical 
situation, choosing instead to present herself as the best candidate on the trail, regardless of 
gender, and ignoring any opportunities she had to connect with voters in a meaningful, more 
intimate way. 
 A double bind Clinton faced that highlighted this issue was in acting as a presidential 
candidate who was at the same time as a former First Lady. The analysis demonstrates that 
Clinton relied on this time in her life more so than her Senate career to establish her abilities to 
lead on an executive level. In fact, one of the most problematic aspects of Clinton’s rhetorical 
situation, as shown in Chapters Four and Five, were the votes she cast as a Senator to vote for 
military action in Iraq. As such, and possibly to rhetorically connect herself to the presidency, 
she tended to emphasize her time in the White House to establish her leadership abilities. 
Unfortunately, since her title during this time was clearly gender-coded as feminine, and because 
she could not rightly claim direct responsibility for many of her husband’s successes during his 
terms as president, the use of her time as First Lady likely complicated the perception of her 
abilities among her audience members. Beyond the fact that much of the time she was First Lady 
has been characterized as a turbulent time in American politics and particularly troubling for 
Democrats, her use of this experience explicitly tied her to a feminine role—a role in which she 
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seemed rarely comfortable, and one she never seemed to use to her advantage in terms of 
establishing, if nothing else, her femininity (i.e. her Bosnia gaffe, her divisiveness and 
secretiveness when working on health care reform, the number of voters who expressed dismay 
after Clinton stayed married to her husband despite his repeated infidelity, etc.). As such, 
Clinton’s rhetoric espousing her expertise in connection to her time as First Lady was 
particularly troubling in terms of voter perception, and Clinton’s rhetoric on the trail never 
adequately responded to this issue in any meaningful way. 
 Indeed, as the analysis has demonstrated in several places, Clinton blatantly ignored the 
premise that she could not be the president because she was a woman, denying that gender was 
an issue in any way during the campaign. While this may have seemed a worthy strategy for a 
candidate who must appear confident in her campaign aspirations and who should avoid 
appearing to have any major weakness, it neglected the idea that voters do, to some extent at 
least, use gender stereotypes and expectations to guide their voting behaviors. It is not my 
intention to assert that Clinton lost the nomination because of these expectations. However, 
understanding that gender stereotypes form an intangible yet powerful set of tools with which we 
evaluate information in our daily lives, it seems naïve to assume that voters could have 
suspended their stereotypes during a significant political campaign. Thus, while Clinton, given 
the entrapment of the double binds previously articulated, was arguably smart to ignore these 
beliefs among voters in favor of running as the best candidate rather than the best female 
candidate, her rhetoric was clearly lacking in terms of addressing the dominant cultural views of 
American voters. 
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Clinton and News Media: Implicit and Explicit Sexism 
 The analysis in this study indicates that the news media both helped and hindered 
Clinton’s candidacy, and thus, served as a constraining element in Clinton’s rhetorical situation. 
On one hand, early in the campaign, news reports about Clinton’s candidacy helped establish her 
as the front-runner among her Democratic rivals, allowing her to more easily adopt an aura of 
inevitability, expertise, and leadership as she used her own rhetoric to assert the same qualities. 
On the other hand, as the campaign progressed, the media also reminded voters of Clinton’s 
weaknesses, the movement-like force behind Obama’s nomination, and continuously tied Clinton 
to negative attributes, chiefly her vote to authorize the Iraq war and the missteps of Bill Clinton 
on the campaign trail. News reports also, in keeping with findings from previous studies, 
reminded voters of Clinton’s gender, running stories about her emotional breakdown (and 
skepticism about this incident) in New Hampshire, framing analysis of Clinton’s campaign 
around her appearance and sometimes her lack of femininity, and tying her to her familial roles 
of wife and mother. In general, in assessing the news reports from major newspapers used in this 
study, it is clear that the media more often than not was implicit in their sexist approach to 
Clinton’s campaign. 
 Members of the news media were more blatant in their sexism during debate 
performances, when moderators like Tim Russert, Wolf Blitzer, and Brian Williams would ask 
hostile questions of Clinton more so than her male rivals, would interrupt her answers more so 
than her male rivals, and would question her sincerity and integrity. Overall, while I 
acknowledge that these moments were somewhat isolated in terms of the overall campaign, they 
do point to the potential power of news media sources during campaigns. As Bystrom (2003b) 
and Duerst-Lahti (2006) have indicated, media sources remind voters about what to think about 
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and sometimes, how to think about it. Thus, when moderators who represent news media sources 
questioned Clinton about her husband’s involvement in the campaign and about her 
inconsistency in dealing with Iraq, and seemed to favor her chief rival, Barack Obama, their 
behavior could have reinforced perceptions negative to Clinton’s candidacy.  
 The analysis in Chapter Five of this study, particularly Clinton’s treatment by the news 
reporters who served as debate moderators, adds force to Vatz’ (2009) argument about the 
inequality of press coverage of the Democratic primary race in 2008. Vatz claimed, “the favoring 
of Barack Obama in the mainstream media over Hillary Clinton when the Democratic race 
whittled down to two was in fact palpable throughout the primaries” (p. 203). When one 
remembers the overtly hostile lines of questioning from Tim Russert, the interruptions offered by 
many moderators, including Wolf Blitzer and Brian Williams, and the ways in which the print 
reporters would question not only Clinton’s qualifications, but her likability and honesty, the 
problems of which Vatz wrote become clarified. The distinction is strengthened when one 
considers the fact that Obama, even during the most arduous moments on the trail (think here 
about Jeremiah Wright, allegations that Obama represented slumlords as an attorney, or his 
association with William Ayers), the press seemingly failed to hold Obama to the same level of 
accountability they used when dealing with Clinton. Indeed, Kornblut (2009b) reported that 
many felt that during the 2008 Democratic Primary campaign, “Obama had been given a free 
pass and undue historical blessing—in short, that race trumped gender” (p. 72). She goes on to 
note that, as Gloria Steinem pointed out in her infamous New York Times op-ed, if a woman with 
Obama’s qualifications had run for president, she never would have been considered as viable, 
and also pointed out how Clinton’s win in New Hampshire (the first ever presidential primary 
win for a woman) was hardly touted in the press.  
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Granted, the purpose of this study was not to analyze the news media’s treatment of 
Hillary Clinton, nor was it ever alleged to be a comparison of press coverage offered to the 
candidates during their campaigns. However, the press, as Duerst-Lahti (2006) has maintained, is 
the ‘great mentioner’, focusing voters’ attention to certain stories and descriptions that have 
implications for the outcomes of elections. Additionally, as news reporters comprise the pool for 
moderators during campaign debates, the objectives and motives of the news media were a vital 
aspect of this analysis. Considering this idea, and in looking back on the analysis offered in this 
study, news media in various ways greatly constrained Clinton’s rhetorical situation—both the 
nature of the situation, and how she was able to respond to it during her debate performances. 
Clinton’s rhetorical situation, in sum, was highly constrained by news reports about her 
campaign and by news reporter moderators during the debates. For her part, Clinton would 
attempt to counteract any negative effects from news media sources by redirecting answers back 
to more positive issues, or by critiquing moderators for their lack of parity. But these strategies, 
in hindsight, often seemed inept in the face of Clinton’s larger rhetorical situation. 
Hillary Clinton’s Leadership Style 
 Finally, an examination of the style of leadership embodied by Hillary Clinton’s rhetoric 
during her campaign is warranted. After all, any candidate running for president must exhibit 
leadership qualities in order to convince voters that she or he is up to the task of assuming the 
presidency. But given Clinton’s unique position as the first viable female candidate for her major 
party’s nomination for president, this would certainly seem to be a dominant purpose of her 
campaign.  Indeed, while Clinton did exhibit several qualities of effective leadership for both 
male and female leaders, her rhetoric also reflected many of the negative qualities associated 
with male leadership. In general, the analysis in this study demonstrates Clinton’s rejection of 
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feminine leadership; instead, based on the constraints of her specific rhetorical situation, she 
focused on traditionally male leadership factors. 
 As the review of salient leadership research in Chapter One indicated, many women in 
politics choose to either reject a male style of leadership altogether or choose to employ a 
blended, or ‘integrative’ style of leadership embodying both masculine and feminine styles. 
Clinton utilized much more of a masculine style of leadership, stressing her own abilities to get 
things done, her own expertise, and her own skills. Arguably it was the context of running for the 
presidency, combined with her own previous experiences in leadership roles, that compelled 
Clinton to choose such a direction. As Clinton was clearly avoiding running as a woman, it made 
sense for her to embody a masculine style of leadership. 
 Unfortunately, as Clinton attempted to embody masculine leadership qualities, she also 
embodied some of the negative aspects of male leadership. When pressed about her decisions on 
Iraq, she would often blame others (chiefly George W. Bush) for her error. She was hesitant to 
apologize for any decision she had made, and she was quick to claim credit for the successes of 
others (primarily those of her husband’s administration) when she had no clear hand in making 
the policy in question a success. These side effects, as they may be conceived, of adopting the 
masculine style of leadership problematized her image among voters, feeding the belief that her 
ambitions sometimes overpowered her honesty and sincerity, and thus, further isolated her from 
voters and diminished her ability to argue that she was the candidate of change. Thus, while most 
conceptions of leadership carry with them potential negative consequences, it seems unwise, in 
hindsight, for Clinton to have adopted this leadership style as it added to, rather than helped to 
correct, many of the constraints of her rhetorical situation during the campaign. 
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In sum, to answer the over-arching question of whether or not gender actually mattered in 
terms of Clinton’s failure in 2008, it is now clear that it did. Because of the complex and 
dynamic nature of a presidential campaign, it is difficult (if not impossible) to isolate any one 
particular factor as fundamental to the success or failure of a particular candidate. Indeed, based 
on the methodology employed in this study and the subsequent analysis, I cannot establish with 
certainty that voters, super delegates, or pundits actually accepted or rejected Hillary Clinton on 
the basis of her gender alone. However, the goal of this study was never to determine why 
Clinton lost, nor was it to answer such a question with an answer focused solely on Clinton’s 
gender. Based on the vast amount of news reports about the campaign and how these reporters 
discussed Clinton’s gender, the internal information from the Clinton campaign as disseminated 
to authors and reporters regarding gender during the campaign, and the nature of Clinton’s 
rhetoric in her speech and debate performances, in addition to the sheer number of connections 
made between Clinton’s rhetorical situation and the scholars who have studied gender and 
politics previously, gender absolutely mattered for Clinton and for the other participants in her 
rhetorical situation during the campaign. The analysis and subsequent conclusions derived from 
this study demonstrate that gender was a guiding factor, not necessarily in terms of voting 
behavior, but certainly in terms of the formation of Clinton’s rhetorical situation during the 
campaign and with regard to the rhetoric she employed while engage in that situation. Based on 
this answer, as well as the previously articulated conclusions, a discussion of the implications, 
limitations of this study, and future avenues of research will follow. 
Implications / Limitations / Suggestions for Future Research 
 Scholars may well be discussing the implications of Hillary Clinton’s candidacy for years 
to come, as it was incredibly historic in nature. Granted, Hillary Clinton was a unique candidate 
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as the spouse of a former president who achieved notoriety for being the first former First Lady 
to win elective office. Because of that she did begin on a different footing from what any future 
woman candidate for president will likely have. However, that background was in and of itself 
the source of double binds and was wrapped in gender issues. Based on the analysis conducted in 
this study, and the conclusions previously articulated, I want to focus the last section of this 
study on a few key ideas that I feel may resonate. 
 First, I think that Hillary Clinton’s candidacy can serve as an important site of 
information for future female presidential candidates. On one hand, Clinton’s rhetorical situation 
should serve as a beacon of hope to female presidential candidates. Though this study addresses 
many of the faults regarding Clinton’s campaign rhetoric, even the most cynical cannot doubt 
that Hillary Clinton’s campaign was very successful on several fronts. She demonstrated very 
clearly that a woman can raise tens of millions of dollars to fuel a presidential campaign, can win 
primaries and caucuses, and can be construed as a front-runner for a major party’s nomination. It 
is my sincere hope that other women will, one day, follow in Clinton’s footsteps and finally 
break the ‘highest, hardest glass ceiling.’ 
 On the other hand, I also believe that this study demonstrates that Clinton’s candidacy 
should also serve as a cautionary tale for women politicians, at least those seeking the 
presidency. It is clear that the double binds that have been discussed in myriad scholarly studies 
are tangible and can derail even a powerful candidate’s campaign. It is equally clear that gender, 
in terms of how politicians embody theirs and display these qualities to voters, still does matter. 
Hillary Clinton clearly, and explicitly, did not want to realize the reality of this most omnipresent 
facet of her rhetorical situation. Yet it seems obvious now, in hindsight, that voters, reporters, 
and her rivals all knew that being a woman running for president carried with it many challenges. 
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Granted, Hillary Rodham Clinton was certainly a unique female presidential candidate. 
However, because the analysis in this study confirmed many of the conclusions that previous 
scholars have identified in terms of the barriers women face seeking elective office, it would be 
wise for future women presidential candidates to learn from Clinton’s experience. Based on this 
study, I cannot establish that a purely feminine or even a blended masculine and feminine 
approach to the presidency will be sufficient to convince voters of a politician's abilities. But 
what can be established, in Hillary Clinton’s case, at least, is that ignoring gender comes at a 
very high price. Future women who seek the presidency (or other executive-level political 
offices) would be wise to use Clinton’s experiences as evidence that they should not ignore their 
gender, nor the gendered stereotypes and expectations of our culture, if they hope to enjoy 
elective success. 
 This study also indicates that while consistency can be a prized attribute in some 
contexts, Clinton’s consistency cost her in rhetorical terms. The examination of Clinton’s key 
speech and debate performances indicates that she was very consistent with her rhetoric, using 
many of the same phrases and ideas from the beginning of her campaign until the conclusion 
some eighteen months later. The Iraq war and health care, along with her lambasting of the Bush 
administration failures were omnipresent in all aspects of the campaign. Time and time again, 
Clinton stressed her toughness and her strength. She also was consistent in downplaying the 
historic nature of her own candidacy. All of these ideas would seem to feed a positive assessment 
of her campaign. However, it demonstrates something that Bitzer’s rhetorical lens specifically 
brings to the fore: political candidates must be able to adapt to their rhetorical situations because, 
quite clearly in national politics on such an enormously important stage, the rhetorical situation 
is dynamic. Bill Clinton’s missteps and gaffes on the trail, strategic changes in Obama’s 
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campaign, the downturn in the economy, the length of the nomination process for Democrats and 
the short duration for Republicans—all of these factors could not have been predicted from the 
outset of the campaign, and all of them, among many others, needed to be addressed through 
Hillary Clinton’s use of rhetoric. But Clinton remained consistent, using many of the same 
rhetorical strategies throughout the campaign, and thus, her rhetoric seemed disjointed and 
unable to keep up.  
The idea that Clinton was consistent in her rhetoric makes it necessary to address one of 
the limitations of the current study. Though the artifacts chosen for this study spanned both the 
key moments as well as the chronological breadth of the 2008 Democratic primary race, it is 
possible that analysis of the other speeches and/or debate performances on the trail could 
challenge the assertions presented in this analysis. All scholarly endeavors like this one must 
include limitations on the ideas or objects of study to include. Thus, it is possible that the 
conclusions drawn in this study do not match wholly or at all with other artifacts from this 
campaign. As such, this limitation should challenge future scholars to consider the speeches and 
debate performances not included within the scope of this analysis to confirm, deny, or adjust the 
findings of this study. 
Finally, from a methodological point of view, the analysis and conclusions of this study 
should foster future scholarship regarding Hillary Clinton’s communication approaches and the 
study of female politicians in general. The rhetorical critique embodied in this study is certainly a 
valuable approach, addressing not only Hillary Clinton’s discourse itself, but also the conditions 
in which it was presented and how it was received by various segments of her national audience. 
Still, it should be noted that Bitzer’s rhetorical situation as a perspective from which to evaluate 
and critique discourse (like almost all methods for engaging in rhetorical analysis and critique) is 
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a framework that has been hotly contested over the years for Bitzer’s privileging of context over 
actual discourse in establishing the meaning of rhetoric (see Vatz, 1973) and for the lack of 
guidance in terms of establishing that discourse which is rhetorical and that which is not (see 
Larson, 1970). However, the entire enterprise of rhetorical criticism, from the selection of 
artifacts and methods to the formulation of conclusions, while grounded in cogent arguments and 
modes of proof, is inherently subjective. Campbell (1972) argued, “‘good’ criticism is not 
objective and impersonal; it is evaluative. It makes clear and unmistaken judgments about the 
quality, worth, and consequences of the discourse” (p. 21-22). After all, as Campbell has 
asserted, “The purpose of criticism is to help the reader become a more appreciative, insightful 
audience for persuasive discourse” (p. 22). As such, this study represents valuable insights 
regarding Clinton’s candidacy, but it is only one vantage point from which to view this historic 
campaign. Future scholars could easily test the assertions made within this analysis via any 
number of other methodological perspectives (focus groups, survey data, content analysis, etc) in 
order to confirm or deny the findings that I have presented here. Similarly, other philosophical 
vantage points, such as postmodernism, could also be used to critique Clinton’s discourse or the 
role gender played in 2008 as these philosophies have guided countless academic inquiries in the 
past and have, thus, expanded our knowledge fruitfully (Mumby, 1997). It is only by 
approaching historical campaigns such as Hillary Clinton’s from multiple, triangulated points 
that we as a discipline can hope to understand all of the intricate facets of such a complex 
amalgam of factors. 
 Hillary Clinton’s candidacy was an important step forward for our culture in terms of 
recognizing what women can achieve in the public, political sphere. In spite of many obstacles, 
Clinton did put eighteen million cracks in the highest and hardest glass ceiling in a way that no 
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woman had ever come close to achieving before. It is the hope of this scholar that Clinton will 
not be the last woman to stake a swing at that ceiling. And hopefully, with the insights fostered 
by this study and several others that have also investigated the ways in which Clinton’s 
campaign functioned, such a feat will one day be possible and we can finally welcome Madame 
President into the Oval Office of the White House. 
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